Crash-aerien 10 MAY 2001 d'un McDonnell Douglas MD-83 EC-FXI

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Accident

Last updated: 19 June 2013

Statuts:	Enquête Officielle
Date:	10 MAI 2001
Heure:	12:32
Type/Sous-type:	McDonnell Douglas MD-83
Compagnie:	Spanair
Immatriculation:	EC-FXI
Numéro de série:	49630/1591
Année de Fabrication:	1989
Heures de vol:	42293
Cycles:	21327
Moteurs:	2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-219
Equipage:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 6
Passagers:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 45
Total:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 51
Dégats de l'appareil:	Substantiels
Conséquences:	Repaired
Lieu de l'accident:	Liverpool International Airport (LPL) (Royaume Uni)
Phase de vol:	A l'atterrissage (LDG)
Nature:	Charter International
Aéroport de départ:	Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI/LEPA), Espagne
Aéroport de destination:	Liverpool International Airport (LPL/EGGP), Royaume Uni
Numéro de vol:	3203

Détails:
An automatic landing on runway 27 was carried out with the first officer being the pilot flying. The right main landing gear failed immediately upon touchdown. The aircraft slid along the runway and came to a halt some 1,600 metres further on, resting on its right flaps, slats and wingtip. An emergency evacuation was carried out. Examination of the aircraft showed that the right main gear strut cylinder had fractured below the attachment trunnions, releasing the wheels/axle assembly back into the flaps and wing/fuselage fairing. The lower portion of the failed cylinder remained attached only by the sidestay. A closer inspection revealed the presence of an anomaly on the forward outer surface of the cylinder fracture, which subsequent examination identified as a fatigue crack measuring approximately 3.5mm long and 1.1mm deep.

CAUSAL FACTORS:
1. The right main landing gear cylinder failed immediately upon touchdown due to the application of spin-up drag loads on a section of the cylinder containing a major fatigue crack 3.2 mm long and 1.0 mm deep and several other smaller cracks associated with it.
2. The origins of these fatigue cracks could not be identified but other embryonic cracks were found which were associated with surface irregularities arising from a grit-blasting process during manufacture. Abnormal loading, possibly due to an occurrence of a mode of fore-and-aft vibration known as 'gear walking' is thought to have been responsible, at some time in the aircraft's history, for propagating the cracks to a depth at which continued growth was possible under normal loading. Alternatively, some abnormal loading may have relaxed the beneficial compressive surface stresses induced by shot-peening at the critical section and allowed propagation from the same surface defects.
3. Inspection and other mandatory preventive measures taken following two similar accidents did not prevent the occurrence of this third accident. This was probably due to the small size of cracks which are required to be detected before reaching a critical dimension.

Sources:

Official accident investigation report

investigating agency:	Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) - U.K.
report status:	Final
report number:	AAIB AAR 4/03
download report:	Report on the accident to McDonnell-Douglas MD-83, EC-FXI, at Liverpool Airport on 10 May 2001 (AAIB AAR 4/03)

Opérations de secours

AAIB issued 5 Safety Recommendations

Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations

Photos

Plan

Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Palma de Mallorca Airport et Liverpool International Airport est de 1579 km (987 miles).

languages:

Issued: --	To: FAA and the Boeing	Safety Recommendation 2001-54
The FAA and the Boeing urgently review the continued airworthiness of the MD-83 MLG strut. In particular, the need for repeat inspection of the strut in the critical area be considered and the ability of the mandated NDE inspection to detect embryonic fatigue cracks in the material, given the small critical crack size, should be re-assessed.
Issued: --	To: JAA	Safety Recommendation 2003-44
It is recommended that the Joint Aviation Authorities amend the relevant sections of JAR-OPS 1 with a view to requiring that all aircraft fitted with a Cockpit Voice Recorder record, without interruption, the audio signals received from each boom and mask microphone in use.
Issued: --	To: FAA and CAA UK	Safety Recommendation 2003-45
It is recommended that the FAA and the CAA should promote an industry study into the possibility that beneficial residual stress fields induced by shot-peening could be relaxed under in-service conditions.
Issued: --	To: Boeing	Safety Recommendation 2003-47
It is recommended that the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group should conduct an ultimate load test on a suitable MD-80 series main landing gear cylinder in order to determine the strength of the component and to verify the figures used in both the original static strength and in the fatigue life calculations.
Issued: --	To: CAA UK, JAA and FAA	Safety Recommendation 2003-48
It is recommended that the CAA, JAA and the FAA should provide guidance as to the recommended best practice for the evacuation of infants and small children down escape slides with minimum delay.