Crash-aerien 06 DEC 1984 d'un Embraer 110P1 Bandeirante N96PB - Jacksonville International Airport, FL (JAX)

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Accident

Last updated: 24 May 2013

Statuts:	Enquête Officielle
Date:	06 DEC 1984
Heure:	18:14 EST
Type/Sous-type:	Embraer 110P1 Bandeirante
Compagnie:	Provincetown-Boston Airline - PBA
Immatriculation:	N96PB
Numéro de série:	110365
Année de Fabrication:	1981
Heures de vol:	5662
Cycles:	7858
Moteurs:	2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-34
Equipage:	victimes: 2 / à bord: 2
Passagers:	victimes: 11 / à bord: 11
Total:	victimes: 13 / à bord: 13
Dégats de l'appareil:	Détruit
Conséquences:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Lieu de l'accident:	2,4 km (1.5 milles) NW of Jacksonville International Airport, FL (JAX) (Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
Phase de vol:	En montée initiale (ICL)
Nature:	Transport de Passagers Nat.
Aéroport de départ:	Jacksonville International Airport, FL (JAX/KJAX), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Aéroport de destination:	Tampa International Airport, FL (TPA/KTPA), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Numéro de vol:	1039

Détails:
At 18:12, flight 1039 was cleared for takeoff from runway 31. At 18:13, while over the departure end of the runway and climbing through 600 feet, the crew acknowledged a frequency change. Thirty seconds later, the airplane was seen in a steep a descent near the extended centerline of the runway.
The Bandeirante struck the ground 7,800 feet beyond the departure end of runway 31 and 85 feet to the right of the extended runway centerline in an inverted nose down attitilde, after which it caught fire and burned. Before ground impact, the horizontal stabilizer, including bulkhead No. 36, had separated from the fuselage. Both elevators and elevator tips, the tail cone assembly, and the aft portion of the ventral fin also had separeted in flight.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "A malfunction of either the elevator control system or elevator trim system, which resulted in an airplane pitch control problem. The reaction of the flight crew to correct the pitch control problem overstressed the left elevator control rod, which resulted in asymmetrical elevator deflection and overstress failure of the horizontal stabilizer attachment structure. The Safety Board was not able to determine the precise problem with the pitch control system."

Sources:
» NTSB/AAR-86/04

Official accident investigation report

investigating agency:	National Transport Safety Bureau (NTSB) - USA
report status:	Final
report number:	NTSB/AAR-86-04
report released:	24-JUN-1986
duration of investigation:	565 days (1 year 6.7 months)
download report:	Provincetown-Boston Airlines Flight 1039, Embraer Bandeirante, EMB-110P1, N96PB, Jacksonville, Florida, December 6, 1984. (NTSB/AAR-86-04)

Sample newspaper article from Newspaperarchive.com

Opérations de secours

NTSB issued 4 Safety Recommendations

Issued: 08-JAN-1985	To: FAA	A-85-001
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) TO REQUIRE, THAT BEFORE FURTHER COMMERCIAL OPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ATTACHMENT OF EMB-110P1 AND -110P2 MODEL AIRPLANES NOT PREVIOUSLY MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AD 83-14-09, AMENDMENT 39-4527, PARAGRAPH (D) OR (E), BE INSPECTED USING AN IMPROVED INSPECTION PROCEDURE TO ENHANCE DETECTION OF LOOSE OR SHEARED RIVETS, PARTICULARLY WHERE BULKHEAD 33 TRANSMITS THE LOADS FROM THE STABLIZIER FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO THE FUSELAGE MONOCOQUE STRUCTURE. THE INSPECTION PROCEDURE SHOULD REQUIRE REMOVAL OF CONTROLS AS NEEDED FOR ACCESS TO RIVETED JOINTS AND APPLICATION OF EXTERNAL LOADS TO DETECT RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN STRUCTURAL MEMBERS. THE AD SHOULD REQUIRE THAT DEFICIENCIES DETECTED DURING INSPECTION BE REPORTED TO THE FAA AND THAT THEY BE CORRECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN APPROVED PROCEDURE BEFORE FURTHER FLIGHT. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 08-JAN-1985	To: FAA	A-85-002
REVISE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) 83-14-09 TO REQUIRE WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD THAT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ATTACHMENT STRUCTURE OF EMB-110P1 AND -110P2 MODEL AIRPLANES BE MODIFIED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN AMENDMENT 39-452, PARAGRAPH (D) OR (E), WHICH REQUIRES THAT THE REPAIR OF ANY CRACKS IN THE WEB OF BULKHEAD 33 AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL "C" CHANNELS WITH REDESIGNED CHANNELS AND MODIFIED RIVET PATTERNS. REVIEW THE CRACK REPAIR PROCEDURES OF THE AD FOR ADEQUACY, AND REQUIRE MODIFICATION OF THE PROCEDURES TO ELIMINATE "BUCKING" OF RIVETS AT LOCATIONS DIFFICULT TO ACCES AND OTHER PROCEDURES LIKELY TO DAMAGE EXISTING STRUCTURE. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 08-JAN-1985	To: FAA	A-85-003
CONDUCT A DIRECTED SAFETY INVESTIGATION OF EMB-110P1 AND -110P2 MODEL AIRPLANES THAT HAVE BEEN MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AD 83-14-09, (AMENDMENT 39-4527, PARAGRAPH (D) OR (E)), TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY STRUCTURAL DAMAGE HAS BEEN INFLICTED IN THE AREA WHERE THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ATTACHES TO BULKHEAD 33 AND TAKE THE CORRECTIVE ACTION INDICATED BY THE RESULTS OF THE DIRECTED SAFETY INVESTIGATION. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 08-JAN-1985	To: FAA	A-85-004
NOTIFY APPROPRIATE FOREIGN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES AND/OR FOREIGN OPERATORS OF EMB-110P1 AND -110P2 MODEL AIRPLANES OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PROVINCETOWN-BOSTON AIRLINES ACCIDENT OF DECEMBER 6, 1984, AND OF THE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED TO U.S. OPERATORS. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)

Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations

Photos

photo of Embraer 110P1 Bandeirante N96PB

Plan

Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Jacksonville International Airport, FL et Tampa International Airport, FL est de 290 km (181 miles).

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