Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Datum: | Mittwoch 17 März 1982 |
Zeit: | 08:10 |
Flugzeugtyp: |  Airbus A300B4-203 |
Fluggesellschaft: | Air France |
Kennzeichen: | F-BVGK |
Werknummer: | 070 |
Baujahr: | 1979-02-22 (3 years ) |
Betriebsstunden: | 9053 |
Anzahl Zyklen der Zelle: | 3376 |
Triebwerk: | 2 General Electric CF6-50C2 |
Besatzung: | Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 13 |
Fluggäste: | Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 111 |
Gesamt: | Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 124 |
Sachschaden: | Zerstört |
Konsequenzen: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Unfallort: | Sana'a International Airport (SAH) ( Yemen)
|
Flugphase: | Start (TOF) |
Betriebsart: | Internationaler Linienflug |
Flug von: | Sana'a International Airport (SAH/ODSN), Yemen |
Flug nach: | Cairo International Airport (CAI/HECA), Ägypten |
Flugnummer: | AF125 |
Unfallbericht:While travelling at 95 knots during takeoff from San'a International Airport, an explosion was felt, followed by shimmy and vibrations. The crew, thinking a tyre had exploded, aborted the takeoff. The explosion was in fact caused by an uncontained failure of the stage 1 HP compressor disk of the no. 2 engine. Debris punctured the fuel tank, causing a fire on the right hand side of the aircraft. The propagation of a low cycle fatigue crack on one of the embossments of the disk rim caused the disk fracture.
Probable Cause:
CAUSES: "The accident directly resulted from the uncontained explosion of a first stage high pressure turbine disk of the right hand engine. The propagation of a low cycle fatigue crack on one of the embossments of the disk rim was at the origin of the disk fracture.
This cracks, which existed before, had not been detected during the inspection conducted in the operator's workshops, according to the method defined by the manufacturer and in accordance with the requirements of the airworthiness authority. The investigations showed that it was necessary, not only to reduce the intervals between the inspections of these disks and conduct two independent sequential inspections, but also to modify the design and make sure they were progressively replaced by the new type. It seems obvious that the limit life validation methods used at the time of the accident, were still insufficient, as far as the probability of non-detection of cracks was concerned."
Sicherheitsempfehlungen
CAMA Yemen issued 4 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 01-JUL-1984 | To: | F-BVGK (1) |
It is recommended that airworthiness regulations for turbo engines be modified in such a way that effective endurance tests be mandatory instead of mathematical models only. |
Issued: 01-JUL-1984 | To: | F-BVGK (2) |
It is recommended that transport category aircraft airworthiness regulations be modified in such a way that wheel wells be considered as "fire sensitive" areas. |
Issued: 01-JUL-1984 | To: | F-BVGK (3) |
It is recommended that all access doors (mechanicaly assisted or not) be equipped with two structural handles, one on each side of the door frame. |
Issued: 01-JUL-1984 | To: | F-BVGK (4) |
It is recommended that chute design and manufacture be revised to avoid any defectuous inflation resulting of an always possible poor folding and, in particular, that the inflation pipes routing includes the necessary mandatory "way points". |
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Fotos

accident date:
17-03-1982type: Airbus A300B4-203
registration: F-BVGK
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Sana'a International Airport to Cairo International Airport as the crow flies is 2077 km (1298 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.