Flugunfall 11 MAY 1990 einer Boeing 737-3Y0 EI-BZG - Manila-Ninoy Aquino International Airport (MNL)

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Accident

Last updated: 20 May 2013

Status:
Datum:	11 MAI 1990
Flugzeugtyp:	Boeing 737-3Y0
Fluggesellschaft:	Philippine Air Lines
Kennzeichen:	EI-BZG
Werknummer:	24466/1771
Baujahr:	1989-08-24 (9 months)
Triebwerk:	2 CFMI CFM56-3B1
Besatzung:	Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 6
Fluggäste:	Todesopfer: 8 / Insassen: 114
Gesamt:	Todesopfer: 8 / Insassen: 120
Sachschaden:	Zerstört
Konsequenzen:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Unfallort:	Manila-Ninoy Aquino International Airport (MNL) (Philippinen)
Flugphase:	Rückstellung/Schleppen (PBT)
Betriebsart:	Inländischer planmäßiger Passagierflug
Flug von:	Manila-Ninoy Aquino International Airport (MNL/RPLL), Philippinen
Flug nach:	Iloilo-Mandurriao Airport (ILO/RPVI), Philippinen
Flugnummer:	143

Unfallbericht:
Ambient air temperatures were high - 95°F (35°C) - as the Boeing 737 was parked at Manila. The air conditioning packs, located beneath the center wing fuel tank, had been running on the ground before pushback (approximately 30 to 45 minutes). The center wing fuel tank, which had not been filled since March 9, 1990, probably contained some fuel vapors. Shortly after pushback a powerful explosion in the center fuel tank pushed the cabin floor violently upwards. The wing tanks ruptured, causing the Boeing to burst into flames. The vapors ignited probably due to damaged wiring, because no bomb, incendiary device or detonator has been found.

Informationsquelle:
» Investigation Report B737-300 / PR143, 11 May 1990 Manila, Philippines (preliminary findings)
» NTSB safety recommendations A-90-100/103

Sicherheitsempfehlungen

NTSB issued 4 Safety Recommendations

Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations

Fotos

Map

This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Manila-Ninoy Aquino International Airport to Iloilo-Mandurriao Airport as the crow flies is 451 km (282 miles).

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.

languages:

Issued: 01-AUG-1990	To: FAA	A-90-100
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE IMMEDIATE INSPECTION OR TESTING OF FLOAT SWITCH WIRING FROM THE FLOAT SWITCHES TO THE REFUELING PANEL FOR CHAFFED OR DAMAGED INSULATION MATERIAL ON BOEING 737-300, -400, AND -500 SERIES AIRPLANES. THE DIRECTIVE SHOULD STATE THAT SPECIAL EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON INSPECTING THE WIRE BUNDLE WHERE IT PASSES THROUGH THE WING PYLON VAPOR SEALS AND UNDER THE WIRE BUNDLE CLAMPS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 01-AUG-1990	To: FAA	A-90-101
DEVELOP TESTING TECHNIQUES TO ENSURE THAT FLOAT SWITCHES MANUFACTURED BY REVERE AEROSPACE ARE FREE FROM DEFECT THAT COULD CAUSE AN EXPLOSION OR FIRE. AFTER TESTING TECHNIQUES ARE DEVELOPED, ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE TESTING OF REVERE AEROSPACE FLOAT SWITHCHES AND REPLACEMENT IF THEY ARE DEFECTIVE. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 01-AUG-1990	To: FAA	A-90-102
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE APPLICABLE TO ALL 14 CFR PART 121 AIRPLANES TO REQUIRE, AT THE NEXT SCHEDULED MAJOR MAINTENANCE INSPECTION, AN INSPECTION OF THE WIRES IN WIRE BUNDLES IN THE WINGS WHERE ADDITIONAL WIRING HAS BEEN ADDED SINCE THE AIRPLANE WAS MANUFACTURED. THE INSPECTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE DETERMINATION OF INSULATION DAMAGE WHERE THE WIRE BUNDLE IS UNDER CLAMPS AND INSIDE VAPOR SEALS AND PRESSURE SEALS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 01-AUG-1990	To: FAA	A-90-103
CONDUCT A DETAILED ENGINEERING DESIGN REVIEW AND TESTING OF THE FUEL PUMPS USED IN THE BOEING 737-300 SERIES AIRPLANES (P/N 10-62049-3) TO VERIFY THAT OVERHEATING AND INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE ROTATING COMPONENTS OF THE PUMP AND ITS CASE WILL NOT CAUSE A FIRE HAZARD. TESTING SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN JET-FUEL VAPOR AT FLASH POINT. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)