Accident Handley Page HP.81 Hermes IVA G-ALDF,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 335544
 

Date:Monday 25 August 1952
Time:01:00
Type:Silhouette image of generic hphm model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Handley Page HP.81 Hermes IVA
Owner/operator:Airwork
Registration: G-ALDF
MSN: HP.81/7
Year of manufacture:1950
Fatalities:Fatalities: 7 / Occupants: 57
Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off
Category:Accident
Location:ca 3 km W off Trapani -   Italy
Phase: En route
Nature:Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport:Blackbushe Airport (BBS/EGLK)
Destination airport:Malta-Luqa Airport (MLA/LMML)
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
Hermes G-ALDF took off from Blackbushe at 19:25 GMT for a flight to Khartoum via Malta. Around 00:25, approaching Sicily, no. 2 and 3 engines problems forced the crew to shut them down and feather both propellers. The only electrical power from the batteries was soon depleted by use of the radio equipment for emergency signals. The remaining two engines also failed, forcing the crew to ditch the aircraft off Port of Trapani.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The probable cause of the accident lay in a failure of one or both of the two inner engines Nos. 2. and 3. The reason for the failure was undetermined.
The contributory causes were; a) State of mind arising from the knowledge of another accident, only a short time before, to an aircraft of the same type, which was proved to have been due to power-plant failure. b) Failure of electrical generators when No. 2 and No. 3 engines stopped. c) Batteries inadequate for ensuring normal flight functions and not even sufficient for satisfactory transmission of distress messages. d) Limited experience of the crew and of the hostesses on this type of aircraft. e) Limited training of the crew. f). Emergency procedures not properly followed, particularly by the hostesses. g) Life rafts either missing or not used. h) Failure of lifebelts.
The Commission was of the opinion that only one of the two inner engines (Nos. 2 and 3) failed of its own accord and that the stoppage and failure of the other one was caused by an error of the flight engineer."

Sources:

ICAO Circular 38-AN/33 (105-109)

Location

Revision history:

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