Narrative:EAS Airlines flight 4226, BAC One-Eleven (5N-ESF), crashed in a residential area after takeoff from Kano Airport, Nigeria. Four of the 77 occupants survived the accident and at least 30 persons on the ground were killed.
The One-Eleven, 5N-ESF, was bought by EAS Airlines from Romanian airline TAROM and joined the EAS fleet on August 2, 2001.
On March 9, 2002, however, its No.2 engine (Rolls-Royce Spey 512-14DW) developed some vibration and loss of power output as a result of which the aircraft was grounded, awaiting engine replacement.
Another One-Eleven aircraft in the EAS Airlines fleet, 5N-ESD, developed a ground-cooling problem on the April 30, which the operator estimated 7 days to be repaired. Due to the operational demand, the operator then decided to transfer one engine from 5N-ESD onto 5N-ESF's No.2 position. Thus the aircraft resumed flying on May 2, 2002.
On May 4, the aircraft operated flight EXW4227 from Lagos to Jos and Kano and flight 4226 from Kano back to Lagos. The flight to Kano was uneventful and the aircraft landed at 11:40 UTC. A total of 47 passengers remained on board and 22 passengers boarded the flight for Lagos.
At 12:22 UTC the aircraft was cleared to taxi to runway 23 for departure. The Tower controller reported a temperature of 36°C with wind from 170 degrees at 7 knots and issued takeoff clearance.
Takeoff was commenced at 12:28 but the acceleration seemed slow to the Tower controller. The aircraft was not able to lift off the runway and continued onto the 60 m blast pad and continued onto the adjacent grass terrain for 180 metres, which raised a huge burst of dust knocking off two approach lights.
After becoming airborne the undercarriage remained down and the aircraft barely climbed. Engine power was lost due to dust ingestion during the overrun. Flight 4226 then impacted the Gwammaja Quarters residential area, some 3 km past the end of the runway. The aircraft broke up and caught fire.
The investigation was severely hampered due to the uncontrollable crowd of people, for many days in the area after the crash. Also, the Cockpit Voice Recorder was never found and the Flight Data Recorder seemed to have never worked on flights in Nigeria.
An investigation of both engines showed that there was no pre-crash failure which could account for the long takeoff run. Other factors like air temperature, runway elevation, centre of gravity, takeoff weight (39243 kg, which was below the mtow of 47,400kg) were all discounted.
The investigators noted that the main 3000 m-long runway at Kano was closed for work and runway 05/23 was in use, which had a length of 2600 meters. Performance calculations showed that the aircraft needed 2347 metres. It was considered that the flight crew was accustomed to be operating from longer runways in Nigeria and this was likely the first time they were operating out of a 2600 m long runway. Contingencies of operating on the shorter runway were probably not seriously considered before the commencement of the takeoff roll.
Subsequently, after becoming airborne, the undercarriage remained extended which caused additional drag and the rate of climb would have increased by 200ft/min had it been raised. Together with the decrease in engine power due to dust ingestion led to the aircraft's failure to climb to a safe altitude.
Probable Cause:
Probable cause: The crew's inability to get the airplane airborne within the safe parameter of the available runway length.
The contributive factor was the breakdown of the crew's cockpit coordination procedure in executing a coercive reaction of initially,
i) getting the aircraft airborne;
ii) improving its climb performance by raising up the gear and
iii) flying the airplane to safe height before thinking of the next line of action.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | AIPB Nigeria  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 205 days (7 months) | Accident number: | FMA/AIPB/382 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Loss of control
Follow-up / safety actions
Nigeria grounded all BAC-1-11 jet aircraft operating in the country May 9, pending the investigation.
In another measure the aviation Ministry issued a ban on all aircraft in Nigeria, older than 22 years.
AIPB issued 8 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: | 5N-ESF(1) |
Based on the AIPB\'s findings that Pilots are in the habit of losing their flying documents in the course of their career, it is reconnnended that NCAA should constitute or set up a machinery for investigation of this "malpractice" with a view to insure that such losses are reduced or prevented. In the course of NCAA investigation into this matter, anyone found culpable should be appropriately sanctioned for abuse or falsification of record. |
Issued: -- | To: | 5N-ESF(2) |
Following AlPB\'s finding of lack of cooperation by the Mobil Fuel Attendants at MAKIA on the day of the accident, AIPB recommends that in emergencies or accident occasions, all airport tenants and vendors should be under the effective supervision of the Airport Authority and be ready to take directives from same, pending the completion of the Preliminary Investigation, in addition, the Airport Authority of Nigeria should oversee the activities of Aviation Fuel supply at airports and in the event of accidents; this authority should be present at the fuel sample taking for the purposes of further investigation into the course of the accident. |
Issued: -- | To: NCAA | 5N-ESF(3) |
For aviation fuel Quality Coutrol purposes, it is recommended that NCAA may establish an inspectorate department, which will always supervise aviation fuel standards in genera1, |
Issued: -- | To: | 5N-ESF(4) |
Stiffer penalties should be imposed on pilot or operator who is found in default of the established procedures in the use of Flight Recorder. |
Issued: -- | To: | 5N-ESF(5) |
It is also reconnnended that all flight data recorders installed on any Nigerian registered aircraft must be a Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR), Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority should not register an aircraft, which is not fitted with Digital Flight Data Recorder. |
Issued: -- | To: | 5N-ESF(6) |
Aircraft Flight Manuals (AFM) and all Aircraft Maintenance Schedules (M/S) are peculiar to the specific aircraft serial number. It is accordingly recommended that the NCAA should review all operators\' Maintenance Schedules to ensure that they are appropriately customized and up to date. |
Issued: -- | To: NCAA | 5N-ESF(7) |
NCAA should employ personnel knowledgeable in aircraft maintenance to perform airworthiness surveillance, NCAA to regularly audit the activities of aircraft operators, should also put the appropriate machinery in place to enable the authority to perform this task. |
Issued: -- | To: NCAA | 5N-ESF(8) |
Finally, NCAA should immediately conduct an audit of all BAC 1-11 aircraft on the Nigerian Registry to ensure that only operators, who have the maintenance facility, support and bonded spare part stores in the country or those who have external spare part support arrangement, should be allowed to operate the BAC 1-11 type of aircraft in the country. The practice of keeping one non-airworthy aircraft on ground to be cannibalized in order to keep others in the fleet flying should be discontinued. |
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Photos

accident date:
04-05-2002type: BAC One-Eleven 525FT
registration: YR-BCN
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Kano-Aminu Kano International Airport to Lagos-Murtala Muhammed International Airport as the crow flies is 830 km (518 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.