Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Friday 5 March 1993 |
Time: | 11:12 |
Type: |  Fokker 100 |
Operator: | Palair Macedonian Airlines |
Registration: | PH-KXL |
MSN: | 11393 |
First flight: | 1992-04-23 (11 months) |
Total airframe hrs: | 188 |
Cycles: | 136 |
Engines: | 2 Rolls-Royce Tay 620-15 |
Crew: | Fatalities: 4 / Occupants: 5 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 79 / Occupants: 92 |
Total: | Fatalities: 83 / Occupants: 97 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | Skopje Airport (SKP) ( North Macedonia)
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Crash site elevation: | 238 m (781 feet) amsl |
Phase: | Initial climb (ICL) |
Nature: | International Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Skopje Airport (SKP/LWSK), North Macedonia |
Destination airport: | Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH), Switzerland |
Flightnumber: | 301 |
Narrative:Palair Macedonian Airlines flight PMK301 was destroyed when it crashed immediately after takeoff from Skopje Airport, North Macedonia. Fourteen of the 97 occupants survived the accident.
The aircraft, a Fokker 100 jet, was leased to Palair by Aircraft Financing and Trading (AFT) of the Netherlands since January 1993. AFT provided route training captains, while Palair provided the first officer or candidate Palair captain and the cabin crew .
The aircraft arrived on a scheduled flight from Frankfurt to Skopje at 09:40 hours local time with a 35 minute delay.
The new crew arrived at Skopje Airport at approximately 10:30 and they went straight to the aircraft. It was snowing lightly. The temperature was 0° Celsius, dewpoint -1° Celsius.
The AFT Director Flight Operations was the pilot-in-command and was sitting in the right seat. He performed the first officer duties and was the pilot not flying (PNF). He was also giving route-instruction. A captain-under-training was sitting in the left seat. He was acting captain and was pilot flying (PF), receiving route-training.
The dispatch officer checked both wing leading edges and saw they were not contaminated with ice or snow, but were only wet of melted snow. The Flying Station Engineer subsequently performed the walk around and was accompanied by three Palair ground handling crewmembers. The ground handling crewmembers stated that they had a brief discussion with the FSE about the weather and asked if the aircraft needed de-icing since there was some snow on the right wing inner flap. The FSE replied that de-icing was not necessary and that any deposit would blow off the wing during take off.
The total time the aircraft remained on the ground at Skopje Airport was about 1 hour 35 minutes. At 11:05 hours start-up was approved and clearance was given to taxi to holding point runway 34.
During taxying, a Yak-42D from Vardar Air, which was standing on the apron, was de-iced. This was the first aircraft that day being de-iced. In the meantime the snowfall had increased to moderate. According to the Cockpit Voice Recorder, no discussion about the weather conditions took place by the pilots.
At 11:11 Palair 301 was cleared for take off, the wind was given as 010° with 3 knots. The tower controller stated that the visibility was 900 meters and it was snowing.
The aircraft rotated normally and the PNF then called "positive", followed by the call "gear up" from the PF, which was confirmed by the PNF. Two seconds after lift off the aircraft experienced heavy vibrations followed by a sudden right bank to approximately 10°, immediately followed by approximately 50° left bank and 55° right bank in sequence within 2 seconds. The roll movements were counteracted by aileron and rudder input. Approximately 10 seconds before impact the PNF called "deselect" followed by sounds which were determined to be the auto pilot cavalry charge (twice) followed by the GPWS aural alert, "sink rate" (twice).
The aircraft right wingtip hit the ground 382 meters beyond the end of the runway with approximately 90° bank, the fuselage was more or less in a horizontal position. The right wing disintegrated towards the wing-fuselage attachment, followed by major impact of the fuselage, which broke up into three major parts, and the impact of the right engine and stabilizer. The right engine separated and subsequently impacted and penetrated the aft fuselage. The stabilizer and the upper part of the vertical tail plane also separated.
Witnesses stated that explosions followed shortly after impact and several residual fires broke out on the debris.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The Board determined that impact with the ground in a steep right bank shortly after lift off was caused by loss of roll controllability due to contamination of the wings with ice. This situation resulted from an omission to carry out spraying of the aircraft with deicing or anti-icing fluid in meteorological conditions conducive to icing, due to a lack of ice-awareness of the flight crew and the Flying Station Engineer . Contributing factors were a lack of common background and procedures in a difficult multi-sources operational environment."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | Raad vd Luchtvaart  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 10 months | Accident number: | jan-93 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Icing
Loss of control
Sources:
» Air Safety Week 15 March 1993 (p. 3)
Follow-up / safety actions
RvdL issued 6 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: | PH-KXL(1) |
Review airline operating instructions and training materials to ensure that these include criteria for flight and ground crews for the application of anti-icing as well as deicing. Ensure that these highlight the pitfalls in judging the contamination condition of the wings at temperatures around the freezing level when the fuel tanks contain cold soaked fuel, taking also into account the operation of the aircraft fuel system where applicable. |
Issued: -- | To: | PH-KXL(2) |
Develop flight simulation facilities that can represent aircraft handling characteristics in take off as affected by wing contamination, and include a simulator demonstration with such affected handling characteristics in initial and/or recurrent pilot training to increase pilot awareness of how the aircraft could behave with wing contamination and the results of control input. |
Issued: -- | To: | PH-KXL(3) |
Stimulate the development of means to assist the flight crews in detecting frozen contamination on critical aircraft surfaces prior to take off. |
Issued: -- | To: | PH-KXL(4) |
Review operational regulations and airline operating procedures to ensure that CVR operation is started automatically or by crew action at the beginning of the flight preparation procedures . Ensure sufficient CVR-recording capability to retain the entire flight preparation at least until take off. |
Issued: -- | To: | PH-KXL(5) |
The regulating authority should require submission of specific guidelines and procedures for cold weather flight operation from airline operators prior to the start of such operations. |
Issued: -- | To: | PH-KXL(6) |
Approval of (lease) operations that involve aircraft, crews, operations and/or maintenance support, or other airline functions contracted from different sources, should be subjected to thorough review of procedural consistency. |
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Photos

accident date:
05-03-1993type: Fokker 100
registration: PH-KXL

accident date:
05-03-1993type: Fokker 100
registration: PH-KXL
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Skopje Airport to Zürich-Kloten Airport as the crow flies is 1190 km (744 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.