Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Thursday 26 February 1998 |
Time: | 17:29 |
Type: |  Fokker 100 |
Operator: | US Airways |
Registration: | N867US |
MSN: | 11312 |
First flight: | 1990-07-23 (7 years 7 months) |
Total airframe hrs: | 17724 |
Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 5 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 87 |
Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 92 |
Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
Aircraft fate: | Repaired |
Location: | Birmingham Airport, AL (BHM) ( United States of America)
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Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
Nature: | Domestic Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Charlotte-Douglas Airport, NC (CLT/KCLT), United States of America |
Destination airport: | Birmingham Airport, AL (BHM/KBHM), United States of America |
Flightnumber: | 861 |
Narrative:A Fokker 100, operated by US Airways as flight 861, experienced loss of directional control while landing at the Birmingham Municipal Airport, Birmingham, Alabama. The airplane was substantially damaged. The flight originated about 16:12, from the Charlotte/Douglas International Airport.
While flying in precipitation deviating within 10 miles from the edge of a level 5 thunderstorm associated with a squall line, the airplane was struck by lightning. Arching damage to the No. 1 elevator pressure and No. 2 elevator return hydraulic lines resulted in depletion of the hydraulic fluid from the Nos. 1 and 2 hydraulic system reservoirs.
The airplane was landed on a wet runway and after touchdown, 2 of the 4 main landing gear tires ruptured. The airplane traveled off the left side of the runway, across grass, and came to rest with the nose landing gear separated. A loose canon plug at the parking brake shutoff valve was discovered which prevented the operation of the alternate antiskid system. That area was inspected 2 days earlier. The airplane was only equipped by design with 1 bonding strap located on the left side of the airplane for the horizontal and vertical stabilizer; which failed.
An Advisory Circular recommends that the area be designated for carrying substantial amounts of electrical current, but the airplane was not designed for such. The flight crew was not provided convective sigmets for the central U.S., which indicated severe thunderstorms over Birmingham. The destination airport was near the boundary of the east and central regions for convective sigmets. The airline does not conduct weather radar training in recurrent, upgrade, or requalification training. The dispatcher did not provide to the flight crew weather watches that were available 15 minutes before and after the flight departed.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "Were the 1) the inoperative alternate anti-skid control valve due to the disconnected electrical connector on the parking brake shut-off valve, the area was inspected 2 days earlier 2) the total loss of the hydraulic system resulting in the inability of the flight crew to maintain directional control. Factors in the accident were the 1) inadequate lightning protection design of the airplane by the manufacturer between the horizontal and vertical stabilizers which resulted in arching damage to hydraulic lines and depletion of the hydraulic fluid from the Nos. 1 and 2 hydraulic systems 2) inadequate weather information disseminated to the flight crew during the preflight briefing by the company dispatcher for failing to provide current up-to-date information of the intensity, and location of adverse weather 3) the failure of the company dispatcher to relay pertinent weather information to the flight crew while en route which included convective sigmets, and the current extent and intensity of the squall line 4) the operation of the airplane by the flight crew within 10 miles from the northern edge of a ground based weather radar depicted level 5 thunderstorm resulting in a lightning strike 5) insufficient standards/requirements, operation/operator by the company management to require weather radar training in recurrent, upgrade, and requalification training, and 6) the limitations of the weather products provided to the flight crew by the airline for failure to include convective sigmets for the central U.S., based on the geographic location of the destination airport being east of the eastern/central boundary."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 3 years | Accident number: | MIA98FA089 | Download report: | Summary report
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Classification:
Lightningstrike
Hydraulic system problem
Runway excursion (veer-off)
Sources:
» NTSB
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 6 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 04-OCT-1993 | To: FAA | A-93-118 |
ISSUE A MAINTENANCE ALERT BULLETIN TO ADVISE U.S. OPERATORS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CORRECT INSTALLATION OF THE SPACERS ON THE MAIN LANDING GEAR TORQUE LINK AND SHIMMY DAMPER ASSEMBLY ON THE FOKKER F-28-MK-0100 AIRPLANE AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF IMPROPER INSTALLATION. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 04-OCT-1993 | To: FAA | A-93-119 |
REQUIRE FOKKER, DOWTY AEROSPACE, AND U.S. OPERATORS OF FOKKER F-28-MK-0100 AIRPLANES TO REVISE THEIR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL (OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT) TO INCLUDE AN IMPROVED DESCRIPTION AND ILLUSTRATION OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR TORQUE LINK AND SHIMMY DAMPER ASSEMBLY INSTALLATION. REQUIRE THE INCLUSION OF NOMENCLATURE OR DIMENSIONS THAT WILL CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE SPACERS USED IN THE INSTALLATION. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 04-OCT-1993 | To: FAA | A-93-120 |
REQUIRE ALL U.S. OPERATORS OF THE FOKKER F-28-MK-0100 AIRPLANE TO REVISE THEIR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL (OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT) TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR MARKING/IDENTIFYING TORQUE LINK AND SHIMMY DAMPER ASSEMBLY PARTS WHEN BEING DISASSEMBLED SO THEY CAN EASILY BE IDENTIFIED DURING INSTALLATION. ALSO, REQUIRE THE OPERATORS TO ESTABLISH A SPECIFIC INSPECTION PROCEDURE THAT WILL VERIFY THE CORRECT INSTALLATION AND DIMENSIONAL MEASUREMENT OF THE TORSIONAL/LATERAL DAMPING MOVEMENT OF MAIN LANDING GEAR LOWER TORQUE LINK ASSEMBLIES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 04-OCT-1993 | To: FAA | A-93-121 |
ADVISE FOREIGN AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES OF THE POSSIBILITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF SPACERS IN THE F-28-MK-0100 MAIN LANDING GEAR TORQUE LINK AND SHIMMY DAMPER ASSEMBLY AND RECOMMEND THAT MAINTENANCE MANUALS, OR EQUIVALENT DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE FOKKER F-28-MK-0100, BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE AN IMPROVED DESCRIPTION AND ILLUSTRATION OF THE ASSEMBLY INSTALLATION AND TO INCLUDE NOMENCLATURE OR DIMENSIONS THAT WILL CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE SPACERS USED IN THE INSTALLATION. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 04-OCT-1993 | To: FAA | A-93-122 |
ENCOURAGE FOKKER TO REDESIGN THE F-28-MK-0100 MAIN LANDING GEAR SHIMMY DAMPER SPACER ASSEMBLY TO PREVENT THE REQUIRED SPACERS FROM BEING INTERCHANGED AND ASSEMBLED INCORRECTLY. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 01-APR-1999 | To: FAA | A-99-19 |
REVIEW THE DESIGN OF THE BONDING STRAP INSTALLATION AT THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER HINGE OF THE FOKKER F.28 MARK 0100 AND MARK 0070 AND REQUIRE OPERATORS TO MODIFY THEIR AIRPLANES TO INCREASE THE LIGHTNING STRIKE PROTECTION AT THAT LOCATION. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Charlotte-Douglas Airport, NC to Birmingham Airport, AL as the crow flies is 560 km (350 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.