| Estado: | Final |
| Fecha: | 25 ENE 1990 |
| Hora: | 21:34 EST |
| Tipo: | Boeing 707-321B |
| Operador: | Avianca |
| Registración: | HK-2016 |
| Numéro de série: | 19276/592 |
| Año de Construcción: | 1967 |
| Horas Totales de la Célula: | 61196 |
| Motores: | 4 Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3B |
| Tripulación: | Fatalidades: 8 / Ocupantes: 9 |
| Pasajeros: | Fatalidades: 65 / Ocupantes: 149 |
| Total: | Fatalidades: 73 / Ocupantes: 158 |
| Daños en la Aeronave: | Destruido |
| Consecuencias: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Ubicación: | Cove Neck, NY (Estados Unidos de América)
 |
| Fase: | Aproximación (APR) |
| Naturaleza: | Vuelo Internacional Programado |
| Aeropuerto de Salida: | Rionegro/Medellín-José María Córdova Airport (MDE/SKRG), Colombia |
| Aeropuerto de Llegada: | New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK/KJFK), Estados Unidos de América |
| Número de Vuelo: | 052 |
Descripción:El vuelo de Avianca AV052 (Bogotá - Medellín - New York-JFK) salio de Medellín, Colombia a las 3.08 pm con aproximadamente 81.000 lb. de combustible. Cuando se encontraba cerca de New York, el avión tuvo que entrar en tres patronos de espera. El primero duro 19 minutos sobre Norfolk, Virginia, el segundo por 29 minutos sobre New Jersey, y el tercero sobre la antena de intersección CAMRN (intersección aérea de aterrizaje del aeropuerto John F. Kennedy de New York).
Mientras sobrevolaba CAMRN, el avión descendió de 14.000 PDA a 11.000. Mientras esperaba sobre CAMRN por 26 minutos a las 8.44 pm, el encargado del radar ARTCC de New York le instruyo a esperar aun mas hasta las 9.05 pm. En ese instante, los pilotos le advirtieron a la TDC que solo podían esperar 5 minutos, y que no podían ir al aeropuerto alterno de Boston debido a falta de combustible. El avión salio del patrón de espera a las 8.47 y el copiloto contacto El Control Terminal de Llegada de Radar (TRACON) de New York, que guió al vuelo AV052 a alinearse para aterrizar por la pista 22L via ILS (Sistema Instrumental de Aterrizaje). Ya de ultimo, a las 9.15 pm, el vuelo contacto a la torre del Kennedy en New York, y les dieron permiso para aterrizar 4 minutos después.
Debido al mal tiempo (solo 300 pies de visibilidad vertical, visibilidad horizontal de 400 metros, y aproche visual de 2.400 pies con ráfagas de viento de 10 nudos) Los pilotos tuvieron que abortar el aterrizaje a las 9.23 pm. La torre de control calibro el vuelo para otro aterrizaje. A las 9.32 pm, a 12 millas al Suroeste del aeropuerto JFK de New York, las turbinas numero 3 y 4 del jet se apagaron, seguidas por las otras dos restantes. A las 9.34 pm, con rumbo de 250 grados, aletas de 14 grados y el carril de aterrizaje adentro, el avión impacto contra una colina en un bosque del área residencial del litoral norte de Long Island. Parte del fuselaje delantero pego contra la terraza de madera de una casa residencial.
La falla de los pilotos de no administrar apropiadamente la carga de combustible del jet, y el no comunicar una situación de emergencia de combustible a la torre de control antes de quedarse sin gasolina. Contribuyo al accidente la falla de los pilotos de usar un sistema operacional de despacho para ayudarlos a manejar un vuelo internacional en zona de alta densidad de trafico aereo con mal tiempo. También contribuyo al accidente el manejo inadecuado de flujo aéreo por parte de la FAA y el no tener terminología adecuada para pilotos y controladores para situaciones de emergencia de combustible. La cámara de seguridad determino también que el viento, cansancio en la tripulación y tensión fueron factores que los llevaron a no realizar un aterrizaje correcto la primera vez, y por ende llevo al accidente.
Fuentes:
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 2.4.1990 (52-53)
» NTSB/AAR-91/04
Official accident investigation report
Sample newspaper article from Newspaperarchive.com
Subsiguiente / acciones de seguridad
NTSB issued 9 Safety Recommendations
| Issued: 21-FEB-1990 | To: FAA | A-90-009 |
| IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALL PILOTS OPERATING COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT FLIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) MUST BE THOROUGHLY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE FLIGHT OPERATING AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC) RULES AND PROCEDURES, INCLUDING STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY, FOR OPERATING IN THE U.S. NAS. THIS INFORMATION IS INCLUDED IN SEVERAL PUBLICATIONS (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 21-FEB-1990 | To: FAA | A-90-010 |
| IMMEDIATELY DISSEMINATE THE CONTENTS OF THIS SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS LETTER (A-90-9 THROUGH -11) TO ALL AIR CARRIER OPERATORS INVOLVED IN COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 21-FEB-1990 | To: FAA | A-90-011 |
| IMMEDIATELY ISSUE A GENERAL NOTICE (GENOT DIRECTING MANAGEMENT OF ALL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC) FACILITIES TO FORMALLY BRIEF ALL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ON THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE JANUARY 25, 1990, ACCIDENT OF AVIANCA AIRLINES FLIGHT 052 AND TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO REQUEST FROM FLIGHT CREWS CLARIFICATION OF UNCLEAR OR AMBIGUOUS TRANSMISSIONS THAT CONVEY A POSSIBLE EMERGENCY SITUATION OR THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ATC ASSISTANCE. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 24-JUN-1991 | To: FAA | A-91-033 |
| DEVELOP IN COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION A STANDARDIZED GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS, TERMS, WORDS, AND PHRASES TO BE USED ARE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE TO BOTH PILOTS AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS REGARDING MINIMUM AND EMERGENCY FUEL COMMUNICATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 24-JUN-1991 | To: FAA | A-91-034 |
| CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL FLOW CONTROL FACILITY AND THE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, BY THE OFFICE OF SAFETY/QUALITY ASSURANCE, TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND APPROPRIATENESS OF TRAINING, RESPONSIBILITIES, PROCEDURES, AND METHODS OF APPLICATION FOR THE TRAFFIC MANAGMENT SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 24-JUN-1991 | To: | A-91-035 |
| REQUIRE THAT TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUALS INCLUDE PROCEDURES SPECIFYING MINIMUM FUEL VALUES FOR VARIOUS PHASES OF AIRLINE FLIGHTS AT WHICH A LANDING SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED AND WHEN EMERGENCY HANDLING BY ATC SHOULD BE REQUESTED. THE MANUAL REQUIREMENT AND ASSOCIATED AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES SHOULD INCLUDE CRITERIA FOR WHEN ATC MUST BE NOTIFIED THAT THE AIRPLANE MUST BE EN ROUTE TO ITS DESTINATION OR ALTERNATE AIRPORT VIA ROUTINE HANDLING, AND WHEN EMERGENCY HANDLING IS REQUIRED. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 24-JUN-1991 | To: FAA | A-91-036 |
| INCORPORATE INTO AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE A RECORDER BROADCAST OF TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION THAT CAN BE MONITORED BY ALL AIRCRAFT WITHIN EACH CENTER\'S BOUNDARIES TO PROVIDE PILOTS WITH EARLY INDICATIONS OF POTENTIAL DELAYS EN ROUTE. (Closed - Reconsidered) |
| Issued: 24-JUN-1991 | To: DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO DE AERONAUTICA CIVIL, COLOMBIA | A-91-037 |
| REVIEW POLICIES, PROCEDURES, TRAINING, AND OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED ON THE DUAL RESPONSIBILITY FLIGHT DISPATCHERS AND FLIGHTCREWS HAVE IN KEEPING EACH OTHER INFORMED OF EVENTS AND SITUATIONS THAT DIFFER FROM THOSE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON IN THE DISPATCH RELEASE. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 24-JUN-1991 | To: DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO DE AERONAUTICA CIVIL, COLOMBIA | A-91-038 |
| REQUIRE THAT AVIANCA AIRLINES INCORPORATE COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND LINE ORIENTED FLIGHT TRAINING CONCEPTS INTO ITS FLIGHTCREW TRAINING PROGRAM. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations
Fotos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Rionegro/Medellín-José María Córdova Airport to New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY as the crow flies is 3817 km (2386 miles).