Narrative:Takeoff was initiated on runway 3C (8,500 feet by 200 feet, wet). The flight crew reported that at an airspeed of approximately 110 knots, the nose of the airplane began to lift off. The captain attempted to lower the nose, however, the airplane was unresponsive. The airplane became airborne and climbed to an altitude of 20 to 30 feet above the runway. The captain reduced the power on both engines and the airplane settled to the runway, striking the tail. The airplane traveled approximately 700 feet off the end of the runway where it came to rest in the muddy terrain. An emergency evacuation was performed during which the L2 evacuation slide did not deploy. During the investigation, NTSB determined that the airplane was loaded so that its center of gravity (CG), although within limits, was in the aft region of the permissible range. Further, the flight crew had incorrectly set the trim for the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) at -1.7°UP (airplane nose up). This setting resulted in a pitch-up trim condition. The proper trim setting, 1.7°DN (airplane nose down), would have resulted in a correct trim condition for the way the airplane was loaded. The improperly set trim caused the nose of the airplane to lift off the runway prematurely.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The pilot induced oscillations and the delay in aborting the takeoff. Factors associated with the accident were the first officer used an improper trim setting and the captain did not identify and correct the setting during the taxi checklist, and the wet runway conditions."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 8 months | Accident number: | CHI01FA104 | Download report: | Summary report
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Classification:
Rejected takeoff
Runway excursion
Sources:
» NTSB id CHI01FA104
Follow-up / safety actions
FAA issued 1 Airworthiness Directive
NTSB issued 4 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 16-MAY-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-27 |
IMMEDIATELY ISSUE AN EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE OPERATORS OF OVERWATER-EQUIPPED AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319, A320, AND A321 AIRPLANES WITH MANUALLY CHAMFERED GIRT BARS TO (1) ENSURE THAT THE DIMENSIONS OF THE TRIGGER LOCKING MECHANISM AND THE STATIONARY PORTION OF THE GIRT BARS CONFORM TO THE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS; (2) PERFORM A RELIABLE FUNCTIONAL TEST TO DEMONSTRATE THE PROPER ENGAGEMENT OF MANUALLY CHAMFERED GIRT BARS UNDER REALISTIC DOOR OPENING CONDITIONS; AND (3) REPAIR OR REPLACE ANY GIRT BARS THAT DO NOT MEET THE DIMENSIONAL REQUIREMENTS OR DO NOT PASS THE FUNCTIONAL TEST, BEFORE THE AIRPLANES ARE RETURNED TO SERVICE. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 16-MAY-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-28 |
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE OPERATORS OF OVERWATER-EQUIPPED AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319, A320, AND A321 AIRPLANES WITH MACHINE-CHAMFERED GIRT BARS TO, BY THE NEXT SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY, (1) ENSURE THAT THE DIMENSIONS OF THE TRIGGER LOCKING MECHANISM AND THE STATIONERY PORTION OF THE GIRT BARS CONFORM TO THE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS; (2) PERFORM A RELIABLE FUNCTIONAL TEST TO DEMONSTRATE THE PROPER ENGAGEMENT OF THE GIRT BARS UNDER REALISTIC DOOR OPENING CONDITIONS; AND (3) REPAIR OR REPLACE ANY GIRT BARS THAT DO NOT MEET THE DIMENSIONAL REQUIREMENTS OR DO NOT PASS THE FUNCTIONAL TEST BEFORE THE AIRPLANES ARE RETURNED TO SERVICE. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 08-SEP-2001 | To: Airbus A319, A320, and A321 series | AD 2001-16-14 |
Required modification of the telescopic girt bar of the escape slide/raft assembly, and follow-on actions |
Issued: 15-APR-2002 | To: FAA | A-02-6 |
Require operators of Airbus Industrie A319, A320, and A321 airplanes to set and cross-check the trim using center of gravity trim values only. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 15-APR-2002 | To: FAA | A-02-7 |
Require operators of Airbus Industrie A319, A320, and A321 airplanes to ensure that the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring display and the aircraft communication addressing and reporting system load data sheet are configured so that they display trimmable horizontal stabilizer trim unit information in a manner that is consistent with the display on the degree scale of the trim wheel indicator. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
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Photos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Detroit-Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, MI to Miami International Airport, FL as the crow flies is 1834 km (1146 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.