Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | mercredi 17 mars 1982 |
Heure: | 08:10 |
Type/Sous-type: |  Airbus A300B4-203 |
Compagnie: | Air France |
Immatriculation: | F-BVGK |
Numéro de série: | 070 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1979-02-22 (3 years ) |
Heures de vol: | 9053 |
Cycles: | 3376 |
Moteurs: | 2 General Electric CF6-50C2 |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 13 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 111 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 124 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Détruit |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Sana'a International Airport (SAH) ( Yémen)
|
Élévation des lieux de l'accident: | 2199 m (7215 feet) amsl |
Phase de vol: | Au décollage (TOF) |
Nature: | Transport de Passagers Intern. |
Aéroport de départ: | Sana'a International Airport (SAH/ODSN), Yémen |
Aéroport de destination: | Cairo International Airport (CAI/HECA), Egypte |
Numéro de vol: | AF125 |
Détails:While travelling at 95 knots during takeoff from San'a International Airport, an explosion was felt, followed by shimmy and vibrations. The crew, thinking a tyre had exploded, aborted the takeoff. The explosion was in fact caused by an uncontained failure of the stage 1 HP compressor disk of the no. 2 engine. Debris punctured the fuel tank, causing a fire on the right hand side of the aircraft. The propagation of a low cycle fatigue crack on one of the embossments of the disk rim caused the disk fracture.
Probable Cause:
CAUSES: "The accident directly resulted from the uncontained explosion of a first stage high pressure turbine disk of the right hand engine. The propagation of a low cycle fatigue crack on one of the embossments of the disk rim was at the origin of the disk fracture.
This cracks, which existed before, had not been detected during the inspection conducted in the operator's workshops, according to the method defined by the manufacturer and in accordance with the requirements of the airworthiness authority. The investigations showed that it was necessary, not only to reduce the intervals between the inspections of these disks and conduct two independent sequential inspections, but also to modify the design and make sure they were progressively replaced by the new type. It seems obvious that the limit life validation methods used at the time of the accident, were still insufficient, as far as the probability of non-detection of cracks was concerned."
Opérations de secours
CAMA Yemen issued 4 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 01-JUL-1984 | To: | F-BVGK (1) |
It is recommended that airworthiness regulations for turbo engines be modified in such a way that effective endurance tests be mandatory instead of mathematical models only. |
Issued: 01-JUL-1984 | To: | F-BVGK (2) |
It is recommended that transport category aircraft airworthiness regulations be modified in such a way that wheel wells be considered as "fire sensitive" areas. |
Issued: 01-JUL-1984 | To: | F-BVGK (3) |
It is recommended that all access doors (mechanicaly assisted or not) be equipped with two structural handles, one on each side of the door frame. |
Issued: 01-JUL-1984 | To: | F-BVGK (4) |
It is recommended that chute design and manufacture be revised to avoid any defectuous inflation resulting of an always possible poor folding and, in particular, that the inflation pipes routing includes the necessary mandatory "way points". |
Show all...
Photos

accident date:
17-03-1982type: Airbus A300B4-203
registration: F-BVGK
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Sana'a International Airport et Cairo International Airport est de 2077 km (1298 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.