Narrative:The aircraft lifted off at a point of 1173 feet-1486 feet down runway 36 and was then seen to begin a steep climb at an angle of 20-45deg. to 300 feet-400 feet height. The plane then turned left and descended nose-down at a flightpath angle of about 45deg. until it struck the ground 1669 feet past the runway end and caught fire.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The failure and inability of the flightcrew to prevent rapid pitchup and stall by exerting sufficient push force on the control wheel. The pitchup was induced by the combination of a mistrimmed horizontal stabilizer and a center of gravity near the aircraft's aft limit. The mistrimmed condition resulted from discrepancies in the aircraft's trim system and the flightcrew's probable preoccupation with making a timely departure. Additionally a, malfunctioning stabilizer trim actuator detracted from the flightcrew's efforts to prevent the stall.
Contributing to the accident were inadequate flightcrew training, inadequate trim warning system check procedures, inadequate maintenance procedures, and ineffective FAA surveillance."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 10 months | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-78-15 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» NTSB-AAR-78-15
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 8 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 04-AUG-1978 | To: | A-78-53 |
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE APPLICABLE TO ALL BEECH 99, 99A, A99, A99A, AND B99 MODEL AIRCRAFT TO REQUIRE AN IMMEDIATE ONE-TIME INSPECTION OF THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIM SYSTEM TO ASCERTAIN THAT ALL COMPONENTS OF THE SYSTEM AND ITS ASSOCIATED POSITION-INDICATING AND -WARNING CIRCUITS ARE OPERATIONAL WITHIN SPECIFIED TOLERANCES. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 04-AUG-1978 | To: | A-78-54 |
REQUIRE AN INSPECTION TO INSURE THAT THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MODE OF THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR ARE CAPABLE OF DEFLECTING THE STABILIZER UNDER SPECIFIED AIRLOADS. THE EXACT INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BY THE BEECH AIRCRAFT COMPANY. THE INSPECTION SHOULD BE MADE AS SOON AS THE BEECH INSTRUCTIONS ARE AVAILABLE AND REPEATED AT 2,000-HOUR INTERVALS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 04-AUG-1978 | To: | A-78-55 |
CHANGE THE MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST TO MAKE THE OUT-OF-TRIM WARNING SYSTEM A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR FLIGHT. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-MAY-1979 | To: | A-79-12 |
ISSUE AND AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH BEECHCRAFT SERVICE INSTRUCTION NOTICE NO. 0956. (Closed - Reconsidered) |
Issued: 01-MAY-1979 | To: | A-79-13 |
EVALUATE THE SAFETY OF REMOVING DOOR SAFETY CHAINS FROM OTHER AIRCRAFT SO EQUIPPED AND USED IN PASSENGER REVENUE OPERATIONS WITH A VIEW TOWARD SIMPLIFIED EXIT OF PASSENGERS AND ENTRY BY CFR PERSONNEL. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 01-MAY-1979 | To: FAA | A-79-14 |
AMEND 14 CFR 135.169 BY INCORPORATING THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF 14 CFR 121.310 (G) (1), (2), AND (3) WITH REGARD TO EXIT CONSPICUITY AND OPERABILITY ON AIR TAXI AIRCRAFT WITH A CAPACITY OF 10 OR MORE PASSENGERS. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 01-MAY-1979 | To: FAA | A-79-15 |
AMEND 14 CFR 135 APPENDIX A (PARAGRAPH 32) BY INCORPORATING THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF 14 CFR 25.811 (F) (1), (2), (3) WITH REGARD TO EXIT CONSPICUITY AND OPERABILITY. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 19-DEC-1979 | To: FAA | A-79-93 |
REQUIRE THAT THE BEECH 99 AND BEECH 100 FLIGHT MANUALS INCLUDE A CHECKLIST PROCEDURE THAT REQUIRES THE CREW TO VERIFY THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE STABILIZER OUT-OF-TRIM WARNING SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Richland Airport, WA to Seattle/Tacoma International Airport, WA as the crow flies is 260 km (162 miles).
Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.