Détails:
Flight 421 departed Mataram around 15:00 and climbed to the cruising altitude of FL310. During the initial descent the crew decided to deviate from the planned route because of thunderstorms along their planned route. At 16:19 the flight encountered an area of severe turbulence and thunderstorm activity with extremely heavy precipitation and hail. The crew attempted to fly towards a gap between two storm cells. About 90 seconds after entering the thunderstorm, as the airplane descended through about FL180 at a flight idle power setting, both engines flamed out. The crew carried out three unsuccessful attempts to restart the engines followed by one unsuccessful attempt to start the auxiliary power unit (APU). The flight crews reported actions to restart the engines and APU however, were contrary to the procedures contained in the Boeing 737 Operations Manual. For instance, they waited only about 1 minute between each restart attempt instead of three minutes.
As the airplane descended below an overcast cloud layer at about 8,000 feet, the crew observed the Bengawan Solo River and decided to attempt to ditch the airplane into the river with flaps and landing gear in a shallow, 1 metre deep part of the river. One stewardess did not survive the crash.
Similar occurrences (Boeing 737-300 double engine flameout while descending in heavy precipitation with engines at flight idle) happened May 24, 1988 and July 26, 1988. Following these incidents OMB 88-5 and AD 6-14-88 were issued to require minimum rpm of 45% and to restrict the use of autothrust in moderate/heavy precipitation; engine modification was provided for increased capacity of water ingestion.
Probable Cause: "The NTSC determines that the probable causes of the accident were the combination of 1) The aircraft had entered severe hail and rain during weather avoidance which subsequently caused both engines flame out; 2) Two attempts of engine-relight failed because the aircraft was still in the precipitation beyond the engines certified capabilities; and 3) During the second attempt relight, the aircraft suffered run-out electrical power."
» Jakarta Post
» NTSB
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
Seat map Boeing 737-3Q8 PK-GWA
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
| Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | mercredi 16 janvier 2002 |
| Heure: | 16:29 |
| Type/Sous-type: |  Boeing 737-3Q8 |
| Compagnie: | Garuda Indonesia Airways |
| Immatriculation: | PK-GWA |
| Numéro de série: | 24403/1706 |
| Année de Fabrication: | 1989-04-07 (12 years 10 months) |
| Heures de vol: | 28141 |
| Cycles: | 24607 |
| Moteurs: | 2 CFMI CFM56-3B1 |
| Equipage: | victimes: 1 / à bord: 6 |
| Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 54 |
| Total: | victimes: 1 / à bord: 60 |
| Dégats de l'appareil: | Perte Totale |
| Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Lieu de l'accident: | 22,5 km (14.1 milles) NE of Yokyakarta ( Indonésie)
|
| Phase de vol: | En approche (APR) |
| Nature: | Transport de Passagers Nat. |
| Aéroport de départ: | Mataram-Selaparang Airport (AMI/WADA), Indonésie |
| Yogyakarta-Adisutjipto Airport (JOG/WARJ), Indonésie | |
| Numéro de vol: | GA421 |
Flight 421 departed Mataram around 15:00 and climbed to the cruising altitude of FL310. During the initial descent the crew decided to deviate from the planned route because of thunderstorms along their planned route. At 16:19 the flight encountered an area of severe turbulence and thunderstorm activity with extremely heavy precipitation and hail. The crew attempted to fly towards a gap between two storm cells. About 90 seconds after entering the thunderstorm, as the airplane descended through about FL180 at a flight idle power setting, both engines flamed out. The crew carried out three unsuccessful attempts to restart the engines followed by one unsuccessful attempt to start the auxiliary power unit (APU). The flight crews reported actions to restart the engines and APU however, were contrary to the procedures contained in the Boeing 737 Operations Manual. For instance, they waited only about 1 minute between each restart attempt instead of three minutes.
As the airplane descended below an overcast cloud layer at about 8,000 feet, the crew observed the Bengawan Solo River and decided to attempt to ditch the airplane into the river with flaps and landing gear in a shallow, 1 metre deep part of the river. One stewardess did not survive the crash.
Similar occurrences (Boeing 737-300 double engine flameout while descending in heavy precipitation with engines at flight idle) happened May 24, 1988 and July 26, 1988. Following these incidents OMB 88-5 and AD 6-14-88 were issued to require minimum rpm of 45% and to restrict the use of autothrust in moderate/heavy precipitation; engine modification was provided for increased capacity of water ingestion.
Probable Cause:
Probable Cause: "The NTSC determines that the probable causes of the accident were the combination of 1) The aircraft had entered severe hail and rain during weather avoidance which subsequently caused both engines flame out; 2) Two attempts of engine-relight failed because the aircraft was still in the precipitation beyond the engines certified capabilities; and 3) During the second attempt relight, the aircraft suffered run-out electrical power."
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
» Flight International» Jakarta Post
» NTSB
Opérations de secours
Photos
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
Seat map Boeing 737-3Q8 PK-GWA
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
accident date: 16-01-2002
type: Boeing 737-3Q8
registration: PK-GWA
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Mataram-Selaparang Airport et Yogyakarta-Adisutjipto Airport est de 626 km (392 miles).
Accident location: Global; accuracy within tens or hundreds of kilometers.
La distance entre Mataram-Selaparang Airport et Yogyakarta-Adisutjipto Airport est de 626 km (392 miles).
Accident location: Global; accuracy within tens or hundreds of kilometers.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.
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