Vliegtuigongeval op 15 NOV 1987 met Douglas DC-9-14 N626TX - Denver-Stapleton International Airport, CO (DEN)

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Accident

Last updated: 19 June 2013

Status:	Definitief
Datum:	15 NOV 1987
Tijd:	14:15
Type:	Douglas DC-9-14
Luchtvaartmaatschappij:	Continental Air Lines
Registratie:	N626TX
Constructienummer:	45726/36
Bouwjaar:	1966
Aantal vlieguren:	52424
Aantal vluchten:	54759
Motoren:	2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7B
Bemanning:	slachtoffers: 3 / inzittenden: 5
Passagiers:	slachtoffers: 25 / inzittenden: 77
Totaal:	slachtoffers: 28 / inzittenden: 82
Schade:	Vernield
Gevolgen:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Plaats:	Denver-Stapleton International Airport, CO (DEN) (Verenigde Staten)
Fase:	Start (TOF)
Soort vlucht:	Binnenlandse lijnvlucht
Vliegveld van vertrek:	Denver-Stapleton International Airport, CO (DEN/KDEN), Verenigde Staten
Vliegveld van aankomst:	Boise Air Terminal (Gowen Field), ID (BOI/KBOI), Verenigde Staten
Vluchtnummer:	1713

Beschrijving:
Flight 1713 was cleared for a runway 35L take-off, 27 minutes after de-icing. On take-off, the DC-9 over rotated. The aircraft descended back and the left wing struck the ground, causing it to separate from the fuselage. The left side of the cockpit and forward fuselage struck the ground next and the aircraft continued to skid inverted.
Both pilots were relatively inexperienced in DC-9 operations (captain: 166 hours on type, of which 33 as captain; and first officer: 36 hours on type).

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The captain's failure to have the airplane de-iced a second time after delay before take-off that led to upper wing surface contamination and a loss of control during rapid take-off rotation by the first officer.
Contributing was the absence of regulatory or management controls governing operations by newly qualified flight crew members and the confusion that existed between the flight crew and air traffic controllers that led to the delay in departure."

Bronnen:
» AOPA Pilot Jan. 1989, p. 88-89
» ICAO Adrep 6/89 (#31)
» NTSB/AAR-88/09

Official accident investigation report

investigating agency:	National Transport Safety Bureau (NTSB) - USA
report status:	Final
report number:	NTSB/AAR-88-09
report released:	27-SEP-1988
duration of investigation:	317 days (10.6 months)
download report:	Continental Airlines, Inc., Flight 1713 McDonnell Douglas DC-9-14, N626TX, Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado November 15, 1987. (NTSB/AAR-88-09)

Sample newspaper article from Newspaperarchive.com

Veiligheidsmaatregelen

NTSB issued 13 Safety Recommendations

Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-134
UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT GUIDELINES FOR DETECTING UPPER WING SURFACE ICING CAN BE INCORPORATED INTO THE AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL, ISSUE AN AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS BULLETIN DIRECTING ALL PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS TO REQUIRE THAT ALL MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-10 SERIES OPERATORS ANTI-ICE AIRPLANES WITH MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE STRENGTH GLYCOL SOLUTION WHEN ICING CONDITIONS EXIST. (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-135
EXPEDITE THE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE USE OF EUROPEAN TYPES I AND II DEICING AND ANTI-ICING FLUIDS. IF EUROPEAN METHODOLOGY IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN CURRENT U.S. METHODOLOGY, INCORPORATE THEIR GUIDELINES INTO THE NEXT VERSION OF ADVISORY CIRCULAR 200-17. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-136
Require all DC-9-10 series operators to establish detailed procedures for detecting upper wing ice before takeoff. (Superseded by A-91-124) (Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-137
ESTABLISH MINIMUM EXPERIENCE LEVELS FOR EACH PILOT IN-COMMAND AND SECOND-IN-COMMAND PILOT, AND REQUIRE THE USE OF SUCH CRITERIA TO PROHIBIT THE PAIRING ON THE SAME FLIGHT OF PILOTS WHO HAVE LESS THAN THE MINIMUM EXPERIENCE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-138
AMEND 14 CFR 121.434 TO REQUIRE THAT A SECOND-IN COMMAND PILOT COMPLETE INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE FOR THAT POSITION WHILE ACTUALLY PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF A SECOND IN-COMMAND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A CHECK PILOT. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-139
REVIEW AND REVISE, AS NECESSARY, THE ENGINEER PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR APPROPRIATE AIRPORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REDUCED AIRPORT CAPACITIES THAT OCCUR WHEN DEICING OPERATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-140
INITIATE A RESEARCH PROJECT TO ACQUIRE DATA FROM DEDICATED SENSORS TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSIDERATION, IF ANY, SHOULD BE GIVEN TO WAKE VORTICES IN A PARALLEL OFFSET RUNWAY SITUATION. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-141
Require commercial operators to conduct substantive background checks of pilot applicants which include verification of personal flight records and examination of training, performance, and disciplinary records of previous employers and federal aviation administration safety and enforcement records. (Superseded by A-90-141) (Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: FAA	A-88-142
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE MORE COMPLETE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS ON THE EXTERIOR SIDE OF THE TAILCONE EXIT HATCH OF DC-9 AIRPLANES. THE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH ACTIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO UNLOCK AND OPEN THE HATCH (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION	A-88-143
ADVISE THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON AIRPLANE RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF THE AIRPLANE ACCIDENT AT DENVER, COLORADO, ON NOVEMBER 15, 1987, WITH A VIEW TOWARD DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON EMERGENCY ACCESS AREAS FOR AIRPLANES THAT MAY REST IN UNUSUAL ATTITUDES AND THE ADVISABILITY AND SAFETY OF DEFUELING WHILE PASSENGERS ARE TRAPPED IN AND UNDER THE FUSELAGE. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES AND THE AIRPORT OPERATORS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL, INC.	A-88-144
ADVISE MEMBERS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE AIRPLANE ACCIDENT AT DENVER, COLORADO, ON NOVEMBER 15, 1987, AND URGE THEM TO CORRECT SUCH PROBLEMS AS CRASH/FIRE/RESCUE (CFR) PERSONNEL TRAINING AND INADEQUATE CFR EQUIPMENT. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.	A-88-145
IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES TO CONDUCT SUBSTANTIVE BACKGROUND CHECKS OF PILOT APPLICANTS WHICH INCLUDE VERIFICATION OF PERSONAL FLIGHT RECORDS AND EXAMINATION OF TRAINING, PERFORMANCE, AND DISCIPLINARY RECORDS OF PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY AND ENFORCEMENT RECORDS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 03-NOV-1988	To: CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.	A-88-146
IMPLEMENT COMPANY PROCEDURES TO MONITOR GROUND MOVEMENTS OF AIRCRAFT AT DENVER STAPLETON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT DURING PERIODS OF ADVERSE WEATHER WHEN DEICING OPERATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, AND METER THE RELEASE OF COMPANY AIRPLANES FROM THE DEICING FACILITY TO ELIMINATE EXCESSIVE DELAYS FOLLOWING DEICING. (Closed - Acceptable Action)

Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations

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Kaart

Deze kaart geeft het vliegveld van vetrek weer en de geplande bestemming van de vlucht. De lijn tussen de vliegvelden geeft niet de exacte vliegroute weer.
De afstand tussen Denver-Stapleton International Airport, CO en Boise Air Terminal (Gowen Field), ID bedraagt 1024 km (640 miles).

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