Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Tuesday 14 September 1999 |
Time: | 23:47 |
Type: |  Boeing 757-204 |
Operator: | Britannia Airways |
Registration: | G-BYAG |
MSN: | 26965/517 |
First flight: | 1992 |
Total airframe hrs: | 26429 |
Cycles: | 9816 |
Engines: | 2 Rolls-Royce RB211-535E4 |
Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 9 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 236 |
Total: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 245 |
Aircraft damage: | Damaged beyond repair |
Location: | Gerona-Costa Brava Airport (GRO) ( Spain)
|
Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
Nature: | Int'l Non Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Cardiff-Wales Airport (CWL/EGFF), United Kingdom |
Destination airport: | Gerona-Costa Brava Airport (GRO/LEGE), Spain |
Flightnumber: | BY226A |
Narrative:Britannia Airways Flight 226A took off from Cardiff at 20:40 local time for a charter flight to Gerona. The crew contacted Gerona ATC at 23:14 hours. With a thunderstorm in the area, flight conditions were turbulent. ATC offered the option of a runway 20 ILS approach, but the crew decided to fly a VOR/DME procedure to runway 02 considering the prevailing conditions of wet runway, downslope and tailwind. At 23:33, in full landing configuration and just after passing 10 DME, the crew were advised of a change of wind to 200 degrees at 12 knots. Upon becoming visual the aircraft was not adequately aligned with the runway and the change in wind direction now favored the reciprocal runway so a missed approach was carried out. The aircraft was now positioned for an ILS approach to runway 20. During the approach the crew noted that the company minimum amount of fuel for a diversion to Barcelona (2,800 kg) had been reached. At 23:46:58 hrs, at 250 feet above ground level (agl) and on the correct glidepath, the captain disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle. The aircraft began to deviate above the glidepath. Twelve seconds later, at 110 feet agl, the captain briefly pushed the control column almost fully forward before returning it to an approximately neutral position. The aircraft pitched down to -4.5° nose down attitude and then back up to -2.5° nose down attitude. During this period the captain lost his visual reference with the runway because all runway lights had suddenly failed. The GPWS then warned of the excessive sink rate and the thrust levers being retarded to idle. At 21:47:17 the aircraft touched down in a 2° nose down attitude and a recorded peak normal (vertical) acceleration of 3.11 g. The aircraft bounced, the nose pitched up to +3.3°, a roll to the right commenced, both the thrust levers advanced and the power on both engines increased to 1.18 EPR. Full nose down elevator was applied and held until a second touchdown, resulting in a rapid pitch down. The aircraft made the second touchdown 1.9 seconds after the first at -0.5° pitch attitude (nose down), with a pitch rate of 7°/sec nose down and 4.2° of right roll. After a run of approximately 343 meters across flat grassland beside the runway, the aircraft ran diagonally over a substantial earth mound adjacent to the airport boundary, becoming semi-airborne as a result. At the far side of the mound a number of medium sized trees were struck and severed, predominantly by the right wing, and the right engine nacelle struck the boundary fence. The aircraft, yawed considerably to the right of its direction of travel, then passed through the fence, re-landed in a field and both main landing gears collapsed. It came to rest after a 244 meter slide across the field, with the fuselage almost structurally severed at two points.
One passenger who was initially admitted to hospital with minor injuries was discharged the following day. He died five days later as a result of unsuspected internal injuries.
Probable Cause:
CAUSES: "It is considered that the most probable cause of the accident was the destabilisation of the approach below decision height with loss of external visual references and automatic height callouts immediately before landing, resulting in touchdown with excessive descent rate in a nose down attitude. The resulting displacement of the nose landing gear support structure caused disruption to aircraft systems that led to uncommanded forward thrust increase and other effects that severely aggravated the consequences of the initial event. Contributory factors were: 1. Impairment of the runway visual environment as a result of darkness and torrential rain and the extinguishing of runway lights immediately before landing; 2. Suppression of some automatic height callouts by the GPWS <> audio caution; 3. The effect of shock or mental incapacitation on the PF at the failure of the runway lights which may have inhibited him from making a decision to go-around; 4. The absence of specific flight crew training in flight simulators to initiate a go-around when below landing decision height; 5. Insufficient evaluation of the weather conditions, particularly the movement and severity of the storm affecting the destination airport."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | CIAIAC  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Accident number: | A-054/1999 | Download report: | Final report
|
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Classification:
Landing after unstabilized approach
Runway excursion (veer-off)
Sources:
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SKYbrary
Follow-up / safety actions
CIAIAC issued 10 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: FAA | REC 26/04 |
It is recommended that the FAA require the B757 aircraft manufacturer to take measures aimed at preventing potentially hazardous effects on aircraft systems as the result of overload failure of the nose landing gear leg or its support structure. In particular the measures should aim to prevent uncommanded forward thrust increase. |
Issued: -- | To: Boeing | REC 27/04 |
It is recommended that the aircraft manufacturer consider the possibility of modifying the procedure or the design of the alert system of the aircraft to minimise the possibility of B757 flight crews inadvertently leaving the speedbrake deployed with engine thrust above idle. |
Issued: -- | To: FAA | REC 28/04 |
It is recommended that the FAA require the B757 aircraft manufacturer to take measures aimed at improving the protection of flight crew members subjected to inertial loading while restrained by their harness, against impact with flight deck components, with the shoulder harness selected to either «lock» or «manual». |
Issued: -- | To: Boeing | REC 29/04 |
It is recommended that the aircraft manufacturer take measures aimed at ensuring adequate crashworthiness of the B757 passenger service units and exit sign batteries. |
Issued: -- | To: EASA | REC 30/04 |
It is recommended to European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) that they evaluate the possibility of making mandatory the requirements to train flight crews in go-around manoeuvres even from below the decision height, with the aim of reducing the response time when faced with unforeseen events. |
Issued: -- | To: Britannia Airways | REC 31/04 |
It is recommended that the Aircraft Operator should review its flight planning and clearance procedures in order to take into consideration probable meteorological conditions at the destination and alternate airports, including thunderstorms. |
Issued: -- | To: Girona Airport | REC 32/04 |
It is recommended that the Girona Airport operator study the possibility of modifying the physical characteristics of the runway strip to make them compliant with the levelling and slope recommended in ICAO Annex 14. |
Issued: -- | To: AENA | REC 33/04 |
It is recommended that AENA should evaluate the possibility of increasing the training and available means to improve the search of crashed aircraft and to reduce the time to locate and actuate on the wreckage in adverse meteorological and reduced visibility conditions. |
Issued: -- | To: AENA | REC 34/04 |
It is recommended that AENA should establish standardised Control Tower procedures that include checklists to prevent and detect errors of execution and omission in the control tasks, and also to increase the trai-ning of air traffic controllers to determine what meteorological information must be provided to the flight crews. |
Issued: -- | To: INM | REC 35/04 |
It is recommended that the National Meteorology Institute (INM), in colla-boration with the air traffic services, establish a standardised system to inform the flight crews on the evolution and intensity of storms, particularly regarding storms that could be a hazard to the operation in the areas of initial climb and approach to aerodromes. |
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Photos

accident date:
14-09-1999type: Boeing 757-204
registration: G-BYAG

accident date:
14-09-1999type: Boeing 757-204
registration: G-BYAG

accident date:
14-09-1999type: Boeing 757-204
registration: G-BYAG

accident date:
14-09-1999type: Boeing 757-204
registration: G-BYAG

accident date:
14-09-1999type: Boeing 757-204
registration: G-BYAG
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Cardiff-Wales Airport to Gerona-Costa Brava Airport as the crow flies is 1145 km (715 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.