Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | lundi 17 décembre 1973 |
Heure: | 15:43 |
Type/Sous-type: | McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 |
Compagnie: | Iberia |
Immatriculation: | EC-CBN |
Numéro de série: | 46925/87 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1973 |
Heures de vol: | 2016 |
Moteurs: | 3 General Electric CF6-50C |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 14 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 154 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 168 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Perte Totale |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS) ( Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
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Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
Nature: | Transport de Passagers Intern. |
Aéroport de départ: | Madrid-Barajas Airport (MAD/LEMD), Espagne |
Aéroport de destination: | Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS/KBOS), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
Numéro de vol: | IB933 |
Détails:The DC-10 approached Boston runway 33L in bad weather (rain, fog, 1.2 km visibility). The aircraft struck approach lights 500 feet short of the threshold and collided with a dyke. The right main gear was sheared off, the aircraft then skidded and came to a rest 3000 feet from the threshold.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The captain did not recognize, and may have been unable to recognize, an increased rate of descent in time to arrest it before the aircraft struck the approach light piers. The increased rate of descent was induced by an encounter with a low-level wind shear at a critical point in the landing approach where he was transitioning from automatic flight control under instrument flight conditions to manual flight control with visual references. The captain's ability to detect and arrest the increased rate of descent was adversely affected by a lack of information as to the existence of the wind shear and the marginal visual cues available. The minimal DC-10 wheel clearance above the approach lights and the runway threshold afforded by the ILS glide slope made the response time critical and, under the circumstances, produced a situation wherein a pilot's ability to make a safe landing was greatly diminished."
Accident investigation:

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Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 11 months | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-74-14 | Download report: | Final report
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Opérations de secours
NTSB issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 06-SEP-1974 | To: | A-74-77 |
RELOCATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ILS GLIDE SLOPE TRANSMITTER SITES IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAA ORDER 8260.24 TO PROVIDE A LARGER MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR WIDE-BODIED AIRCRAFT DURING CATEGORY I APPROACHES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-SEP-1974 | To: | A-74-78 |
AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, INCREASE DH AND VISIBILITY MINIMUMS FOR THOSE APPROACHES WHERE THE COMBINATION OF THE GLIDE SLOPE TRANSMITTER ANTENNA INSTALLATION AND THE AIRCRAFT GLIDE SLOPE RECEIVER ANTENNA INSTALLATION PROVIDE A NOMINAL WHEEL CLEARANCE OF LESS THAN 20 FEET AT THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD. (Closed--No Longer Applicable) |
Issued: 06-SEP-1974 | To: | A-74-79 |
PENDING THE RELOCATION OF THE GLIDE SLOPE FACILITY TO COMPLY WITH FAA ORDER 8260.24, EXPEDITE THE MODIFICATIONS TO OFFICIAL U.S. INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES SO THAT THEY DISPLAY GLIDE SLOPE RUNWAY THRESHOLD CROSSING HEIGHT FOR ALL APPROACHES HAVING A TCH OF LESS THAN 47 FEET. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-SEP-1974 | To: | A-74-80 |
ISSUE AN ADVISORY CIRCULAR WHICH DESCRIBES THE WIND SHEAR PHENOMENON, HIGHLIGHTS THE NECESSITY FOR PROMPT PILOT RECOGNITION AND PROPER PILOTING TECHNIQUES TO PREVENT SHORT OR LONG LANDINGS, AND EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO BE CONSTANTLY AWARE OF THE AIRCRAFT\'S RATE OF DESCENT, ATTITUDE AND THRUST DURING APPROACHES USING AUTOPILOT/AUTOTHROTTLE SYSTEMS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-SEP-1974 | To: | A-74-81 |
MODIFY INITIAL AND RECURRENT PILOT TRAINING PROGRAMS AND TESTS TO INCLUDE A DEMONSTRATION OF THE APPLICANT\'S KNOWLEDGE OF WIND SHEAR AND ITS EFFECT ON AN AIRCRAFT\'S FLIGHT PROFILE, AND OF PROPER PILOTING TECHNIQUES NECESSARY TO COUNTER SUCH EFFECTS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-SEP-1974 | To: | A-74-82 |
EXPEDITE THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND OPERATIONAL USE OF THE ACOUSTIC DOPPLER WIND MEASURING SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-SEP-1974 | To: | A-74-83 |
DEVELOP AN INTERIM SYSTEM WHEREBY WIND SHEAR INFORMATION DEVELOPED FROM METEOROLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS OR PILOT REPORTS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE PILOTS OF ARRIVING AND DEPARTING AIRCRAFT. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos
accident date:
17-12-1973type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
registration: EC-CBN
accident date:
17-12-1973type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
registration: EC-CBN
accident date:
17-12-1973type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
registration: EC-CBN
accident date:
17-12-1973type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
registration: EC-CBN
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Madrid-Barajas Airport et Boston-Logan International Airport, MA est de 5435 km (3397 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.