Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | mardi 25 juillet 2000 |
Heure: | 16:44 |
Type/Sous-type: |  Aérospatiale / BAC Concorde 101 |
Compagnie: | Air France |
Immatriculation: | F-BTSC |
Numéro de série: | 203 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1975 |
Heures de vol: | 11989 |
Cycles: | 4873 |
Moteurs: | 4 Rolls-Royce Olympus 593/610 |
Equipage: | victimes: 9 / à bord: 9 |
Passagers: | victimes: 100 / à bord: 100 |
Total: | victimes: 109 / à bord: 109 |
Victimes au sol: | victimes: 4 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Détruit |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Gonesse ( France)
|
Phase de vol: | En vol (ENR) |
Nature: | Charter International |
Aéroport de départ: | Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG/LFPG), France |
Aéroport de destination: | New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK/KJFK), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
Numéro de vol: | AF4590 |
Détails:The Air France Concorde, registered F-BTSC, was to depart Paris-Charles de Gaulle for a flight (4590) to New York-JFK. Departure was delayed by about one hour because the crew had requested a replacement of the thrust reverser pneumatic motor of the no. 2 engine. Also, the rear bogie truck of the left hand main undercarriage was replaced. When all 100 passengers had boarded, the plane taxied to runway 26R (4217 m long). Takeoff weight was calculated to be 186,9 tons, including 95 tons of fuel, which was one tone over the maximum takeoff weight. At 14:42:17 the crew were cleared for takeoff.
At 14:42:31, the captain commenced takeoff. At 14:42:54.6, the co-pilot called one hundred knots, then V1 nine seconds later. A few seconds after that, tyre No 2 (right front) on the left main landing gear was destroyed after having run over a strip of metal lost by a Continental Airlines DC-10-30, registered N13067 which departed Paris as flight 055 to Newark five minutes before. The destruction of the tyre in all probability resulted in large pieces of rubber being thrown against the underside of the left wing and the rupture of a part of tank 5. A severe fire broke out under the left wing and around the same time engines 1 and 2 suffered a loss of thrust, severe for engine 2, slight for engine 1. By 14:43:13, as the captain commenced the rotation, the controller informed the crew the presence of flames behind the aircraft. The co-pilot acknowledged this transmission and the flight engineer announced the failure of engine no. 2. Nine seconds later the engine fire alarm sounded and the flight engineer announced "shut down engine 2" then the captain called for the "engine fire" procedure. A few seconds later, the engine 2 fire handle was pulled and the fire alarm stopped. The co-pilot drew the captain's attention to the airspeed, which was 200 kt. At 14:43:30, the captain called for landing gear retraction. The controller confirmed the presence of large flames behind the aircraft. Twelve seconds later the engine fire alarm sounded again for around 12 seconds. It sounded for the third time at about 14:43:58 and continued until the end of the flight. At 14:43:56, the co-pilot commented that the landing gear had not retracted and made several callouts in relation to the airspeed. Three seconds later, the GPWS alarm sounded several times. The co-pilot informed ATC that they were trying for Le Bourget aerodrome. Then the number 1 engine lost power as well. The aircraft entered a left turn until control was lost, crashing into hotel 'Hotellisimo' and bursting into flames.
Probable Cause:
CAUSE PROBABLE: "L'accident est dû aux causes suivantes :
- Passage à grande vitesse d'un pneumatique sur une pièce perdue par un avion qui avait décollé cinq minutes plus tôt et destruction de ce pneumatique.
- Arrachement d'un important morceau de réservoir selon un processus complexe de transmission de l'énergie produite par l'impact d'un morceau de pneumatique en un autre point du réservoir, cette transmission associant la déformation de la paroi du réservoir et le déplacement du carburant, avec peut-être l'effet contributif d'autres chocs moins importants et/ou d'un coup de bélier hydrodynamique.
- Inflammation du carburant qui fuyait par un arc électrique dans le puits de train ou au contact des parties chaudes du moteur avec remontée de la flamme, provoquant un feu très important sous l'aile de l'avion et d'importantes pertes de poussée des moteurs 2 puis 1.
- Par ailleurs, l'impossibilité de rentrer le train a probablement contribué à l'accrochage et à la stabilisation de la flamme durant tout le vol."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | BEA  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 6 months | Accident number: | Report f-sc000725 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
»
SKYbrary » Bureau Enquêtes-Accidents (BEA)
Opérations de secours
The Concorde certificate of airworthiness was suspended 16-8-2000. Major changes to the fuel tank were ordered before Concorde was allowed to fly on passenger services again on November 7, 2001.
BEA issued 13 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: | F-BTSC(1) |
the airworthiness authorities, the manufacturers and the operators of Concorde reinforce the means available for the analysis of the functioning of aircraft systems and in-service events and for the rapid definition of corrective actions. |
Issued: -- | To: ICAO | F-BTSC(10) |
the ICAO study the procedures for recording specific exchanges between cabin crew members and exchanges between the cockpit and the cabin. |
Issued: -- | To: DGAC France | F-BTSC(11) |
the DGAC, in liaison with the appropriate regulatory bodies, study the possibility of installing devices to visualise parts of the structure hidden from the crews view or devices to detect damage to those parts of the aircraft. |
Issued: -- | To: DGAC France | F-BTSC(12) |
the DGAC, in liaison with the appropriate regulatory bodies, study the possibility of modifying the regulatory requirements relating to new flight simulators so that they accurately reproduce the accelerations really experienced in the cockpit. |
Issued: -- | To: ICAO | F-BTSC(13) |
the ICAO put recommendation 8/1 of the AIG 99 meeting into practice in the shortest possible time and, while waiting for the results of this work, that the primary certification authorities ask manufacturers to immediately identify all potentially dangerous substances in case of an accident which are used in the manufacture of aircraft under their responsibility and to mention them in an explicit manner in documentation. |
Issued: -- | To: Air France | F-BTSC(2) |
Air France ensure that the emergency procedures in the section on Concorde utilisation in its Operations Manual be coherent with the Flight Manual. |
Issued: -- | To: Air France | F-BTSC(3) |
Air France equip its Concorde aircraft with recorders capable of sampling at least once a second the parameters that allow engine speed to be determined on all of the engines. |
Issued: -- | To: DGAC France | F-BTSC(4) |
the DGAC undertake an audit of Concorde operational and maintenance conditions within Air France. |
Issued: -- | To: DGAC France | F-BTSC(5) |
the DGAC, in liaison with the appropriate regulatory bodies, study the reinforcement of the regulatory requirements and demonstrations of conformity with regard to aviation tyres. |
Issued: -- | To: DGAC France | F-BTSC(6) |
the DGAC, in liaison with the appropriate regulatory bodies, modify the regulatory certification requirements so as to take into account the risks of tank damage and the risk of ignition of fuel leaks. |
Issued: -- | To: DGAC France | F-BTSC(7) |
the DGAC ensure the rapid implementation of programmes for the prevention of debris on aerodromes. These programmes should involve all organisations and personnel operating on the movement area |
Issued: -- | To: FAA | F-BTSC(8) |
the FAA carry out an audit of Continental Airlines maintenance both in the United States and at its foreign sub-contractors. |
Issued: -- | To: ICAO | F-BTSC(9) |
the ICAO fix a precise timetable for the FLIREC group to establish propositions on the conditions for the installation of video recorders on board aircraft undertaking public transport flights. |
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Photos

accident date:
25-07-2000type: Concorde 101
registration: F-BTSC

accident date:
25-07-2000type: Concorde 101
registration: F-BTSC

accident date:
25-07-2000type: Concorde 101
registration: F-BTSC

accident date:
25-07-2000type: Concorde 101
registration: F-BTSC

accident date:
25-07-2000type: Concorde 101
registration: F-BTSC

accident date:
25-07-2000type: Concorde 101
registration: F-BTSC

accident date:
25-07-2000type: Concorde 101
registration: F-BTSC
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport et New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY est de 5792 km (3620 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.