Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Sunday 22 February 1998 |
Time: | 16:23 |
Type: |  Boeing 737-2K3 |
Operating for: | Chanchangi Airlines |
Leased from: | Aviogenex |
Registration: | YU-ANU |
MSN: | 24139/1530 |
First flight: | 1988-03-17 (9 years 11 months) |
Engines: | 2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15 |
Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 21 |
Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 24 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | Kaduna Airport (KAD) ( Nigeria)
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Crash site elevation: | 632 m (2073 feet) amsl |
Phase: | Taxi (TXI) |
Nature: | Training |
Departure airport: | Kaduna Airport (KAD/DNKA), Nigeria |
Destination airport: | Kaduna Airport (KAD/DNKA), Nigeria |
Narrative:The Boeing 737 completed a flight from Lagos (LOS) through Abuja (ABV) to Kaduna (KAD) and was parked for over an hour. At 14:45 UTC, the Chief Pilot of Chanchangi Airline approached the Air Traffic Controller stating that he would like to fly around the circuit for a training flight. He was told that the visibility was 600 meters which was below the landing minima and was then advised against it. The pilot then suggested that he would carry out a "Rejected Takeoff" training.
Additional persons boarded the flight to witness the exercise.
At 15:37 UTC the pilot requested a take off clearance which was granted, and was directed to proceed to the holding point of runway 05. The prevailing visibility was 600 meters and the wind was 090 at 10 knots. Four rejected take off training runs were carried out within an interval of twelve minutes.
In the conditions at Kaduna, a single exercise of a rejected take off would have required a cooling period of at least ten minutes.
At the end of the fourth run, the left main landing gear number 2 brake unit had started to burn. The pilot steered the airplane off the runway into the last taxiway. Fifty meters from the runway 05 threshold the left inner wheel failed and leaving a molten rubber footprint on the taxiway and at the same time the hydraulic fluid of the brake units started to spill tracing an oily track along. Pieces of broken wheel rim were randomly shed for a distance of 150 meters when the rims appeared to undergo a major collapse. The footprint of the two left wheels became more pronounced for a distance of 120 meters when there was a positive turn to the left indicating a total failure in roll from the left wheel assembly. The zigzag motion continued for about 699 meters until the aircraft could no longer be easily moved and the pilot called for the fire trucks. The aircraft burnt to ashes on the spot.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The decision of the instructor pilot to carry out four rejected take-off exercises within a time interval of twelve minutes was the main cause of the accident. His estimate of reducing the brake temperatures by avoiding the use of brakes was a fabrication which is contradicted by the fact that the brake units on the left main landing gear did heat up and started the fire."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | AIPB Nigeria  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Accident number: | 04/365 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Damaged on the ground
Follow-up / safety actions
AIB Nigeria issued 5 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: | YU-ANU (1) |
The fire services at Kaduna Airport must be ungraded and equipped to serve their purposes. Furthermore, the use of fluoro-protein foam compound should be reassessed and may be the pure protein foam agent which was originally used in Nigeria may be reintroduced. There is definitely a need to adopt a more effective foam compound. |
Issued: -- | To: | YU-ANU (2) |
With immediate effect, Captain [name] is banned from operating an aircraft within the Nigerian airspace. This is a directive from the Honourable Minister of Aviation in Nigeria. |
Issued: -- | To: | YU-ANU (3) |
The Kaduna Airport runway and associated taxiways, should be derubberised, especially the contamination resulting from this accident. |
Issued: -- | To: | YU-ANU (4) |
All training programmes must adhere to the recommendations of the aircraft manufacturers. Improvisations in drawing up or amending standard programmes may result in commissions or omissions in other areas that may not readily come into mind in the improvised programmes. |
Issued: -- | To: | YU-ANU (5) |
The provision of medical personnel during aircraft emergencies must remain a standard procedure in effecting a search and rescue operation. |
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Photos

accident date:
22-02-1998type: Boeing 737-2K3
registration: YU-ANU

accident date:
22-02-1998type: Boeing 737-2K3
registration: YU-ANU

accident date:
22-02-1998type: Boeing 737-2K3
registration: YU-ANU
Map
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.