Narrative:Flight 603 took off from Lima runway 15 at 12:42 am for a flight to Santiago. Five minutes after takeoff the crew reported problems with their instruments and stated they wanted to return to the airport.
During the initial climb, the airspeed and altitude indications were too low. In calm winds, the windshear warning suddenly sounded. The aircraft climbed to FL130, before a return to Lima was initiated. While returning, the captain's airspeed and altitude indications were too high, causing an overspeed warning. At the same time, the co-pilot's airspeed indications were too low, triggering the stick shaker.
The aircraft kept descending and impacted the water with the left wing and no. 1 engine at a 10 degrees angle, at a speed of 260 knots. The aircraft pulled up to about 200 feet and crashed inverted. The captain's airspeed indicated 450 knots and altitude 9500 feet.
Investigation results showed that the aircraft's three static ports on the left side were obstructed by masking tape. The tape had been applied before washing and polishing of the aircraft prior to the accident flight.
PROBABLE PRINCIPAL CAUSE :
ERROR OF THE MAINTENANCE STAFF INCLUDING THE CREW
It can be deduced from the investigation carried out that the maintenance staff did not remove the protective adhesive tape from the static ports. This tape was not detected during the various phases of the aircraft's release to the line mechanic, its transfer to the passenger boarding apron and, lastly, the inspection by the crew responsible for the flight (the walk-around or pre-flight check), which was carried out by the pilot-in-command, [name], according to the mechanic responsible for the aircraft on the day of the accident.
b.1) PERSONAL ERROR OF THE CREW
The pilot-in-command, Mr [name], made a personal error by not complying with the procedure for GPWS alarms and not noticing the readings of the radio altimeters in order to discard everything which he believed to be fictitious.
b.2) PERSONAL ERROR INCLUDING THE CREW
The co-pilot, Mr [name], made a personal error by not being more insistent, assertive and convincing in alerting the pilot-in-command much more emphatically to the ground proximity alarms.
Loss of control
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 2.12.96 (33)
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 7 October 1996 (21-22)
» Flight International 9-15 October 1996 (8)
» NTSB Safety Recommendation A-96-141
» Scramble 210
Follow-up / safety actions
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not
display the exact flight path.
Distance from Lima-Jorge Chávez International Airport to Santiago-Arturo Merino Benitez Airport as the crow flies is 2452 km (1532 miles).