Crash-aerien 17 JUL 1996 d'un Boeing 747-131 N93119

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Statuts:	Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Date:	mercredi 17 juillet 1996
Heure:	20:31
Type/Sous-type:	Boeing 747-131
Compagnie:	Trans World Airlines - TWA
Immatriculation:	N93119
Numéro de série:	20083/153
Année de Fabrication:	1971-08-18 (24 years 11 months)
Heures de vol:	93303
Cycles:	16869
Moteurs:	4 Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7AH
Equipage:	victimes: 18 / à bord: 18
Passagers:	victimes: 212 / à bord: 212
Total:	victimes: 230 / à bord: 230
Dégats de l'appareil:	Détruit
Conséquences:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Lieu de l'accident:	13 km (8.1 milles) S de East Moriches, NY ( Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
Phase de vol:	En vol (ENR)
Nature:	Transport de Passagers Intern.
Aéroport de départ:	New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK/KJFK), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Aéroport de destination:	Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG/LFPG), France
Numéro de vol:	TW800

Détails:
TWA Boeing 747 N93119 arrived as Flight TW881 from Athens at New York-JFK at 16:31. The airplane was refueled at JFK and remained at gate 27 with the auxiliary power unit (APU) and two of its three air conditioning packs operating for about 2 1/2 hours until it departed as TWA flight 800. The flight was scheduled to depart JFK for Paris about 19:00; however, the flight was delayed because of a disabled piece of ground equipment and concerns about a suspected passenger/baggage mismatch. The aircraft was pushed back from the gate about 20:02. Between 20:05 and 20:07, the flight crew started the Nos. 1, 2, and 4 engines and completed the after-start checklist. The flight crew then received taxi instructions and began to taxi to runway 22R. While the airplane was taxiing, about 20:14, the flight crew started the No. 3 engine and conducted the delayed engine-start and taxi checklists.
At 20:18:21, ATC advised the pilots that the wind was out of 240-degrees at 8 knots and cleared flight 800 for takeoff. After takeoff the pilots received a series of altitude assignments and heading changes from New York Terminal Radar Approach Control and Boston ARTCC controllers. At 20:25:41, Boston ARTCC advised the pilots to climb and maintain FL190 and expedite through FL150.
At 20:26:24, Boston ARTCC amended TWA flight 800's altitude clearance, advising the pilots to maintain FL130. At 20:29:15, the captain stated, "Look at that crazy fuel flow indicator there on number four .. see that?" One minute later Boston ARTCC advised them to climb and maintain FL150. The crew then selected climb thrust. After a every loud sound for a fraction of a second, the CVR stopped recording at 20:31:12. At that moment, the crew of an Eastwind Airlines Boeing 737 flying nearby reported seeing an explosion. The aircraft broke up and debris fell into the sea, 8 miles south off East Moriches.

Probable Cause:

PROBABLE CAUSE: "An explosion of the center wing fuel tank (CWT), resulting from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the tank. The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be determined with certainty, but, of the sources evaluated by the investigation, the most likely was a short circuit outside of the CWT that allowed excessive voltage to enter it through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system.
Contributing factors to the accident were the design and certification concept that fuel tank explosions could be prevented solely by precluding all ignition sources and the design and certification of the Boeing 747 with heat sources located beneath the CWT with no means to reduce the heat transferred into the CWT or to render the fuel vapor in the tank nonflammable."

Accident investigation:

Investigating agency:	NTSB
Status:	Investigation completed
Duration:	4 years and 1 months
Accident number:	NTSB/AAR-00-03
Download report:	Final report

Sources:

» SKYbrary
» Lessons Learned From Transport Airplane Accidents: TWA 800

Opérations de secours

FAA issued 2 Airworthiness Directives
FAA issued 3 Special Federal Aviation Regulations
NTSB issued 15 Safety Recommendations

Issued: 13-DEC-1996	To: FAA	A-96-174
Require the development of and implementation of design or operational changes that will preclude the operation of transport-category airplanes with explosive fuel-air mixtures in the fuel tank (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 13-DEC-1996	To: FAA	A-96-175
Require the development of & implementation of design or operational changes that will preclude the operation of transport-category airplanes with explosive fuel-air mixtures in the fuel tanks (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 13-DEC-1996	To: FAA	A-96-176
Require that the B-747 flight handbooks of TWA & other operators of B-747s & other aircraft in which fuel tank temperature cannot be determined by flightcrews be immediately revised to reflect the increases in CWT fuel temperatures found by flight tests, including operational procedures to reduce the potential for exceeding CWT temperature limitations. (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Issued: 13-DEC-1996	To: FAA	A-96-177
Require modification of the CWT of B-747 airplanes & the fuel tanks of other airplanes that are located near heat sources to incorporate temperature probes & cockpit fuel tank temperature displays to permit determination of the fuel tank temperatures. (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Issued: 21-JAN-1997	To: B747	AD 96-26-06
Requirement for a one-time inspection to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed) on certain B747 airplanes
Issued: 18-FEB-1997	To: FAA	A-97-11
DEVELOP & IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES, INCLUDING A CHECKLIST OF SAFETY-RELATED ITEMS, FOR THE HANDLING & PLACEMENT OF EXPLOSIVE TRAINING AIDS BY K-9 EXPLOSIVES DETECTION TEAMS TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION OF AIRCRAFT & AIRPORT FACILITIES & TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE K-9 EXPLOSIVES DETECTION PROGRAM. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 29-DEC-1997	To: B747	AD 97-26-07
This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD 96-26-06), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that currently requires a one-time inspection to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed); replacement of any damaged sleeving with new sleeving; and repair or replacement of any damaged wires with new wires. For airplanes on which any burned wires are found, that AD also requires an inspection to detect damage of the conduit, and replacement of any damaged conduit with a serviceable conduit. This amendment requires repetitive inspections in lieu of the one-time inspection. This amendment also expands the applicability of the existing AD. This amendment is prompted by reports of chafing of the sleeving. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and correct abrasion of the Teflon sleeving and wires in the bundles of the fuel boost pumps for the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed), which could result in electrical arcing between the wires and the aluminum conduit and consequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank.
Issued: 07-APR-1998	To: FAA	A-98-34
Issue, as soon as possible, an airworthiness directive to require a detailed inspection of fuel quantity indication system wiring in Boeing 747-100,-200 and-300 series airplane fuel tanks for damage, and the replacement or the repair of any wires found to be damaged. Wires on Honeywell series 1-3 probes and compensators should be removed for examination. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 07-APR-1998	To: FAA	A-98-35
Issue an airworthiness directive to require the earliest possible replacement of the Honeywell corporation series 1-3 terminal blocks used on Boeing 747 fuel probes with terminal blocks that do not have knurled surfaces or sharp edges that may damage fuel quantity indication system wiring. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 07-APR-1998	To: FAA	A-98-36
Conduct a survey of fuel quantity indication system probes and wires in Boeing 747s equipped with systems other than Honeywell series 1-3 probes and compensators and in other model airplanes that are used in title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 service to determine whether potential fuel tank ignition sources exist that are similar to those found in the Boeing 747. The survey should include removing wires from fuel probes and examining the wires for damage. Repair or replacement procedures for any damaged wires that are found should be developed. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 07-APR-1998	To: FAA	A-98-37
Require research into copper-sulfide deposits on fuel quantity indication system parts in fuel tanks to determine the levels of deposits that may be hazardous, how to inspect and clean the deposits, and when to replace the components. (Superseded by A-00-107) (Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded)
Issued: 07-APR-1998	To: FAA	A-98-38
Require in Boeing 747 airplanes, and in other airplanes with fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wire installations that are corouted with wires that may be powered, the physical separation and electrical shielding of FQIS wires to the maximum extent possible. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 07-APR-1998	To: FAA	A-98-39
Require, in all applicable transport airplane fuel tanks, surge protection systems to prevent electrical power surges from entering fuel tanks\' fuel quantity indication system wires. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 19-SEP-2000	To: FAA	A-00-105
Examine manufacturers\' design practices with regard to bonding of components inside tanks and require changes in those practices, as necessary, to eliminate potential ignition hazards. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 19-SEP-2000	To: FAA	A-00-106
Review the design specifications for aircraft wiring systems of all U.S. -certified aircraft and (1) identify which systems are critical to safety and (2) require revisions, as necessary, to ensure that adequate separation is provided for the wiring related to those critical systems. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 19-SEP-2000	To: FAA	A-00-107
Require the development and implementation of corrective actions to eliminate the ignition risk posed by silver-sulfide deposits on fuel quantity indication system components inside fuel tanks. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 19-SEP-2000	To: FAA	A-00-108
Regardless of the scope of the aging transport systems rulemaking advisory committee\'s eventual recommendations, address (through rulemaking or other means) all of the issues identified in the aging transport non-structural systems plan, including (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 06-JUN-2001	To:	SFAR 88
This rule requires design approval holders of certain turbine- powered transport category airplanes, and of any subsequent modifications to these airplanes, to substantiate that the design of the fuel tank system precludes the existence of ignition sources within the airplane fuel tanks. It also requires developing and implementing maintenance and inspection instructions to assure the safety of the fuel tank system. For new type designs, this rule also requires demonstrating that ignition sources cannot be present in fuel tanks when failure conditions are considered, identifying any safety-critical maintenance actions, and incorporating a means either to minimize development of flammable vapors in fuel tanks or to prevent catastrophic damage if ignition does occur. These actions are based on accident investigations and adverse service experience, which have shown that unforeseen failure modes and lack of specific maintenance procedures on certain airplane fuel tank systems may result in degradation of design safety features intended to preclude ignition of vapors within the fuel tank.
Issued: 30-AUG-2002	To:	SFAR 88 - update 1
This final rule adds a provision to the existing requirements for fuel tank system fault tolerance evaluations that allows type certificate holders to use equivalent safety provisions for demonstrating compliance. The current regulations do not provide such provisions. This rulemaking will allow current certificate holders to use the same equivalent safety provisions already available to applicants for new or changed type design approvals.
Issued: 09-DEC-2002	To:	SFAR 88 - update 2
This final rule extends the compliance deadline for supplemental type certificate holders to complete safety assessments of their fuel tank systems, and any system that may affect the fuel tank system, and to develop design changes and maintenance programs needed to correct unsafe conditions. It also extends the compliance time for the affected operators to incorporate instructions for maintenance and inspection of the fuel tank system into their maintenance or inspection programs. This action is needed to allow supplemental type certificate holders additional time to complete their compliance submittals using a newly identified method of completing their safety assessments and identifying corrective actions without acquiring information from the type certificate holders. Because the operators are dependent upon the supplemental certificate holders for showing compliance with the operating rules, this rule allows them the same time extension.

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Photos

accident date: 17-07-1996
type: Boeing 747-131
registration: N93119

Video, social media

Plan

Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY et Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport est de 5794 km (3621 miles).
Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.

Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.

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Boeing 747

1551+ built
26^ème loss
16^ème accident fatal
le accident 7^ème le plus grave (à ce moment là)
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Etats-Unis d'Amérique

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