Beschrijving:
The Boeing 737 arrived in Pekanbaru on schedule after a flight from Jakarta. The airplane was prepared for the continuing flight to Batam. At 10:05 the First Officer asked for start clearance and received weather information. The weather was fine, wind calm and clear. After start-up was completed, the aircraft taxied to runway 18. The crew decided to use 'reduced take off power' with an assumed temperature of 35 deg. C, while the actual temperature was 27 deg. C. The First Officer acted as Pilot Flying. After being cleared for takeoff, the captain advanced the throttles and adjusted them to the required take off power setting. He then called the V1 and VR speeds and the First Officer pulled the control column to a 15 deg. nose up pitch. The aircrafts nose lifted up, but the aircraft did not become airborne. The stick shaker activated. The captain then added power and the speed increased to V2+15 (approx. 158 KIAS) but the aircraft still did not get airborne. The captain then decided to abort . He called 'stop', retarded the power levers to idle, applied reverse thrust, extended the speed brake and applied brakes. The nose of the aircraft touched down hard, causing the front left door (L1) to open and two trolleys at front galley to move forward, blocking the cockpit door. The flight crew turned the aircraft slightly to the right to avoid approach lights ahead. It hit some trees and stopped at approx. 275 meters from the end of runway.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "Since there is no indication that flaps system failure or flap asymmetry contributes in the failure of flap to travel to take-off configuration, the most probable cause for the failure is the improper execution of take-off checklist. Failure of the maintenance to identify the real problem on the aural warning CB, causes the CB to open during the accident and therefore is a contributing factor to the accident."
accident date: 14-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-291
registration: PK-LID
accident date: 14-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-291
registration: PK-LID
accident date: 14-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-291
registration: PK-LID
accident date: 14-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-291
registration: PK-LID
| Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Datum: | maandag 14 januari 2002 |
| Tijd: | 10:15 |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-291 |
| Luchtvaartmaatschappij: | Lion Air |
| Registratie: | PK-LID |
| Constructienummer: | 20363/218 |
| Bouwjaar: | 1969-11-05 (32 years 3 months) |
| Aantal vlieguren: | 68133 |
| Aantal vluchten: | 66998 |
| Motoren: | 2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-9A (HK3) |
| Bemanning: | slachtoffers: 0 / inzittenden: 7 |
| Passagiers: | slachtoffers: 0 / inzittenden: 96 |
| Totaal: | slachtoffers: 0 / inzittenden: 103 |
| Schade: | Afgeschreven |
| Gevolgen: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Plaats: | Pekanbaru-Sultan Syarif Kasim II Airport (PKU) ( Indonesië)
|
| Fase: | Start (TOF) |
| Soort vlucht: | Binnenlandse lijnvlucht |
| Vliegveld van vertrek: | Pekanbaru-Sultan Syarif Kasim II Airport (PKU/WIBB), Indonesië |
| Batam-Hang Nadim Airport (BTH/WIDD), Indonesië | |
| Vluchtnummer: | 386 |
The Boeing 737 arrived in Pekanbaru on schedule after a flight from Jakarta. The airplane was prepared for the continuing flight to Batam. At 10:05 the First Officer asked for start clearance and received weather information. The weather was fine, wind calm and clear. After start-up was completed, the aircraft taxied to runway 18. The crew decided to use 'reduced take off power' with an assumed temperature of 35 deg. C, while the actual temperature was 27 deg. C. The First Officer acted as Pilot Flying. After being cleared for takeoff, the captain advanced the throttles and adjusted them to the required take off power setting. He then called the V1 and VR speeds and the First Officer pulled the control column to a 15 deg. nose up pitch. The aircrafts nose lifted up, but the aircraft did not become airborne. The stick shaker activated. The captain then added power and the speed increased to V2+15 (approx. 158 KIAS) but the aircraft still did not get airborne. The captain then decided to abort . He called 'stop', retarded the power levers to idle, applied reverse thrust, extended the speed brake and applied brakes. The nose of the aircraft touched down hard, causing the front left door (L1) to open and two trolleys at front galley to move forward, blocking the cockpit door. The flight crew turned the aircraft slightly to the right to avoid approach lights ahead. It hit some trees and stopped at approx. 275 meters from the end of runway.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "Since there is no indication that flaps system failure or flap asymmetry contributes in the failure of flap to travel to take-off configuration, the most probable cause for the failure is the improper execution of take-off checklist. Failure of the maintenance to identify the real problem on the aural warning CB, causes the CB to open during the accident and therefore is a contributing factor to the accident."
Bronnen:
» NTSC, Air Accident Investigation Commission (AAIC)Veiligheidsmaatregelen
NTSC issued 9 Safety Recommendations
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Foto's
accident date: 14-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-291
registration: PK-LID
accident date: 14-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-291
registration: PK-LID
accident date: 14-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-291
registration: PK-LID
accident date: 14-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-291
registration: PK-LID
Kaart
Deze kaart geeft het vliegveld van vetrek weer en de geplande bestemming van de vlucht. De lijn tussen de vliegvelden geeft niet de exacte vliegroute weer.
De afstand tussen Pekanbaru-Sultan Syarif Kasim II Airport en Batam-Hang Nadim Airport bedraagt 305 km (190 miles).
De afstand tussen Pekanbaru-Sultan Syarif Kasim II Airport en Batam-Hang Nadim Airport bedraagt 305 km (190 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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