Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Tuesday 19 November 1996 |
Time: | 17:01 |
Type: |  Beechcraft 1900C-1 |
Operated by: | Great Lakes Airlines |
On behalf of: | United Express |
Registration: | N87GL |
MSN: | UC- 87 |
First flight: | 1989 |
Total airframe hrs: | 18446 |
Engines: | 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-65B |
Crew: | Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 10 / Occupants: 10 |
Total: | Fatalities: 12 / Occupants: 12 |
Collision casualties: | Fatalities: 2 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | Quincy Municipal Airport, IL (UIN) ( United States of America)
|
Crash site elevation: | 234 m (768 feet) amsl |
Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
Nature: | Domestic Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Burlington Airport, IA (BRL/KBRL), United States of America |
Destination airport: | Quincy Municipal Airport, IL (UIN/KUIN), United States of America |
Flightnumber: | 5925 |
Narrative:United Express / Great Lakes Flight 5925/5926 took off from Chicago at 15:25 with a delay of some 3 hours. After an intermediate stop at Burlington, the Beechcraft 1900 took off again for Quincy at 16:40 local time. As the Beechcraft was approaching Quincy, two aircraft were ready for departure.
A Beechcraft 65-A90 King Air (N1127D) and Piper PA-28 (N7646J) were taxiing to runway 04. Since Quincy is an uncontrolled airport, all 3 aircraft used a common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). The United Express crew asked for the first time whether the King Air was holding short or was going to depart at 16:59:29. The King Air crew didn't respond, so the King Air was asked again if they were holding short, at 17:00:16. This time the Cherokee pilot responded he was holding short of runway 04. Because of the GPWS 200 feet altitude warning in the Beech 1900 cockpit, just the last part of the transmission, including the words "King Air" were heard.
Probably thinking the King Air was holding short, the United Express crew continued their approach to runway 13. The King Air however, had taxied onto the runway and had started its takeoff roll when the Beech 1900 touched down. A collision took place at the runway 04/13 intersection. Both aircraft skidded for 110 feet and came to rest along the east edge of runway 13 with the Beech 1900's right wing interlocked with the left wing of the King Air. Both aircraft caught fire immediately.
Three pilots witnessed the accident and rushed to the scene. With the right side of the Beech 1900 on fire, they went to the right side and saw the captain with her head and one arm out of the window, shouting "get the door open!". Several attempts to open the door failed until the left wing buckled, causing the nose wheel and cockpit to fall to the right. Attempts by passengers to open the door from the inside had also failed.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the pilots in the King Air A90 to effectively monitor the common traffic advisory radio frequency or to properly scan for traffic, resulting in their commencing a takeoff roll when the Beech 1900C (United Express flight 5925) was landing on an intersecting runway.
Contributing to the cause of the accident was the Cherokee pilot's interrupted radio transmission, which led to the Beech 1900C pilots' misunderstanding of the transmission as an indication from the King Air that it would not take off until after flight 5925 had cleared the runway.
Contributing to the severity of the accident and the loss of life was the lack of adequate aircraft rescue and firefighting services, and the failure of the air stair door on the Beech 1900C to open."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 224 days (7 months) | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-97-04 | Download report: | Final report
|
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Classification:
Runway incursion
Runway mishap
Sources:
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 14.07.1997 (41,42)
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 25.11.96 (33)
» Business & Commercial Aviation Aug. 1997 (82)
» NTSB/AAR-97/04
»
Preparing for Last-minute Runway Change, Boeing 757 Flight Crew Loses Situational Awareness, Resulting in Collision with Terrain (Flight Safety Foundation - Accident Prevention July-August 1997)
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 9 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 03-JAN-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-1 |
IMMEDIATELY ISSUE A TELEGRAPHIC AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE DIRECTING ALL BEECHRAFT 1900 OPERATORS TO (1) CONSPICUOUSLY IDENTIFY THE EXTERNAL AIR STAIR EXIT DOOR BUTTON WITH HIGHLY VISIBLE MARKINGS, (2) INDICATE THAT THE BUTTON MUST BE DEPRESSED WHILE THE HANDLE IS ROTATED, & (3) INCLUDE AN ARROW TO SHOW THE DIRECTION THAT THE HANDLE MUST BE MOVED TO OPEN THE DOOR. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 22-MAY-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-36 |
PROMPTLY REQUIRE THE INSPECTION OF THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER (CVR) & ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ON ALL BEECH 1900 AIRCRAFT & ENSURE THAT OPERATORS TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION TO REPAIR DEFICIENT CVR SYSTEMS SO THAT THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING RADIO TRANSMISSIONS TO & FROM AIRPLANE, IS AS HIGH AS PRACTICABLE. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 12-SEP-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-102 |
REITERATE TO FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPHASIZING CAREFUL SCANNING TECHNIQUES DURING PILOT TRAINING AND BIENNIAL FLIGHT REVIEWS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 12-SEP-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-103 |
EVALUATE THE OF BEECH 1900C DOOR/FRAME SYSTEM TO JAM WHEN IT SUSTAINS MINIMAL PERMANENT DOOR DEFORMATION &, BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THAT EVALUATION, REQUIRE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CHANGES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 12-SEP-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-104 |
ESTABLISH CLEAR & SPECIFIC METHODS FOR SHOWING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FREEDOM FROM JAMMING CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. (Closed - Reconsidered) |
Issued: 12-SEP-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-105 |
CONSIDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 11/19/96, QUINCY ILLINOIS, ACCIDENT WHEN DEVELOPING METHODS FOR SHOWING COMPLIANCE WITH FREEDOM FROM JAMMING REQUIREMENTS, & DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS FEASIBLE TO REQUIRE THAT DOORS BE SHOWN TO BE FREE FROM JAMMING AFTER AN IMPACT OF SIMILAR SEVERITY. (Closed - Reconsidered) |
Issued: 12-SEP-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-106 |
REVIEW & IMPROVE AS NECESSARY GUIDANCE FOR PRINCIPAL MAINTENANCE INSPECTORS TO USE IN ENSURING THAT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ARE PROPERLY TRAINED IN ACCOMPLISHING THE MAINTENANCE TASKS THAT THEY ARE ASSIGNED. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 12-SEP-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-107 |
DEVELOP WAYS TO FUND AIRPORTS THAT ARE SERVED BY SCHEDULED PASSENGER OPERATIONS ON AIRCRAFT HAVING 10 OR MORE PASSENGER SEATS, AND REQUIRE THESE AIRPORTS TO ENSURE THAT AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING UNITS WITH TRAINED PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE DURING COMMUTER FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND ARE CAPABLE OF TIMELY RESPONSE. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 12-SEP-1997 | To: FAA | A-97-108 |
ADD TO THE SAFETY INFO SECTION OF THE FAA\'S INTERNET HOME PAGE A LIST OF AIRPORTS THAT HAVE SCHEDULED AIR SERVICE BUT DO NOT HAVE AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING CAPABILITIES. (Closed--No Longer Applicable) |
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Photos

accident date:
19-11-1996type: Beechcraft 1900C-1
registration: N87GL
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Burlington Airport, IA to Quincy Municipal Airport, IL as the crow flies is 93 km (58 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.