ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 323749
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| Date: | Saturday 8 May 1999 |
| Time: | 07:01 |
| Type: |  Saab 340B |
| Owner/operator: | American Eagle Airlines |
| Registration: | N232AE |
| MSN: | 340B-232 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1991 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 17488 hours |
| Engine model: | General Electric CT7-9B |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 30 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial, repaired |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK) -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Baltimore/Washington International Airport, MD (BWI/KBWI) |
| New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK/KJFK) | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The Saab 340B sustained substantial damage during landing at New York-JFK International Airport.
The departure from Baltimore/Washington International Airport, and cruise flight to JFK was uneventful. The captain completed an approach checklist and briefing, and ATC gave the flightcrew a vector for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 4R. Later, ATC advised the flightcrew that the runway visibility range (RVR) was 1,600 feet. The controller asked if the flightcrew could proceed with the approach, or if they were going to have to hold until the RVR was at 1,800 feet. The captain stated that they needed 1,800 feet RVR to initiate the approach. ATC then cleared the flight to turn to 010 degrees and intercept the runway 4R localizer, and hold southwest of the EBBEE intersection, on the localizer, at 4,000 feet.
The airplane had not reached EBBEE, but was on the localizer course, when the controller stated, "Eagle flight nine twenty five, runway four right RVR is eighteen hundred if, if you want to make it from there, or you might be too high. Just let me know..." The captain replied "we can take it." The controller then cleared flight 4925 for the ILS approach to runway 4R. At that time, the airplane was approximately 4,000 feet mean sea level (MSL), and 6.6 miles from the approach end of the runway. The first officer began the approach descent, but the captain extended the landing gear and took control of the airplane.
Approximately 24 seconds after issuing the approach clearance, the controller stated, "Eagle flight nine twenty five, you good for the approach from there?" The captain replied, "We're gonna give it our best."
During the descent, the flightcrew received four audible warnings, including one "sink rate", and three "too low terrain" warnings. According to a Saab 340 manual, a "too low terrain" warning would cancel a flap warning. At 0701:12, the first officer stated "okay, there's three hundred feet." Approximately 7 seconds later, the captain stated "okay, before landing checklist is." The first officer replied "three green, flaps zero." During the approach, the first officer made no other callouts. The flaps remained retracted during the approach. However, after the accident, the captain extended the flaps to 20 degrees.
The airplane's descent rate reached a maximum vertical velocity of approximately 2,950 feet per minute. The airplane crossed the runway threshold about 180 knots. It touched down approximately 7,000 feet beyond the approach end of the runway, at 157 knots. The flightcrew applied reverse thrust and maximum braking, but the airplane departed the end of the runway about 75 knots.
The airplane traveled off the end of the runway, over a deflector, and onto an Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS). The airplane traveled approximately 248 feet across the 400 foot long EMAS, and the landing gear sank approximately 30 inches into the EMAS, at its final resting place. During the overrun, the nose gear, fuselage, and propellers sustained damage.
Probable Cause: "The pilot-in-command's failure to perform a missed approach as required by his company procedures. Factors were the pilot-in-command's improper in-flight decisions, the pilot-incommand's failure to comply with FAA regulations and company procedures, inadequate crew coordination, and fatigue."
Accident investigation:
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Sources:
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