| Statuts: | Enquête Officielle |
| Date: | 22 AOU 1999 |
| Heure: | 18:43 |
| Type/Sous-type: | McDonnell Douglas MD-11 |
| Compagnie: | China Airlines |
| Immatriculation: | B-150 |
| Numéro de série: | 48468/518 |
| Année de Fabrication: | 1992 |
| Heures de vol: | 30721 |
| Cycles: | 5824 |
| Moteurs: | 3 Pratt & Whitney PW4460 |
| Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 15 |
| Passagers: | victimes: 3 / à bord: 300 |
| Total: | victimes: 3 / à bord: 315 |
| Dégats de l'appareil: | Perte Totale |
| Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Lieu de l'accident: | Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG) (Hong-Kong)
 |
| Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
| Nature: | Transport de Passagers Intern. |
| Aéroport de départ: | Bangkok-Don Muang International Airport (BKK/VTBD), Thaïlande |
| Aéroport de destination: | Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG/VHHH), Hong-Kong |
| Numéro de vol: | 642 |
Détails:China Airlines flight 642 departed Bangkok for a flight to Taipei via Hong Kong. Weather in the Hong Kong area was very poor with a severe tropical storm ('Sam') 50km NE of the airport and gale force winds and thunderstorms. Extra fuel was carried, because the crew intended to continue to Taipei, depending on weather at Hong Kong on arrival. Before the arrival of flight 642 four flights carried out missed approaches, five planes diverted and 12 planes landed successfully.
Weather information obtained by the crew at 18:06 reported a 300deg wind at 35 knots and an RVR of 650m in heavy rain. The flight crew then prepared for a runway 25L ILS approach. Landing reference speed was calculated to be 152 knots and the captain (pilot-in-command) would fly the approach at 170 knots and would continue to land depending on a wind check on finals.
At 18:41, while flying the runway 25L ILS approach, weather was reported to the crew being 1600m visibility in the touchdown zone, wind 320deg/25 knots gusting to 33 knots. The aircraft was then cleared to land. At an altitude of 700 feet prior to touchdown a further wind check was passed to the crew: 320deg/28 knots gusting to 36 knots. Maximum crosswind component limit for the aircraft was 24 knots. The pilot-in-command continued with the approach, disconnected the autopilot but left auto throttle engaged. The MD-11, with a weight very close to the maximum landing weight permitted, stabilized slightly low on the glide slope. At 50 feet above the runway, upon power reduction to flight idle, the airspeed decreased from 170 to 152 knots. An attempt was made to flare in a slightly right wing down (less than 4 deg) attitude. The aircraft landed hard on its right main gear and the no. 3 engine touched the runway. The right main gear separated and the right wing separated. The MD-11 then rolled inverted as it skidded off the runway in flames. It came to rest on a grass area next to the runway, 1100m from the runway threshold. The right wing was found on a taxiway 90m from the nose of the plane.
The crash sequence in this case bears similarities to a Fedex MD-11 which also flipped upside down on landing at Newark.
CAUSAL FACTORS:
"The cause of the accident was the commander’s inability to arrest the high rate of descent existing at 50 ft RA.
Probable contributory causes to the high rate of descent were:
(i) The commander’s failure to appreciate the combination of a reducing airspeed, increasing rate of descent, and with the thrust decreasing to flight idle.
(ii) The commander’s failure to apply power to counteract the high rate of descent prior to touchdown.
(iii) Probable variations in wind direction and speed below 50 ft RA may have resulted in a momentary loss of headwind component and, in combination with the early retardation of the thrust levers, and at a weight only just below the maximum landing weight, led to a 20 kt loss in indicated airspeed just prior to touchdown.
A possible contributory cause may have been a reduction in peripheral vision as the aircraft entered the area of the landing flare, resulting in the commander not appreciating the high rate of descent prior to touchdown."
China Airlines and the plane's co-pilot applied for a review of the findings and conclusions of the accident report. In September, 2002, the Chief Executive appointed an independent Board of Review made up of a Principal Magistrate and two overseas expert assessors. Their report completed in December, 2004.
Regarding the causal factors, the Board of Review rejected the part of the causal factor relating to the maximum landing weight in para. (iii) being a possible significant contributing cause to the high rate of descent: "In relation to para. (iii), we are of the view that the reference to aircraft weight is possibly misleading as any increase in drag resulting from the aircraft weight would have been minimal and a heavier aircraft would have more inertia and possibly greater stability in these particular circumstances. Furthermore, the extra fuel carried would have allowed for a wider range of aircraft diversion options, thereby relieving some of the pressures on the crew to avoid a go-around."
Sources:
Official accident investigation report
Opérations de secours
CAD Hong Kong issued 10 Safety Recommendations
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: China Airlines | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (1) |
| China Airlines should remind its MD11 pilots of the need for an early and complete approach briefing. |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: HK CAD | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (10) |
| With reference to local wind effects, HKO should provide information regarding the character of airflow in the vicinity of the TDZ of RW 25L and RW 25R in conditions of severe tropical storms and, in particular, when the wind directions are between northwest, through north, to south with the purpose of providing the CAD with further advisory meteorological
information to be included in the Hong Kong AIP. |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: China Airlines | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (2) |
| China Airlines should review the content of its CRM training course to ensure that contributions made by the monitoring pilot, in operational situations, are both accurate and appropriate. |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: China Airlines | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (3) |
| China Airlines should review its MD11 training syllabuses to ensure the crew monitor the automated systems on the flight deck, so as to be ready to intervene, or override manually, whenever necessary. |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: China Airlines | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (4) |
| China Airlines should consider the introduction of a ‘Flight Instructor Guide’ of a type used by other MD11 operators and which includes advice to training staff on techniques to be followed during crosswind landings. |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: China Airlines | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (5) |
| China Airlines should, in association with the Boeing Company, amend the recommended landing procedures in the MD11 SOP to include procedures for approaches and landings in more demanding weather conditions. |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: China Airlines | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (6) |
| China Airlines should ensure that crosswind landing limitations noted in its publications are consistent throughout. |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: China Airlines | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (7) |
| China Airlines should re-emphasise to flight crews the need on instrument approaches, to continue to monitor the flight instruments in the final stages of the approach as prescribed in the China Airlines Flight Operations Manual (FOM). |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: Boeing | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (8) |
| The Boeing Company and the equipment vendor should conduct a study to examine methods for preventing the loss of QAR data in the event the equipment is switched off in a non standard way such as by an interruption to the power supply. |
| Issued: -DEC-2004 | To: HK CAD | Safety Recommendation AAR 1/2004 (9) |
| CAD should give consideration to the installation of equipment, such as video recorders, to monitor the touch down zones of Runways 25 R/L and 07 R/L. |
Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations
Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Bangkok-Don Muang International Airport et Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport est de 1677 km (1048 miles).