Date: | Thursday 7 June 2001 |
Time: | 02:13 |
Type: | Beechcraft B300C Super King Air 350 |
Owner/operator: | Aerope 3S Aviation |
Registration: | F-GOAE |
MSN: | FM-1 |
Year of manufacture: | 1990 |
Total airframe hrs: | 5331 hours |
Cycles: | 7451 flights |
Engine model: | Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-60A |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
Category: | Accident |
Location: | 4 km N of Santiago de Compostella (SCQ) -
Spain
|
Phase: | Landing |
Nature: | Cargo |
Departure airport: | Le Mans-Arnage Airport (LME/LFRM) |
Destination airport: | Santiago de Compostela Airport (SCQ/LEST) |
Investigating agency: | CIAIAC |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:A Beechcraft B300C Super King Air 350, registration F-GOAE, departed from Le Mans-Arnage Airport (LME), France to Santiago De Compostela Airport (SCQ), Spain on a cargo flight according to instrument flight rules. Near the destination airport, the meteorological conditions were reported to be good, and the crew requested a visual approach to runway 17, even though the active runway was 35.
Once cleared to land, the aircraft encountered a fog patch and from this moment it began a high rate descent (2000 to 3000 ft/min). A minute after entering an unexpected and unforeseen fog patch, the aircraft struck some trees in level flight and with an airspeed of 148 kt.
The wings and engines detached from the fuselage, and they dragged along a scrubland area until they came to a stop.
The crew suffered minor injuries and the aircraft was completely destroyed.
Causes:
The probable cause was the decision to start a visual approach without having the runway in sight and the continuance of the visual approach in spite of the loss of external visual references, as they unexpectedly entered a fog patch.
Contributing Factors:
As contributing factors to the accident, the following are considered:
- Lack of coordination amongst the crew which resulted in poor cockpit workload distribution, neglecting altitude alerts and instrument references once in the fog.
- Lack of planning and preparation of the approach which caused the PNF to not completely know the procedure they were going to perform resulting in an ineffective decision making when the aircraft entered the fog.
- Lack of response to the GPWS alerts due to inexistent procedures and lack of knowledge and training.
- The aircraft encountered the fog patch when the workload was highest. The autopilot had been disconnected, they were attempting to intercept the LOC 17, the landing gear was extended and the aircraft was not trimmed.
- The mental predisposition of both crewmembers to complete a visual approach, even before starting the descent to Santiago, since the weather information that they had got indicated VMC conditions and did not warn against possible visibility problems.
METAR:
00:00 UTC / 02:00 local time:
LEST 070000Z 36002KT CAVOK 10/10 Q 1021 NOSIG=
visibility of 10 km or more with no significant changes expected in the following two hours.
00:30 UTC / 02:30 local time:
LEST 070030Z 36001KT 0800 R35/P1500 R17/1200 BCFG VV001 10/10Q 1021 NOSIG=
visibility 800 meters, an RVR for runway 35 of 1,500 meters and for runway 17 of 1,700 meters and observed fog patches. Vertical visibility was 100 ft. No significant changes were expected in the following two hours.
Accident investigation:
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| |
Investigating agency: | CIAIAC |
Report number: | A-032/2001 |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
CIAIAC Location
Images:
photo (c) CIAIAC; Santiago de Compostella (SCQ); 07 June 2001
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |