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Last updated: 19 March 2019
Date:Thursday 14 June 2001
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH8A model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103
Operator:Widerøes Flyveselskap
Registration: LN-WIS
C/n / msn: 247
First flight: 1990
Total airframe hrs:23935
Engines: 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW121
Crew:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3
Passengers:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 24
Total:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 27
Aircraft damage: Damaged beyond repair
Location:Båtsfjord Airport (BJF) (   Norway)
Phase: Landing (LDG)
Nature:Domestic Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:Alta Airport (ALF/ENAT), Norway
Destination airport:Båtsfjord Airport (BJF/ENBS), Norway
Flightnumber: 954
Widerøe flight WF954 departed Alta at 15:22 for a flight to Båtsfjord. The Localizer/DME approach to runway 21 at Båtsfjord was flown by the co-pilot. After passing the missed approach point the captain took over control because they lost sight of the runway. The approach was continued but the airplane touched down hard on the right hand main gear, which collapsed. The aircraft was shipped to Bodø August 26, 2001 and broken up.

Probable Cause:

1 Flyet var luftdyktig før landing.
2 Flyets masse og balanse var innenfor gjeldende begrensninger.
3 Besetningen var kvalifisert for oppdraget.
4 Fartøysjefen hadde mangeårig erfaring fra flyging på kortbaner med Twin Otter, med en totaltid over 20 000 timer, men kun ca. 320 timer på DHC-8.
5 Styrmannen hadde ca. 1 000 timer på DHC-8.
6 Besetningen avvek fra de foreskrevne innflygingsprosedyrer.
7 Besetningen avvek fra selskapets standard operasjonsprosedyrer.
8 Besetningens CRM-samarbeid fungerte ikke som foreskrevet i selskapets AOM.
9 Besetningen forlot minimumshøyden uten tilstrekkelige visuelle referanser.
10 Besetningen vurderte ikke "go-around" ved passering av DP uten tilstrekkelige visuelle referanser til rullebanen.
11 Besetningen vurderte ikke "go-around" under landing med tilsynelatende kontrollproblemer.
12 Besetningen fullførte landingen til tross for at flyet ikke var stabilisert for landing.
13 Den ustabiliserte landingen med stor gjennomsynking overbelastet høyre Fuse Pin slik at understellet kollapset.
14 Flyet fikk omfattende strukturelle skader ved havariet.
15 Ingen ombordværende fikk fysiske skader ved havariet.
16 PA-systemet virket ikke fra cockpit da fartøysjefen ga ordre om evakuering.
17 Den kabinansatte utførte sine oppgaver på en eksemplarisk måte.
18 Lufthavnens brann- og havaritjeneste utførte sine oppgaver på en eksemplarisk måte.
Translation: CONCLUSION:
1 The aircraft was in airworthy condition before landing,
2 The Aircraft Mass & balance was within limits,
3 The Crew was qualified for the flight in question,
4 The Commander had several years of experience on the Norwegian STOL Airport System with DHC-6/300 Twin Otter,and had a total of more than 20.000 hours, but only 320 hours on the Bombardier Dash-8/100,
5 The 1st Officer had approximately 1000 hours on the Dash-8,
6 The Crew deviated from the prescribed procedure,
7 The Crew deviated from the company Standard Operating Procedure - SOP,
8 The Crew's use of CRM did not function as described in the company Flight Operations Manual - FOM,
9 The Crew departed minimum altitude without adequate visual reference,
10 The Crew did not consider "go around" when passing Decision Point without adequate, visual references to the runway
11 The Crew did not consider "go around" during a landing with apparent flight control problems,
12 The Crew completed the landing despite the fact that the aircraft was not in a stabilised configuration,
13 The non-stabilised landing with a high descent rate overloaded the right undercarriage fuse pin to a point at which it collapsed,
14 The Aircraft received considerable, structural damage during the accident,
15 None of the occupants was injured during the accident,
16 The Public Address System did not function when used by the Commander for evacuation,
17 The Cabin Attendant carried out her duties in an exemplary fashion
18 The Airport Fire- & Rescue Service carried out their duties in an exemplary fashion.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: HSLB Norway
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years and 3 months
Accident number: HSLB Rap. 2003/42
Download report: Final report

» Thomas Brügge
» Air International 5/02
» Harald Olsen
» Air International 1/02


photo of de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103 LN-WIS
photo of de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103 LN-WIS
photo of de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103 LN-WIS
photo of de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103 LN-WIS
photo of de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103 LN-WIS
photo of de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103 N813AW
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This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Alta Airport to Båtsfjord Airport as the crow flies is 245 km (153 miles).

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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