Crash-aerien 08 JUN 1995 d'un McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32 N908VJ - Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA (ATL)

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Statuts:	Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Date:	jeudi 8 juin 1995
Heure:	19:08
Type/Sous-type:	McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32
Compagnie:	ValuJet Airlines
Immatriculation:	N908VJ
Numéro de série:	47321/455
Année de Fabrication:	1969
Heures de vol:	630
Moteurs:	2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7B
Equipage:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 5
Passagers:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 57
Total:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 62
Dégats de l'appareil:	Substantiels
Conséquences:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Lieu de l'accident:	Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA (ATL) ( Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
Phase de vol:	Au décollage (TOF)
Nature:	Transport de Passagers Nat.
Aéroport de départ:	Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA (ATL/KATL), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Aéroport de destination:	Miami International Airport, FL (MIA/KMIA), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Numéro de vol:	597

Détails:
At about 19:08 EDT Flight VJA 597 (Atlanta-Miami) took off from runway 27R. During the takeoff roll a loud bang was heard, and the crew of a following aircraft informed the ValuJet crew that they had an engine fire.
The takeoff was aborted immediately, but shrapnel form the uncontained engine failure penetrated the right engine main fuel line. A cabin fire erupted from the fuel that was sprayed out of the fuel line. The DC-9 was stopped on the runway, and the occupants evacuated through the forward doors and the over wing exits.
The engine failed due to a fatigue crack that had originated at a small corrosion pit on the 7th stage HP compressor disk. The corrosion had not been detected when the effected part had been inspected during overhaul by THY in 1991.

Probable Cause:

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The failure of Turk Hava Yollari maintenance and inspection personnel to perform a proper inspection of a 7th stage high compressor disk, thus allowing the detectable crack to grow to a length at which the disk ruptured, under normal operating conditions, propelling engine fragments into the fuselage; the fragments severed the right engine main fuel line, which resulted in a fire that rapidly engulfed the cabin area. The lack of an adequate record-keeping system and the failure to use "process sheets" to document the step-by-step overhaul/inspection procedures contributed to the failure to detect the crack and, thus, to the accident."

Accident investigation:

Investigating agency:	NTSB
Status:	Investigation completed
Duration:	1 year and 2 months
Accident number:	NTSB/AAR-96-03
Download report:	Final report

Sources:

» Air Safety Week 17 July 1995 (p. 5, 6)
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 17.07.95(35)
» Flight International 26 July-1 August 1995 (11)
» Uncontained Disk Failure in Right Engine of DC-9 During Initial Takeoff Run Results in Rejected Takeoff and Aircraft Evacuation (Flight Safety Foundation - Accident Prevention September 1996)
» ICAO Adrep Summary 2/97 (#82)

Opérations de secours

NTSB issued 15 Safety Recommendations

Issued: 06-JUL-1995	To: FAA	A-95-71
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE THE INSPECTION OF PRATT & WHITNEY JT8D ENGINE HIGH PRESSURE COMPRESSOR STEEL DISCS THAT WERE LAST OVERHAULED & MAINTAINED BY TURK HAVA YOLLARI OF TURKEY PRIOR TO REACHING 3,000 CYCLES SINCE THAT LAST OVERHAUL & INSPECTION. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POTENTIAL FOR CORROSION PITTING OR CRACKS IN THE SHIELDING HOLES IN 7TH STAGE HIGH PRESSURE COMPRESSOR DISCS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 06-JUL-1995	To: FAA	A-95-72
MODIFY THE WORDING OF THE INSPECTION & DAMAGE LIMITS PROVIDED IN THE PRATT & WHITNEY MANUALS & SERVICE BULLETINS FOR JT8D HIGH PRESSURE COMPRESSOR STEEL DISCS TO PREVENT ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE ALLOWED & THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED FOR THE REPAIR & RETURN TO SERVICE OF THE DISCS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 06-JUL-1995	To: FAA	A-95-73
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE TO DESIGNATED AIRWORTHINESS REPRESENTATIVES & AVIATION MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER FACILITIES THAT HAVE REPAIRED OR OVERHAULED AIRCRAFT, AIRCRAFT ENGINES & AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT SUBMITTED FOR ACCEPTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES HELD THE PROPER FAA CERTIFICATES AT THE TIME THE WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED. IN EITHER EVENT, THE GUIDANCE SHOULD INCLUDE THE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-78
REVIEW THE AIR AGENCY CERTIFICATES & REPAIR STATION OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS OF ALL REPAIR STATIONS & ENSURE THAT THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS CLEARLY INDICATES THE EXTENT OF THE REPAIR STATIONS\' AUTHORITY. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-79
REVISE 14 CFR PART 145 TO REQUIRE SUBPART C FOREIGN REPAIR STATIONS TO ADHERE TO THE SAME RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS AS DOMESTIC REPAIR STATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-80
REVISE THE APPLICABLE REGULATIONS & PROVIDE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THE DOCUMENTATION TO BE USED & KEPT DURING INSPECTIONS & OVERHAULS, INCLUDING "PROCESS SHEETS" OR SIMILAR DETAILED DOCUMENTATION FOR ALL CERTIFICATED REPAIR STATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-81
REQUIRE THAT "SERVICEABLE TAGS" BE USED TO RETURN ENGINES & OTHER COMPONENTS TO SERVICE, THAT THEY BE IN A PRESCRIBED FORMAT (PERHAPS IN THE FORMAT OF FAA FORM 8130-3), & THAT WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP, & CERTAINLY UPON IMPORTATION, THE APPROVAL FOR RETURN TO SERVICE ATTEST TO THE OVERALL AIRWORTHINESS OF THE PART & THE TAG REFLECT THAT A COMPLETE & THOROUGH REVIEW OF RECORDS, INCLUDING "PROCESS SHEETS" OF THE LAST OVERHAUL, HAS TAKEN PLACE. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH RECORDS, REQUIRE AN OVERHAUL OF THE PART WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-82
REQUIRE THAT ALL TRANSPORT-CATEGORY AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED BEFORE 11/27/90, BE RETROFITTED WITH A PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM CAPABLE OF OPERATING ON AN INDEPENDENT POWER SOURCE. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-83
EMPHASIZE TO PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS THE IMPORTANCE OF THOROUGHLY REVIEWING FLIGHT ATTENDANT TRAINING PROGRAMS BEFORE APPROVING THEM & FLIGHT ATTENDANT MANUALS BEFORE ACCEPTING THEM. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-84
PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE REQUIREMENT THAT OCCUPANTS WHO ARE MORE THAN 24 MONTHS OLD ARE RESTRAINED DURING TAKEOFFS, LANDINGS, & DURING TURBULENCE. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-85
REQUIRE THAT EACH FLIGHT ATTENDANT HAVE A COCKPIT KEY IN HIS/HER POSSESSION AT ALL TIMES WHILE ON DUTY. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-86
PROHIBIT THE USE DURING ANY TYPE REPLACEMENT, AFTER 1997 OF CABIN MATERIALS IN ALL TRANSPORT-CATEGORY AIRPLANES THAT DO NOT COMPLY WITH THE CURRENT FIRE SAFETY STANDARDS CONTAINED IN 14 CFR 25.853. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-87
AMEND 14 CFR PART 121 PROHIBIT, UPON A TRANSFER OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM ONE CERTIFICATE HOLDER TO ANOTHER, OR BY JANUARY 1, 2001, WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST, THE OPERATION OF AIRPLANES WITH CABIN MATERIALS THAT DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 14 CFR PART 25.853. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-88
ISSUE AN OPERATIONS BULLETIN RECOMMENDING THT PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS ADVISE THEIR AIR CARRIERS TO DISSEMINATE FAA SAFETY GUIDANCE ON AIRLINE PASSENGER ATTIRE TO THEIR FLIGHT ATTENDANTS. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 04-SEP-1996	To: FAA	A-96-89
REQUIRE ALL AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY REQUIRED TO BE INSTALLED WITH A COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER TO BE RETROFITTED WITHIN 2 YEARS WITH A CVR INSTALLATION DESIGNED SUCH THAT AN UNINTERRUPTED RECORDING FROM THE BOOM OR MASK MICROPHONES & HEADPHONES FOR EACH FLIGHT CREWMEMBER\'S POSITION & FROM AN AREA MICROPHONE CAN BE MADE ON DEDICATED CHANNELS OF THE CVR. A SIDETONE SHALL BE PRODUCED ONLY WHEN THE TRANSMITTER OR INTERPHONE IS SELECTED, &, IN ADDITION, ALL AUDIO SIGNALS RECEIVED BY HAND-HELD MICROPHONES SHALL BE RECORDED ON THE RESPECTIVE CREWMEMBER\'S CHANNEL WHEN KEYED TO THE \'ON" POSITION. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)

Show all...

Photos

accident date: 08-06-1995
type: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32
registration: N908VJ

Plan

Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA et Miami International Airport, FL est de 953 km (596 miles).

Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.

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DC-9-30

662 built
52^ème loss

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