Narrative:
On arrival from London a monitored automatic ILS approach was made in fog at Milano-Linate Airport, Italy but the captain decided to overshoot because, although the approach lights were seen, the aircraft was not satisfactorily positioned on the centre line. A second monitored automatic approach was then made and the approach lights were seen when the aircraft reached 300 ft. It was on the centre line and the descent was continued. The captain took over the controls at about 250 ft. as the runway lights were seen, continuing the approach by visual reference. The time was some 20 minutes after dawn had broken and landing lights were not used. After the touchdown reverse thrust was immediately applied, followed by braking. Soon after landing the aircraft ran into
an area of much reduced visibility and braking was increased. After a swing to port, which was corrected without difficulty, deceleration was pronounced. When the aircraft came to a standstill it was found that the tyres on the port mainwheels had burst
and were on fire. The fire was extinguished by the aerodrome fire tenders. It was also found that one tyre on the starboard main undercarriage had burst. A deterioration in runway visual range was observed immediately before the touchdown, but too late to pass to the pilot.
Runway mishap
| Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | Friday 2 August 1963 |
| Type: |  de Havilland DH-106 Comet 4B |
| Operator: | British European Airways - BEA |
| Registration: | G-ARJN |
| MSN: | 6459 |
| First flight: | 1961-07-21 (2 years ) |
| Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 7 |
| Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 89 |
| Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 96 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Aircraft fate: | Repaired |
| Location: | Milano-Linate Airport (LIN) ( Italy)
|
| Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
| Nature: | International Scheduled Passenger |
| Departure airport: | London Airport (LHR/EGLL), United Kingdom |
| Milano-Linate Airport (LIN/LIML), Italy |
On arrival from London a monitored automatic ILS approach was made in fog at Milano-Linate Airport, Italy but the captain decided to overshoot because, although the approach lights were seen, the aircraft was not satisfactorily positioned on the centre line. A second monitored automatic approach was then made and the approach lights were seen when the aircraft reached 300 ft. It was on the centre line and the descent was continued. The captain took over the controls at about 250 ft. as the runway lights were seen, continuing the approach by visual reference. The time was some 20 minutes after dawn had broken and landing lights were not used. After the touchdown reverse thrust was immediately applied, followed by braking. Soon after landing the aircraft ran into
an area of much reduced visibility and braking was increased. After a swing to port, which was corrected without difficulty, deceleration was pronounced. When the aircraft came to a standstill it was found that the tyres on the port mainwheels had burst
and were on fire. The fire was extinguished by the aerodrome fire tenders. It was also found that one tyre on the starboard main undercarriage had burst. A deterioration in runway visual range was observed immediately before the touchdown, but too late to pass to the pilot.
Classification:
Runway mishap
Sources:
» Survey of accidents to aircraft in the United Kingdom 1963 / CAAPhotos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from London Airport to Milano-Linate Airport as the crow flies is 974 km (609 miles).
Distance from London Airport to Milano-Linate Airport as the crow flies is 974 km (609 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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