Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Datum: | donderdag 3 februari 2005 |
Tijd: | 15:15 |
Type: | Boeing 737-242 Advanced |
Vloog voor: | Kam Air |
Gehuurd van: | Phoenix Aviation |
Registratie: | EX-037 |
Constructienummer: | 22075/630 |
Bouwjaar: | 1980-01-04 (25 years 1 months) |
Aantal vlieguren: | 51363 |
Aantal vluchten: | 42055 |
Motoren: | 2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-17A (HK3) |
Bemanning: | slachtoffers: 8 / inzittenden: 8 |
Passagiers: | slachtoffers: 97 / inzittenden: 97 |
Totaal: | slachtoffers: 105 / inzittenden: 105 |
Schade: | Vernield |
Gevolgen: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Plaats: | 32 km (20 mijl) ESE of Kabul Airport (KBL) ( Afghanistan)
|
Fase: | Kruisvlucht (ENR) |
Soort vlucht: | Binnenlandse lijnvlucht |
Vliegveld van vertrek: | Herat Airport (HEA/OAHR), Afghanistan |
Vliegveld van aankomst: | Kabul Airport (KBL/OAKB), Afghanistan |
Vluchtnummer: | 904 |
Beschrijving:Kam Air Flight 904 from Herat to Kabul, Afghanistan, was destroyed when it impacted a mountain side during descent. All 105 on board were killed.
The Boeing 737-242 aircraft, with Kyrgyz Republic registration EX-037, departed from Herat at 10:02 UTC. The estimated time of arrival (ETA) at Kabul International Airport was 10:55 UTC.
The aircraft was cruising at flight level 270 when it contacted Bagram Radar Approach Control ("Bagram") for descent and landing. The flight was normal until it failed to level at flight level 130 during the VOR/DME approach.
At 10:43 UTC, Bagram cleared the flight to descend at its discretion and to expect the VOR approach to runway 29. The prevailing weather was also passed on to the aircraft. Visibility was reported 2 kilometers with snow, ceiling 2200 feet broken. wind calm and altimeter setting QNH 1016.
When the aircraft was 35 miles west of the Kabul VOR, radar contact was established with Bagram. The aircraft was advised by Bagram to cross the VOR at or above flight level 130 and cleared it for the VOR/DME approach to runway 29 at Kabul Airport. At 10:48 UTC the aircraft reported flight level 130.
Bagram again cleared the aircraft for the VOR approach to runway 29 and advised the aircraft to report procedure turn inbound. The crew replied that they would report proceeding inbound for the VOR approach to runway 29. This was the last transmission from the aircraft.
Search for the aircraft was delayed and hampered due to a severe snowstorm in the region. The aircraft was located approximately three days later by an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helicopter
The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) was recovered, but the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) could not be found. No data was found recorded on the FDR.
Probable Cause:
Probable Cause: "The accident occurred probably due to the premature descent by the Aircraft below its minimum assigned altitude of 13,000 feet during approach in weather conditions below VFR requirements. The reason for descending below the minimum altitude could not be determined due to inadequate evidence."
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | CAO Afghanistan |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 years | Accident number: | Final report | Download report: | Final report
|
|
Bronnen:
» NTSB
» Reuters
Veiligheidsmaatregelen
MoT Afghanistan issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 01-FEB-2006 | To: | EX-037 (1) |
All operalors should advise their flight crew to strictly adhere to the laid down instrument approach procedures. This aspect should be checked during their periodic proficiency checks and refresher courses. |
Issued: 01-FEB-2006 | To: Bagram ATC | EX-037 (2) |
Bagram controllers should instruct flight crew to cross LANNI at the assigned altitude inbound to ensure terrain clearance by fl ights. In case of any deviation in altitude, ATC should warn the flight crew. |
Issued: 01-FEB-2006 | To: | EX-037 (3) |
Installation of effective radar that ensures coverage of the airspace around Kabul airport should be expedited. In addition, Minimum Safe Altitude Waming System (MSAW) software should be provided in the radar system. |
Issued: 01-FEB-2006 | To: | EX-037 (4) |
All operators must check the read outs of FOR and CVR at least once in six months to ensure proper recording of the data and voices. Certificate of Airworthiness renewal of aircfafts should be done by the Flight Safety office only on demonstrating satisfactory performance of the recorders. |
Issued: 01-FEB-2006 | To: | EX-037 (5) |
Transition altitude and transition level high enough should be established to ensure terrain clearance regardless of weather cooditions. |
Issued: 01-FEB-2006 | To: | EX-037 (6) |
All operators should advise their flight crew to read back fully the clearances granted by air traffic control. The air traffic controllers should repeat the clearance in case the crew does nol read back fully. |
Issued: 01-FEB-2006 | To: | EX-037 (7) |
The air traffic controllers should clear aircrafts for VFR approaches only under circumstances where VFR can be effectively and safely implemented |
Show all...
Foto's
accident date:
03-02-2005type: Boeing 737-242
registration: EX-037
accident date:
03-02-2005type: Boeing 737-242
registration: N238TA
Aircraft history
04 JAN 1980 |
C-GNDR |
Nordair |
|
31 JAN 1981 |
N8536Z |
Wien Air Alaska |
leased
|
25 APR 1981 |
C-GNDR |
Nordair |
returned
|
02 JAN 1987 |
C-GNDR |
CP Air |
airline merged
|
26 APR 1987 |
C-GNDR |
Canadian Airlines International |
airline merged
|
25 JUL 1991 |
N238TA |
TACA International |
leased
|
01 DEC 1991 |
N238TA |
Aviateca |
sub leased
|
08 SEP 1992 |
N238TA |
TACA International |
returned
|
07 DEC 1992 |
N238TA |
LACSA |
transferred
|
20 AUG 1993 |
N238TA |
Ecuatoriana |
sub leased
|
|
N238TA |
TACA International |
returned
|
|
N238TA |
LACSA |
transferred
|
26 AUG 2004 |
EX-037 |
Phoenix Aviation |
|
26 OCT 2004 |
EX-037 |
Kam Air |
leased
|
Kaart
Deze kaart geeft het vliegveld van vetrek weer en de geplande bestemming van de vlucht. De lijn tussen de vliegvelden geeft
niet de exacte vliegroute weer.
De afstand tussen Herat Airport en Kabul Airport bedraagt 638 km (399 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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