| Statuts: | Enquête Officielle |
| Date: | 19 OCT 1996 |
| Heure: | 16:38 EST |
| Type/Sous-type: | McDonnell Douglas MD-88 |
| Compagnie: | Delta Air Lines |
| Immatriculation: | N914DL |
| Numéro de série: | 49545/1444 |
| Année de Fabrication: | 1988 |
| Heures de vol: | 24420 |
| Moteurs: | 2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-219 |
| Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 5 |
| Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 58 |
| Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 63 |
| Dégats de l'appareil: | Substantiels |
| Conséquences: | Repaired |
| Lieu de l'accident: | New York-La Guardia Airport, NY (LGA) (Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
 |
| Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
| Nature: | Transport de Passagers Nat. |
| Aéroport de départ: | Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA (ATL/KATL), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
| Aéroport de destination: | New York-La Guardia Airport, NY (LGA/KLGA), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
| Numéro de vol: | 554 |
Détails:Just before touchdown, after an ILS/DME approach to runway 13, the right wing struck approach lights.
The maingear then struck the runway end and broke off, causing the aircraft to skid down the runway for 2700 feet.
Weather at the time was 800 feet broken ceiling, 0,5mile visibility in fog, a Runway Visual Range of 3000 feet and possible low level windshear.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inability of the captain, because of his use of monovision contact lenses, to overcome his misperception of the airplane's position relative to the runway during the visual portion of the approach. This misperception occurred because of visual illusions produced by the approach over water in limited light conditions, the absence of visible ground features, the rain and fog, and the irregular spacing of the runway lights.
Contributing to the accident was the lack of instantaneous vertical speed information available to the pilot not flying, and the incomplete guidance available to optometrists, aviation medical examiners, and pilots regarding the prescription of unapproved monovision contact lenses for use by pilots." (NTSB/AAR-97/03)
Sources:
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 26.05.1997 (42,47)
» CNN
» NTSB Identification: NYC97MA005
» NTSB/AAR-97/03
» Scramble 210
Opérations de secours
NTSB issued 13 Safety Recommendations
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-084 |
| Identify Part 139 airports that have irregular runway light spacing, evaluate the potential hazards of such irregular spacing, and determine if standardizing runway light spacing is warranted. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-085 |
| Require all 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 operators to review and revise their company operations manuals to more clearly delineate flightcrew member (pilot flying/pilot not flying) duties and responsibilities for various phases of flight, and to more clearly define terms that are critical for safety of flight decisionmaking, such as "stabilized approach." (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-086 |
| Revise FAA Form 8500-8, "Application for Airman Medical Certificate," to elicit info regarding contact lens use by pilot/applicant. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-087 |
| Require the Civil Aeromedical Institute to publish and disseminate a brochure containing info about vision correction options, to include info about the potential hazards of monovision (MV) contact lens use by pilots while performing flying duties and to emphasize that MV contact lenses are not approved for use while flying. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-088 |
| Require all 121 and 135 operators to notify their pilot and medical personnel of the circumstances of this accident, and to alert them to the hazards of monovision contact lens use by flightcrew members. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-089 |
| Require all flight standards district office air safety inspectors and accident prevention specialists to inform general aviation pilots of the circumstances of this accident and to alert them to the hazards of monovision contact lens use by pilots while flying. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-090 |
| Require all 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 air carriers to make their pilots aware (through specific training, placards, or other means) of the type of vertical speed info (instantaneous/non-instantaneous) provided by the vertical speed indicators installed in their airplanes, and to make them aware of the ramifications that type of info could have on their perception of their flight situation. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-091 |
| Require all 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 operators to convert, where practical, the non-instantaneous vertical speed instrumentation on airplanes that have inertial reference units installed to provide flightcrews with instantaneous vertical speed info. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-092 |
| Expedite the development and publication specific criteria and conditions for the classification of special airports; the resultant publication should include specific remarks detailing the reason(s) an airport is determined to be a special airport, and procedures for adding and removing airports from special airport. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-093 |
| Develop criteria for special runways and/or special approaches giving consideration to the circumstances of this accident and any unique characteristics and special conditions at airport (such as those that exist for the approaches to runways 31 and 13 at LaGuardia airport) and include detailed pilot qualification requirements for designated special runways or approaches. (Closed - Reconsidered) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-094 |
| Once criteria for designating special airports and special runways and/or special approaches have been developed as recommended in recommendations A-97-92 and -93, evaluate all airports against that criteria and update special airport publications accordingly. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-095 |
| Require all 14 CFR Part 121 and 135 operators to review their flight attendant training programs and emphasize the need for flight attendants to aggressively initiate their evacuation procedures when an evacuation order has been given. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-AUG-1997 | To: OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATIONS | A-97-096 |
| ISSUE A BRIEFING BULLETIN TO MEMBER OPTOMETRISTS, INFORMING THEM OF THE POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF AND PROHIBITION AGAINST MONOVISION (MV) CONTACT LENS USE BY PILOTS WHILE PERFORMING FLYING DUTIES, & URGING THEM TO ADVISE PILOT-RATED PATIENTS OF THOSE POTENTIAL HAZARDS (MV CONTACT LENS\' EFFECT ON DISTANCE JUDGEMENTS/PERCEPTIONS) . (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations
Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA et New York-La Guardia Airport, NY est de 1216 km (760 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tels qui sont connus à ce jour.
