Crash-aerien 15 MAR 1993 d'un Boeing 737-130 N14212 - Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR)

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Incident

Last updated: 20 June 2013

Statuts:	Enquête Officielle
Date:	15 MAR 1993
Heure:	09:20
Type/Sous-type:	Boeing 737-130
Compagnie:	Continental Air Lines
Immatriculation:	N14212
Numéro de série:	19029/108
Année de Fabrication:	1968-12-07 (24 years 3 months)
Heures de vol:	58997
Moteurs:	2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7A
Equipage:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 4
Passagers:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 57
Total:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 61
Dégats de l'appareil:	Mineurs
Conséquences:	Repaired
Lieu de l'accident:	Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR) (Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
Phase de vol:	En montée initiale (ICL)
Nature:	Transport de Passagers Nat.
Aéroport de départ:	Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR/KEWR), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Aéroport de destination:	Greensboro/High Point-Piedmont Triad International Airport, NC (GSO/KGSO), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Numéro de vol:	1659

Détails:
Continental Flight 1659 experienced a loss of control of the left aileron while departing from Newark. The captain stated that the airplane rolled to the left as soon as it became airborne. Considerable difficulty was experienced controlling the airplane, but when the flaps were retracted and full right aileron was applied, control was maintained with less difficulty. An in-flight visual inspection of the left aileron panel revealed the panel in the full up position. The crew elected to return to Newark. The captain reported that control became increasingly difficult during the approach to land when the flaps were extended from 15 degrees to 30 degrees. The captain said he used 30 degrees of flaps because of ice and snow on the runway at Newark. The captain reported that just before touchdown he needed full right aileron and a significant amount of left rudder to keep the airplane lined up with the runway. The airplane was landed without further incident, and none of the occupants were injured.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "Inadequate maintenance/inspection by company maintenance personnel, the manufacturer's inadequate inspection and/or replacement procedures for the aileron cables, and subsequent failure of the 'down' aileron control cable due to wear."

Sources:
» NTSB

Opérations de secours

NTSB issued 3 Safety Recommendations

Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations

Photos

Plan

Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Newark International Airport, NJ et Greensboro/High Point-Piedmont Triad International Airport, NC est de 712 km (445 miles).

Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tels qui sont connus à ce jour.

languages:

Issued: 10-MAR-1994	To: FAA	A-94-064
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) TO OPERATORS OF BOEING 727 AND 737 AIRPLANES REQUIRING PERIODIC INSPECTION OF THE AILERON CABLES FOR BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL WEAR, AND FOR BROKEN WIRES, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE AREA OF THE CABLE CONTACTING THE PULLEYS. THE INSPECTION SHOULD INCLUDE RELEASING CABLE TENSION TO BETTER DETECT CABLE WEAR AND WIRE BREAKAGE AND ESTABLISHING A MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE REDUCTION IN CABLE DIAMETER WHERE PULLEY CONTACT OCCURS. BASED ON THE INSPECTIONS, DEVELOP SPECIFIC FLIGHT HOUR INTERVALS FOR REPLACEMENT OF THE CABLES. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 10-MAR-1994	To: FAA	A-94-065
REQUIRE THAT THE BOEING COMPANY EXAMINE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A 737-100 AILERON CABLE FAILURE, AND PROVIDE APPROPRIATE FLIGHTCREW OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE BEST LANDING CONFIGURATION IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A FAILURE. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 10-MAR-1994	To: FAA	A-94-066
CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY TO DETERMINE THE FREQUENCY OF SPOILER, RUDDER, AND AILERON CABLE FAILURES ON AIRPLANES WEIGHING 12,500 POUNDS OR GREATER. WHERE THE STUDY REVEALS FLIGHT CONTROL INSPECTION PROCEDURES TO BE INADEQUATE, REQUIRE APPROPRIATE REVISIONS TO THOSE INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND/OR ISSUE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES TO MANDATE SERVICE LIFE LIMITS TO ASSURE GREATER RELIABILITY OF THOSE CONTROL CABLES. (Closed - Acceptable Action)