Narrative:Flight EXC 204 departed Bergen at 17:40 and the following climb to FL150 was normal. The first officer was pilot flying on the flight to Skien. A descent for an LLZ/DME (non-precision) approach to runway 19 at Skien was initiated. During the descent through the clouds down to Geiteryggen, some ice formed on the wings. This was noted by the captain at 15 DME. At a distance of 8 DME, while descending through about 3050 feet, the Ground Proximity Warning System (GWPS) sounded and warned: "Terrain... terrain. Pull up ... pull up." The captain told the first officer: "Just easy, easy, easy ... easy that is all right" and warned him not to descend too fast. The same thing happened at 7 DME and also at 6 DME when the plane was about 100 feet too low in relation to the approach procedure. The first officer began to climb and the captain now shouted: "Are you climbing? You are going to 2,200 ft Sir. Dont start to f.... it up again now (first officers name)." As a result of the climb, the aircraft passed the locator Myra (MR) at an altitude of 2,800 ft, around 600 ft too high, and the descent to D3 was steep. The tone in the cockpit was strained and the Commander began to give orders to the first officer. With three miles to go the gear was selected down but the captain expressed his doubts: "We never gonna make this... Come on, go down, go down. Stay on the localizer, stay on
the localizer." The aircraft maintained an indicated speed of approx. 110-115 kt when the aircraft encountered an abnormally high sink rate and hit the runway at 6g. The landing led to permanent deformation of the left wing on the forward wing beam. As a result of this deformation, the left landing gear leg was bent backwards, with the engine and propeller pointing obliquely downwards. The left propeller touched the runway and the crew lost directional control so the aircraft skewed out to the left and left the runway. It continued, skidding in an arc to the left, crossed a taxiway twice and hit a gravel bank with great force. The gravel bank was hit by the nose of the aircraft and the left propeller at an assumed angle of 45° in the horizontal plane. The aircraft continued up the gravel bank in a virtually horizontal attitude while the tail was thrown out to the right. Then the aircraft fell so that it was resting on its tail and main wheels with the nose up on the gravel bank.
Probable Cause:
SIGNIFICANT INVESTIGATION RESULTS:
a) The decision was made to wait to remove the ice from the wings because, according to the SOP, it should only be removed if it had been "typically half an inch on the leading edge". This postponement was a contributory factor in the ice being forgotten.
b) At times, the relationship between the flight crew members was very tense during the approach to Skien. This led to a breakdown in crew coordination.
c) Among the consequences of the warnings from the GPWS was a very high workload for the crew. In combination with the defective crew coordination, this contributed to the ice on the wings being forgotten.
d) It is probable that the aircraft hit the runway with great force because the wings were contaminated with ice. The AIBN is not forming a final opinion on whether the wings stalled, whether the aircraft developed a high sink rate due to ice accretion or whether the hard landing was due to a combination of the two explanatory models.
e) The company could only provide documentary evidence to show that the Commander had attended an absolute minimum of training after being employed within the company. Parts of the mandatory training had taken place by means of self-study without any form of formal verification of achievement of results.
f) The companys operation was largely based on minimum solutions. This reduced the safety margins within company operations.
g) The companys quality system contributed little to ensuring Safe Operational Practices in the company.
h) Authority inspection of the company was deficient.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | HSLB Norway  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 3 years and 4 months | Accident number: | HSLB Rep. 2005/11 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Runway excursion
Sources:
»
SKYbrary
Follow-up / safety actions
AIBN issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 01-APR-2005 | To: | SL recommendation no. 10/2005 |
During the investigation, the AIBN has become aware that pilots have received warnings from the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) during apparently normal approaches to runway 19 at Skien airport Geiteryggen. This can undermine respect for the warning system. Inadvertent GPWS warnings were also a factor relating to the accident in question here. The AIBN recommends that Avinor should undertake a review of approach procedures (LLZ DME) for runway 19, among other things, with a view to reducing the opportunity for inadvertent GPWS warnings. |
Issued: 01-APR-2005 | To: | SL recommendation no. 11/2005 |
The investigation has discovered that the Swedish Civil Aviation Authority largely based its inspection work on inspections of the companys manuals, and to a lesser extent verified the companys actual practices. The AIBN recommends therefore that the Swedish Civil Aviation Authority should assess whether, to a greater extent than previously, its inspection activities should also be directed towards verifying the actual practices within a company. |
Issued: 01-APR-2005 | To: | SL recommendation no. 12/2005 |
A review of the quality system at European Executive Express has uncovered a series of weaknesses. The AIBN recommends that the Swedish Civil Aviation Authority should undertake a new assessment of the quality system at European Executive Express AB. |
Issued: 01-APR-2005 | To: | SL recommendation no. 13/2005 |
The accident in question can, with great probability, be linked to the fact that the aircraft was landing with ice on the wings. Current procedures for this aircraft type do not contain any items that would guarantee a maximum possible degree of ice-free wing before landing. The AIBN therefore recommends that the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK (CAA-UK) should order BAE Systems to introduce a procedure that would reduce the possibility of landings with wings contaminated with ice. |
Issued: 01-APR-2005 | To: | SL recommendation no. 14/2005 |
The procedures for removing ice on the wing are based on the crew being able to assess the thickness of the ice without having a specific tool to undertake such as assessment. The AIBN therefore recommends that the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK (CAA-UK) should order BAE Systems to assess whether a form of ice accretion meter should be installed on this aircraft type. |
Issued: 01-APR-2005 | To: | SL recommendation no. 15/2005 |
The Jet stream 31 is equipped with a stall warning system which activates on the basis of the wings angle of attack. If the aircrafts wings are contaminated with ice, stalling can occur at smaller angles of attack than the criteria for issuing a warning. This is not discussed in the Approved Flight Manual (AFM), and the flight crew in this instance were apparently unfamiliar with the situation. The AIBN recommends therefore that the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK (CAA-UK) should order BAE Systems to inform and warn operators of the fact that the stall warning systems do not function as assumed when the wings are contaminated with ice. |
Issued: 01-APR-2005 | To: | SL recommendation no. 16/2005 |
The investigation has discovered that the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAR-OPS 1) have very general requirements for training when a company employs flight crew members with adequate type rating and possibly authorisation to act as Commander. These requirements form the basis for the training that the Commander was given within the company, and which the AIBN believes was marginal. The AIBN therefore recommends that the JAA should assess whether the requirements for training should be increased within the CRM, the companys OM and the companys quality system. |
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Photos

accident date:
30-11-2001type: BAe 3101 Jetstream 31
registration: SE-LGA

accident date:
30-11-2001type: BAe 3101 Jetstream 31
registration: SE-LGA

accident date:
30-11-2001type: BAe 3101 Jetstream 31
registration: SE-LGA
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Bergen-Flesland Airport to Skien Airport as the crow flies is 271 km (169 miles).
Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.