Statuts:	Enquête Officielle
Date:	23 OCT 1996
Heure:	14:22
Type/Sous-type:	Boeing 707-372C
Compagnie:	Fuerza Aérea Argentina - FAA
Immatriculation:	LV-LGP
Numéro de série:	20077/728
Année de Fabrication:	1968
Moteurs:	4 Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3B
Equipage:	victimes: 2 / à bord: 8
Passagers:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 0
Total:	victimes: 2 / à bord: 8
Dégats de l'appareil:	Perte Totale
Conséquences:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Lieu de l'accident:	Buenos Aires/Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, BA (EZE) (Argentine)
Phase de vol:	A l'atterrissage (LDG)
Nature:	Cargo
Aéroport de départ:	Santiago-Arturo Merino Benitez Airport (SCL/SCEL), Chili
Aéroport de destination:	Buenos Aires/Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport, BA (EZE/SAEZ), Argentine
Numéro de vol:	5025

Détails:
The Boeing was on a cargo flight from Santiago, Chile (SCL) to Buenos Aires (EZE) carrying 30 tons of fish. The cargo was to be reloaded on a Boeing 747 heading for Madrid, Spain.
The airplane took off from Santiago at 11:50 (12:50 Argentine time). En route to Buenos Aires the captain told the copilot to perform the duties of pilot-in-command and carry out the landing from the left hand seat. The descent was flown without actioning the appropriate checklist. Tailwind caused the airplane to be high at each reporting point. The resulting descent was fast. Near the Outer Marker of runway 11 - at 7 nm from the runway - the airplane should already have been configured for the final approach. The crew quickly extended flaps to 14, 25 and 40 degrees. The flaps were then selected to 50 degrees and the captain reported on finals. The airplane then developped a nose down attitude. From an altitude of 900-1000 m there was not much time to correct. The Boeing 707 struck the ground hard about 750 m short of runway 11, broke up and caught fire.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "Erroneous setting of the air brakes at the same time as the flaps were fully extended during the short final approach. Contributing factors were: 1) Erroneous planning during the descent and approach; 2) Failure to use the experience of a similar previous event; 3) Insufficient attention to the critical situation in the aircraft operating documentation; 4) Failure to conduct a briefing prior to the approach and descent; 5) Non-use of the LCP during the entire approach maneuver; and 6) Insufficient training in CRM"

Sources:
» Junta de Investigaciones de Accidente de Aviación Civil (JIAAC), DISPOSICION N° 36/97
» ICAO Adrep Summary 4/98 (#13)