Narrative:The crew had to pull Ground Control Relay circuit breakers H20 and J20 after takeoff due to cabin pressurization problems. When on final approach to RWY 02R at 100 feet the cabin had depressurized completely, so the captain reset both circuit breakers. Suddenly the spoilers deployed, which gave the aircraft a high sink rate. The DC-9 struck the runway with full power on both engines and a nose-high attitude. The aircraft bounced back and the crew managed to climb away. After landing back on RWY31 major damage was discovered to the fuselage.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The flightcrew's improper procedures and actions (failing to contact system operations/dispatch, failing to use all available aircraft and company manuals, and prematurely resetting the ground control relay circuit breakers) in response to an in-flight abnormality, which resulted in the inadvertent in-flight activation of the ground spoilers during the final approach to landing and the airplane's subsequent increased descent rate and excessively hard ground impact in the runway approach light area.
Contributing factors in the accident were ValuJet's failure to incorporate cold weather nosegear servicing procedures in its operations and maintenance manuals, the incomplete procedural guidance contained in the ValuJet quick reference handbook, and the flightcrew's inadequate knowledge and understanding of the
aircraft systems."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 11 months | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-96/07 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» Air Safety Week 12 February 1996 (p. 6)
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 1.7.96(31-32)
» NTSB/AAR-96/07
» Scramble 201(50)
» Scramble 204(48)
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 8 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 20-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-166 |
REQUIRE ALL AIRLINES TO REVIEW THEIR OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE MANUALS &, IF NECESSARY, ADJUST OR EXPAND THESE MANUALS TO REFLECT THE MANUFACTURER\'S RECOMMENDED COLD WEATHER NOSEGEAR SERVICING PROCEDURES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-167 |
STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF ADHERENCE TO THE RULES, STRUCTURE, & GUIDELINES WITHIN THE REVISED VALUJET COMPANY OPERATING MANUAL TO VALUJET MANAGEMENT & ITS EMPLOYEES, TO FLIGHT SAFETY INTERNATIONAL (OR OTHER CONTRACTED TRAINING ORGANIZATIONS USED BY VALUJET), & TO THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF VALUJET. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-168 |
REEVALUATE VALUJET\'S FLIGHT OPERATIONS TRAINING MANUAL & THE VALUJET TRAINING SYLLABUS USED BY FLIGHT SAFETY INTERNATIONAL, & REQUIRE VALUJET TO REVISE OR EXPAND THESE DOCUMENTS TO INCLUDE MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS & EXPLANATION OF THE DOUGLAS DC-9 SYSTEMS & PROCEDURES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-169 |
REQUIRE VALUJET TO REVISE ITS CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM) TRAINING CURRICULUM TO MORE CLEARLY REFLECT MODERN INTEGRATED (FLIGHTCREW, CABIN CREW, COMPANY, ETC.) CRM PRACTICES (INCLUDING LINE OPERATIONAL SIMULATION TRAINING) & TO COMBINE ACADEMIC/CLASSROOM TRAINING WITH INTEGRATED PRACTICAL CREW SIMULATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-170 |
REQUIRE ALL AIRLINES TO REVISE THEIR PROCEDURES TO STIPULATE THAT FLIGHTCREWS TURN OFF POWER TO THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER AS PART OF THE ENGINE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF A REPORTABLE INCIDENT/ACCIDENT. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-DEC-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-171 |
REQUIRE THAT ALL NEWLY MANUFACTURED COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS INTENDED FOR USE ON AIRPLANES HAVE A MINIMUM RECORDING DURATION OF 2 HOURS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-DEC-1996 | To: ValuJet Airlines | A-96-172 |
Develop, immediately, a more extensive & accurate winter operations manual, with corresponding adjustments to maintenance procedures, to reflect the manufacturer\'s cold weather nosegear servicing procedures. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-DEC-1996 | To: ValuJet Airlines | A-96-173 |
Clarify for all flightcrews the importance of referencing all available crew reference documents & consulting with company maintenance personnel (time permitting) to resolve in-flight abnormalities before committing a flight to landing. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Show all...
Photos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA to Nashville International Airport, TN as the crow flies is 342 km (214 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.