ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 323826
| Date: | Monday 4 January 1999 |
| Time: | 08:59 |
| Type: |  Beechcraft 1900C-1 |
| Owner/operator: | Regionnair |
| Registration: | C-FGOI |
| MSN: | UC- 85 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Engine model: | Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-65B |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 12 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Saint-Augustin River, QC -
 Canada
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Lourdes-de-Blanc-Sablon Airport, QC (YBX/CYBX) |
| Saint-Augustin Airport, QC (YIF/CYIF) | |
| Investigating agency: | TSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The Beechcraft 1900C took off from Lourdes-de-Blanc-Sablon Airport at about 08:35 for the scheduled IFR flight GIO 1707. At about 08:45, 28nm east of Saint-Augustin, just before leaving cruising altitude at FL100, the first officer contacted the authorized approach UNICOM (AAU) radiotelephone operator, who provided the following information: the runway was snow-covered, the ceiling was 300 feet, visibility was a quarter of a mile in snow flurries, the winds were from the southeast at 15 knots gusting to 20 knots, and the altimeter setting was 29.80 inches of mercury. Because of the winds, the captain decided to conduct the LOC/DME approach for runway 20. At 08:59, the aircraft flew into the frozen surface of the Saint-Augustin River at about 109 knots. The aircraft was on the final approach path 0.7 nm from the runway threshold. The crash occurred 1 400 feet from either side of the river. The aircraft bounced before coming to a halt on its belly 1 300 feet farther on.
FINDINGS AS TO CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: "1. The crew did not follow the company's SOPs for the briefing preceding the approach and for a missed approach.; 2. In the approach briefing, the captain did not specify the MDA or the MAP, and the first officer did not notice these oversights, which shows a lack of coordination within the crew.; 3. The captain continued descent below the MDA without establishing visual contact with the required references.; 4. The first officer probably had difficulty perceiving depth because of the whiteout.; 5. The captain did not effectively monitor the flight parameters because he was trying to establish visual contact with the runway.; 6. The chief pilot (the captain of C-FGOI) set a bad example to the pilots under him by using a dangerous method, that is, descending below the MDA without establishing visual contact with the required references and using the GPWS to approach the ground."
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
Scramble 237, 243
Images:
photo (c) aeroprints.com; Rantoul, KS; 30 April 2013; (CC:by-sa)
Revision history:
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