Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Wednesday 16 January 2002 |
Time: | 16:29 |
Type: |  Boeing 737-3Q8 |
Operator: | Garuda Indonesia Airways |
Registration: | PK-GWA |
MSN: | 24403/1706 |
First flight: | 1989-04-07 (12 years 10 months) |
Total airframe hrs: | 28141 |
Cycles: | 24607 |
Engines: | 2 CFMI CFM56-3B1 |
Crew: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 6 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 54 |
Total: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 60 |
Aircraft damage: | Damaged beyond repair |
Location: | 22,5 km (14.1 mls) NE of Yokyakarta ( Indonesia)
|
Phase: | Approach (APR) |
Nature: | Domestic Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Mataram-Selaparang Airport (AMI/WADA), Indonesia |
Destination airport: | Yogyakarta-Adisutjipto Airport (JOG/WARJ), Indonesia |
Flightnumber: | GA421 |
Narrative:Flight 421 departed Mataram around 15:00 and climbed to the cruising altitude of FL310. During the initial descent the crew decided to deviate from the planned route because of thunderstorms along their planned route. At 16:19 the flight encountered an area of severe turbulence and thunderstorm activity with extremely heavy precipitation and hail. The crew attempted to fly towards a gap between two storm cells. About 90 seconds after entering the thunderstorm, as the airplane descended through about FL180 at a flight idle power setting, both engines flamed out. The crew carried out three unsuccessful attempts to restart the engines followed by one unsuccessful attempt to start the auxiliary power unit (APU). The flight crews reported actions to restart the engines and APU however, were contrary to the procedures contained in the Boeing 737 Operations Manual. For instance, they waited only about 1 minute between each restart attempt instead of three minutes.
As the airplane descended below an overcast cloud layer at about 8,000 feet, the crew observed the Bengawan Solo River and decided to attempt to ditch the airplane into the river with flaps and landing gear in a shallow, 1 metre deep part of the river. One stewardess did not survive the crash.
Similar occurrences (Boeing 737-300 double engine flameout while descending in heavy precipitation with engines at flight idle) happened May 24, 1988 and July 26, 1988. Following these incidents OMB 88-5 and AD 6-14-88 were issued to require minimum rpm of 45% and to restrict the use of autothrust in moderate/heavy precipitation; engine modification was provided for increased capacity of water ingestion.
Probable Cause:
Probable Cause: "The NTSC determines that the probable causes of the accident were the combination of 1) The aircraft had entered severe hail and rain during weather avoidance which subsequently caused both engines flame out; 2) Two attempts of engine-relight failed because the aircraft was still in the precipitation beyond the engines certified capabilities; and 3) During the second attempt relight, the aircraft suffered run-out electrical power."
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | NTSC Indonesia  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Accident number: | KNKT/02.02/06.01.33 | Download report: | Final report
|
|
Classification:
Precipitation-induced flame-out
Ditching
Sources:
» Flight International
» Jakarta Post
» NTSB
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 2 Safety Recommendations
NTSC issued 11 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(a) |
Regulatory body, aircraft and engine manufacturer to provide a target airspeed in the dual engine restart procedures. |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(b) |
Regulatory body and weather radar manufacturer to work on the airborne weather radar system to better identify the level of the adverse weather, particularly the characteristic of the present generation of airborne weather radar. |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(c) |
Regulatory body and engine manufacturer to provide procedure on how to improve their engines water/hail ingestion capability, if adverse weather can not be avoided (i.e. increasing the throttle setting when entering the weather). |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(d) |
The aircraft manufacturer should provide engine cowl and wing anti-ice bleed closing procedure prior to the in-flight engine restart. |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(e) |
The aircraft and engine manufacturer should provide procedure for in-flight engine relight in precipitation. |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(f) |
BMG to provide SIGMET to airmen to assist their decision in flight when expecting en-route adverse weather. |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(g) |
BMG to consider the provision of ground based weather radar. |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(h) |
Relevant authorities to emphasize the coordination between civilian and military controllers. |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(i) |
Rearrangement of both International and National Procedures of the Air Transportation Safety Regulation should be considered after this accident where limited information was provided (no Early Warning on Adverse Weather of active Cb along the track). |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(j) |
Training the crew for better reading of the planes radar and other relevant subjects/topics in connection with extreme weather condition for Air Transportation Safety. |
Issued: -- | To: | PK-GWA(k) |
The coordination and consolidation of the operational ground support (ACC/ATC and Meteorological Offices) should be reviwed for proper management of Air Transportation Safety. |
Issued: 31-AUG-2005 | To: FAA | A-05-19 |
Complete the review of the current turbofan engine certification standards for rain and hail ingestion, and, if necessary, revise the standards in consideration of recent service experience and atmospheric data. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 31-AUG-2005 | To: FAA | A-05-20 |
Require that all turbofan engine and turbofan-powered aircraft manufacturers, working with operators of such aircraft, develop effective operational strategies and related guidance materials to minimize the chance of a dual-engine power loss; the FAA should then verify that these strategies and guidance materials are incorporated into operating manuals and training programs in a timely fashion. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Show all...
Photos

accident date:
16-01-2002type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA

accident date:
16-01-2002type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA

Seat map Boeing 737-3Q8 PK-GWA

accident date:
16-01-2002type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA

accident date:
16-01-2002type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA

accident date:
16-01-2002type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Mataram-Selaparang Airport to Yogyakarta-Adisutjipto Airport as the crow flies is 626 km (392 miles).
Accident location: Global; accuracy within tens or hundreds of kilometers.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.