| Statuts: | Enquête Officielle |
| Date: | 19 OCT 1986 |
| Heure: | 21:21 |
| Type/Sous-type: | Tupolev 134A-3 |
| Compagnie: | República de Moçambique |
| Immatriculation: | C9-CAA |
| Numéro de série: | 63457 |
| Année de Fabrication: | 1980-10-14 (6 years ) |
| Heures de vol: | 1105 |
| Moteurs: | 2 Soloviev D-30-III |
| Equipage: | victimes: 8 / à bord: 9 |
| Passagers: | victimes: 26 / à bord: 35 |
| Total: | victimes: 34 / à bord: 44 |
| Dégats de l'appareil: | Perte Totale |
| Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Lieu de l'accident: | près de Komatipoort (Afrique du Sud)
 |
| Phase de vol: | En approche (APR) |
| Nature: | Charter International |
| Aéroport de départ: | Mbala Airport (MMQ), Zambie |
| Aéroport de destination: | Maputo International Airport (MPM/FQMA), Mozambique |
Détails:The Tupolev 134 departed Mbala (MMQ), Zambia, for a flight back to Maputo (MPM). The flight carried Mozambique president Samora Machel who had attended a meeting of African leaders in Zambia. While approaching Maputo, an inadvertent selection of the MATSAPA VOR frequency caused the crew to execute a premature 37-degrees turn. Although the pilot queried the turn, no effort was made to verify it by using the available navigational aids. The aircraft descended below the 3000 feet limit in spite of not having visual contact with Maputo. The crew erroneously assumed a power failure at Maputo.
A 32-second GPWS warning was ignored and the aircraft collided with the ground at 2187 feet, bounced and crashed into an uphill slope. The aircraft broke up, slid across the South African/Swaziland border and caught fire. Machel, along with 33 other occupants did not survive the accident.
CAUSE: "The cause of the accident was that the flight crew failed to follow procedural requirements for an instrument let-down approach , but continued to descend under visual flight rules in darkness and some cloud, i.e. without having visual contact with the ground, below minimum safe altitude, and in addition the ignored GPWS alarm."
Sources:
» Flight International 22.11.1986 (14-15)
» Flight International 1.11.1986 (10)
» Report of the Board of Inquiry into the accident to Tupolev 134A-3 aircraft C9-CAA on 19th October 1986
Opérations de secours
BoI SA issued 5 Safety Recommendations
| Issued: -- | To: | C9-CAA (1) |
| Aviation Authorities should draw the attention of operating crews and air traffic control personnel to the need for compliance with and the correct use of the RTF terminology interpretation, as provided in Annex 10, Chapter 5. |
| Issued: -- | To: | C9-CAA (2) |
| Attention should further be given to recurrent training in the use of correct air traffic control terminology, particularly in cases where a language foreign to that of the flight personnel or air traffic controller is used. |
| Issued: -- | To: | C9-CAA (3) |
| The monitoring of crew compliance with prescribed operating procedures should be reviewed. |
| Issued: -- | To: | C9-CAA (4) |
| The period over which CVR installations should keep a running record should be increased from 30 minutes to at least 1 hour. |
| Issued: -- | To: | C9-CAA (5) |
| Attention is drawn to the importance of maintaining navigational aids in accordance with the standards of integrity laid down by ICAO. |
Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations
Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Mbala Airport et Maputo International Airport est de 1894 km (1183 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tels qui sont connus à ce jour.