Estado:	Final
Fecha:	30 MAY 1979
Hora:	20:55 EDT
Tipo:	de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter 200
Operador:	Downeast Airlines
Registración:	N68DE
Numéro de série:	229
Año de Construcción:	1969
Horas Totales de la Célula:	21050
Motores:	2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-20
Tripulación:	Fatalidades: 2 / Ocupantes: 2
Pasajeros:	Fatalidades: 15 / Ocupantes: 16
Total:	Fatalidades: 17 / Ocupantes: 18
Daños en la Aeronave:	Anulado
Consecuencias:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Ubicación:	Rockland, ME (Estados Unidos de América)
Fase:	Aproximación (APR)
Naturaleza:	Vuelo Doméstico Programado
Aeropuerto de Salida:	Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS/KBOS), Estados Unidos de América
Aeropuerto de Llegada:	Rockland-Knox County Regional Airport, ME (RKD), Estados Unidos de América
Número de Vuelo:	46

Descripción:
Flight 46 departed Boston with a 65-minute delay due to adverse weather encountered on an earlier flight leg that day. Around 20:30 the crew requested weather information for Rockland and 3 alternate airports. Weather at Rockland was indefinite ceiling, 300 feet, sky obscured, visibility 3/4 mile in fog; wind light and variable - conditions deteriorating. Navy Brunswick Approach Control then cleared the flight to descend to 3000 feet at captain's discretion. At 20:42 the flight was cleared to cruise at 3000 feet for a Richmond runway 03 approach. Last radio transmission was when the crew reported inbound from the Sprucehead NDB. The Twin Otter struck trees 80 feet above the ground with its left wing and continued striking trees before coming to rest 1,2 miles SSW of the runway 03 threshold, 340 feet from initial impact. The aircraft fuselage came to rest on its left side with the forward 16 feet-section of the fuselage crushed.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The failure of the flight crew to arrest the aircraft's descent at the minimum descent altitude for the non-precision approach, without the runway environment in sight, for unknown reasons.
Although the Safety Board was unable to determine conclusively the reason(s) for the flight crew's deviation from standard instrument procedures, it is believed that inordinate management pressures, the first officer's marginal instrument proficiency, the captain's inadequate supervision of the flight, inadequate crew training and procedures, and the captain's chronic fatigue were all factors in the accident."

Fuentes:
» ICAO Circular 173-AN/109 (1-30)
» NTSB Safety Recommendations A-80-42/43
» NTSB-AAR-80-5