Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | jeudi 7 septembre 1989 |
Heure: | 19:05 |
Type/Sous-type: | BAC One-Eleven 320AZ |
Compagnie: | Okada Air |
Immatriculation: | 5N-AOT |
Numéro de série: | 133 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1968 |
Heures de vol: | 42575 |
Moteurs: | 2 Rolls-Royce Spey 511-14 |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 4 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 88 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 92 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Perte Totale |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Port Harcourt Airport (PHC) ( Nigéria)
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Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
Nature: | Transport de Passagers Nat. |
Aéroport de départ: | Lagos-Murtala Muhammed International Airport (LOS/DNMM), Nigéria |
Aéroport de destination: | Port Harcourt Airport (PHC/DNPO), Nigéria |
Numéro de vol: | 307 |
Détails:Okada Air Flight OKJ 307 originated from Lagos (LOS), at about 17:10 hours UTC en-route to Port-Harcourt (PHC).
By 17:40 hours, at FL250, the crew established contact with Port Harcourt Tower and was cleared to the "PR" Radio Beacon. The 1700 hours weather report was passed onto the crew with the assurance not to expect any delay for an ILS approach to runway 21.
At 75 nm from Port Harcourt, the aircraft was cleared down to FL90 and the crew reviewed their approach briefings. The First Officer was still flying when the airplane was further cleared to 2000 feet with the instructions to report when established on the localizer.
At 700 feet, the Commander had the field-in-sight but the flying pilot had not. Then the Commander took over control from the First Officer. The captain requested the tower to increase approach lights intensity because of drizzling rain. The BAC 1-11 passed an area of heavy downpour. It entered a high sink rate and made a hard landing. The airplane bounced and made the second touchdown on its nose-wheel. The right nose wheel shattered instantaneously while the second nose wheel fractured at the hub. It rolled for about 90 metres and crumbled under the weight of the aircraft. When both wheels of the nose gear had broken away, the wheel axle made contact with runway to cut grooves onto the runway surface for about 25 metres before the nose strut finally gave way. The aircraft now scooped forward on the nose fuselage section and continued off the runway on to the left shoulder. On the shoulder, the aircraft ran into the wide trench which was covered up with loose soil and the impact severed off the right main gear from the attachment point. The aircraft eventually came to a stop 735 meters after touchdown.
Probable Cause:
CAUSE OF ACCIDENT: "The probable cause of this accident is the poor handling of the controls at the critical movement of final approach and landing phases, probably due to the sudden loss of azimuth in the heavy down pour of rain. The contributory factor to the accident is the excavation and improper refilling of the outrageous trenches of wide dimensions along the length of runway 03/21."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | AIPB Nigeria |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 265 days (9 months) | Accident number: | CIA 148 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» Flight International 17-23 January 1989 (46)
Opérations de secours
AIB Nigeria issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 30-MAY-1990 | To: Okada Air | 5N-AOT (1) |
The Operator should, with immediate effect produce its Company Operations Manual and distributes copies to all concerned parties. |
Issued: 30-MAY-1990 | To: | 5N-AOT (2) |
Whenever it is necessary for the flight crew to change over the control at the critical moment of the final approach, pilots should be encouraged to excercise a GO-AROUND. |
Issued: 30-MAY-1990 | To: Nigerian Airports Authority | 5N-AOT (3) |
The Nigerian Airports Authority should be made aware of its safety responsibilities to aircraft operators as far as airport operations are concerned. The Authority should desist from using untrained personals who could not recognize potential aviation hazards when many of these hazards are obvious, |
Issued: 30-MAY-1990 | To: Nigerian Airports Authority | 5N-AOT (4) |
Nigerian Airports Authority must have the simplest implements to recover disable aircraft from its runways. |
Issued: 30-MAY-1990 | To: Nigerian Airports Authority | 5N-AOT (5) |
Nigerian Airports Authority should bring the runway shoulder to the load bearingstandard as recommended by the ICAO document 9157 - AN/901 Part 1. |
Issued: 30-MAY-1990 | To: | 5N-AOT (6) |
The Meteorological Station at Port-Harcourt should be provided with working materials like CLAM Forms, Runway Visual Range Equipment etc. |
Issued: 30-MAY-1990 | To: | 5N-AOT (7) |
Quick dissemination of meteorological information must be made possible at Port- Harcourt and impediments like faulty lifts, radar, recording machines etc must be given their due maintenance. |
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Photos
accident date:
07-09-1989type: BAC One-Eleven 320AZ
registration: 5N-AOT
accident date:
07-09-1989type: BAC One-Eleven 320AZ
registration: 5N-AOT
accident date:
07-09-1989type: BAC One-Eleven 320AZ
registration: G-BKAX
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Lagos-Murtala Muhammed International Airport et Port Harcourt Airport est de 435 km (272 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.