Narrative:At 15:36, the power levers were advanced to the take-off power range. V1 was called, and rotation was initiated at the target rotation speed (VR) of 115 KIAS, with approximately 3700 feet of runway remaining. The elevator was deflected, and the nose began to pitch up. The captain relaxed the elevator controls somewhat when the aircraft approached what he thought was the take-off attitude. When the aircraft did not get airborne as expected, he pulled back on the controls a second time. The aircraft had reached 121 KIAS, with 2800 feet remaining during the second attempt. The aircraft did not get airborne and the captain called for a reject as the aircraft accelerated through 127 KIAS. He retarded the power levers as the aircraft reached a speed of 131 KIAS and was approximately 1750 feet from the end of the runway. The captain applied full braking, and the full-fine pitch stop lever was applied for aerodynamic braking. When it became apparent that the aircraft would not stop on the runway, the captain steered the aircraft to the left in an attempt to avoid the localizer antenna. The aircraft was traveling at approximately 100 knots as it went off the end of the runway. As the aircraft rolled through the soft ground, the nose-wheel gear collapsed. The right wing hit the localizer antenna, and the aircraft continued skidding on its belly through heavy rocks. It came to rest in a nose-down attitude approximately 800 feet off the declared end of the runway.
FINDINGS AS TO CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:
- The captain rejected the take-off at a speed well above the engine-failure recognition speed (V1) with insufficient runway remaining to stop before the end of the runway.
- The far-forward position of the center of gravity contributed to the pilot not rotating the aircraft to the normal take-off attitude.
- The aircraft never achieved the required pitch for take-off. The captain's inability to accurately assess the pitch attitude was probably influenced by the heavier than normal elevator control forces and the limited nighttime visual references.
- The loadmaster did not follow the company- and Transport Canada-approved procedures to evaluate the excess baggage added to the aircraft, which led to a discrepancy of 450 pounds and a C of G position further forward than expected.
- The performance analysis suggested that the aircraft was under-rotated as a result of a forward C of G loading and the generated lift never exceeded the aircraft's weight during the take-off attempt.
» Scramble 239
Official accident investigation report
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not
display the exact flight path.
Distance from Iqaluit Airport, NU to Igloolik Airport, NU as the crow flies is 846 km (529 miles).