Beschrijving:At about 10:25 local time an An-124, property of Aeroflot and operated by Ajax was flying empty from Russia to Turin, Italy, to collect Ferrari cars to be delivered in Brunei. After having failed to land on runway 36 at Caselle Airport, while trying to go-around from an altitude of about 15 meters (50 ft) above the runway, the aircraft struck trees and houses in the small town of San Francesco al Campo, north of the runway end.
|Datum:||dinsdag 8 oktober 1996|
|Luchtvaartmaatschappij:||Aeroflot Russian International Airlines|
|Motoren:|| 4 Lotarev D-18T|
|Bemanning:||slachtoffers: 2 / inzittenden: 23|
|Passagiers:||slachtoffers: 0 / inzittenden: 0|
|Totaal:||slachtoffers: 2 / inzittenden: 23 |
|Slachtoffers op de grond:||slachtoffers: 2|
|Gevolgen:|| Written off (damaged beyond repair)|
|Plaats:||San Francesco al Campo ( ItaliŰ)
|Fase:|| Nadering (APR)|
|Vliegveld van vertrek:||Chkalovsky Airport (CKL), Rusland|
|Vliegveld van aankomst:||Torino-Caselle Airport (TRN/LIMF), ItaliŰ|
runway 36 at that time was undergoing resurfacing works near the 36 threshold. The cat.III ILS was operating as Localizer only, because the glide slope was turned off during the works. The usable length of the runway was reduced to 2350 meters from 3300, due to work in progress. All these informations were included in a regular NOTAM and the crew was advised accordingly at first contact from the Turin Radar controller.
Reported weather at time of crash (10:20 local) was: wind variable, 3 knots, visibility 2000 m, RVR runway 36 more than 1500 meters, no change, light rain, scattered at 1500 feet, scattered at 3500 feet, broken at 7000 feet, temperature and dew point 13░C, QNH 1012 hPa.
The airplane scraped trees at an elevation of 329 meters ASL (1079 ft) and finally came to rest into an house, destroying it, at an elevation of about 330 meters ASL (1083 ft); runway end elevation is 304 meters ASL (997 ft).
According to the preliminary inquiry results, minimum distance from the runway surface reached by the 24 wheels of main gear bogey during the go-around was just less than one meter, about three feet. It seems that poor crew coordination and training (the captain had just 431 hours on the civil type), poor approach planning (no planning was made for a possible missed approach, despite the crew having been informed by the Tower eleven minutes before the crash that the preceding aircraft had got the runway in sight at just 200 feet), late decision to start the missed approach (according to the inquiry results, the captain at last decided to go around when the aircrafts was almost touching down and about 1350 meters, 4400 feet, of runway plus 300 meters, 1000 feet, of stopway were still available) and some trouble with the engines (whose throttle levers were "wildly" moved during the attempted go-around) have all contributed to the crash.
» Soviet Transports
» ANSA Press Releases
» Enrico Zaffiri
» ICAO Adrep Summary 6/96 (#4)
» Marco Riva
» Scramble 210
» Volare, #155
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Networkĺs opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.