Estado: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Fecha: | lunes 22 diciembre 1980 |
Hora: | 23:12 UTC |
Tipo: | Lockheed L-1011 TriStar 200 |
Operador: | Saudi Arabian Airlines |
Registración: | HZ-AHJ |
Numéro de série: | 1161 |
Año de Construcción: | |
Tripulación: | Fatalidades: 0 / Ocupantes: 20 |
Pasajeros: | Fatalidades: 2 / Ocupantes: 271 |
Total: | Fatalidades: 2 / Ocupantes: 291 |
Daños en la Aeronave: | Considerable |
Consecuencias: | Repaired |
Ubicación: | sobre Qatar ( Qatar)
|
Fase: | En ruta (ENR) |
Naturaleza: | Vuelo Internacional Programado |
Aeropuerto de Salida: | Dhahran International Airport (DHA/OEDR), Arabia Saudita |
Aeropuerto de Llegada: | Karachi International Airport (KHI/OPKC), Pakistán |
Número de Vuelo: | 162 |
Descripción:Flight SV162 experienced an explosive decompression of the cabin while climbing through 29.000 feet over international waters near the State of Qatar. The aircraft had departed Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and was enroute to Karachi, Pakistan. An emergency descent was initiated and a successful landing was made at Doha International Airport in Qatar. Two passengers were killed when they were ejected from the aircraft through a hole in the cabin floor which had resulted from the forces of explosive decompression.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The Presidency of Civil Aviation determines that the probable cause of this accident was an in-flight, fatigue failure of a main landing gear inboard wheel flange resulting in the rupture of the aircraft's pressure hull and explosive decompression. The failure of the flange,was the result of the failure of the B.F. Goodrich Company and the Lockheed Aircraft Company to properly assess the safety hazard associated with the type of wheels installed on aircraft HZ-AHJ. Contributing to the accident was the lapse of effective quality control procedures by the B.F. Goodrich Company and the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration to provide adequate surveillance of the manufacturer."
Fuentes:
» ICAO Circular 178-AN/111(151-170)
» NTSB Safety Recommendations A-81-1/5
Subsiguiente / acciones de seguridad
NTSB issued 5 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 06-JAN-1981 | To: FAA | A-81-1 |
ISSUE AN IMMEDIATE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE THAT OPERATORS OF L-1011 AIRCRAFT AT THE NEXT TIRE CHANGE OR WITHIN 20 CYCLES, WHICHEVER IS SOONER, MEASURE THE FLANGE THICKNESS ON ALL P/N 3-1365 WHEELS WITH SERIAL NUMBER UP TO 1404 WHICH HAVE BEEN USED ON AIRCRAFT WITH A GROSS TAKEOFF WEIGHT OF 430,000 POUNDS OR MORE, AND INCLUDE IN THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE A REQUIREMENT TO REMOVE ALL WHEELS WITH OUTER FLANGE THICKNESS OF LESS THAN 0.490 INCH AND INSTALLED ON AIRCRAFT OPERATING AT GROSS TAKEOFF WEIGHTS OF 430,000 POUNDS OR MORE. FURTHER REQUIREMENTS SHOULD INCLUDE AT EACH WHEEL DISASSEMBLE OF ALL P/N 3-1365 AND P/N 3-1311 WHEELS, AN INSPECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE BEEN EVALUATED BY THE FAA AND DEMONSTRATED BY INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN DETECTING IN-SERVICE CRACKING PRIOR TO FAILURE. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 06-JAN-1981 | To: FAA | A-81-2 |
INITIATE AN IMMEDIATE SURVEY OF B.F. GOODRICH MANUFACTURING FACILITIES BY A QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS REVIEW TEAM OR EQUIVALENT TO ASSURE THE MANUFACTURER\'S COMPLIANCE WITH CURRENT REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS GOVERNING PRODUCTION CERTIFICATION AND SPECIFICALLY THE ISSUANCE AND APPROVAL OF SERVICE BULLETINS, INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING OF SERVICE DIFFICULTIES, MAINTENANCE OF APPROPRIATE PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION RECORDS, AND COORDINATION OF SERVICE DIFFICULTIES WITH PRIMARY AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-JAN-1981 | To: FAA | A-81-3 |
REQUIRE TIRE, WHEEL, AND AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERS TO PUBLISH AND DISSEMINATE TO ALL OPERATORS ALL ENGINEERING DATA NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT ON FATIGUE LIFE OF AIRCRAFT WHEELS BY INCREASING OR DECREASING TIRE INFLATION PRESSURES. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-JAN-1981 | To: FAA | A-81-4 |
ESTABLISH A PROGRAM WITH AIR CARRIERS, WHEEL, AND AIRFRAME MANUFACTURERS TO DETERMINE EFFECTIVE NONDESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION TECHNIQUES FOR THE VARIETY OF AIRCRAFT AND WHEEL COMBINATIONS IN AIR CARRIER SERVICE AND REQUIRE OPERATORS TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE INSPECTION PROGRAMS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 06-JAN-1981 | To: FAA | A-81-5 |
EXPEDITIOUSLY DISSEMINATE ANY REQUIRED WHEEL INSPECTION AND SERVICE PROGRAMS TO ALL FOREIGN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES WITH REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES OVER OPERATORS OF U.S.-MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Fotos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Dhahran International Airport to Karachi International Airport as the crow flies is 1701 km (1063 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.