Issued: 24-JAN-2006 | To: CASA | R20060002 |
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review and clarify the legal requirements concerning the qualifications for two-crew (pilot) operation during the conduct of instrument approaches in air transport operations. The review should assess the safety benefit arising from ensuring that when an instrument approach is conducted in an aircraft required to be operated by a two-person flight crew, both flight crew members are qualified to conduct the type of approach being carried out. |
Issued: 24-JAN-2006 | To: CASA | R20060003 |
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review the adequacy of current legislation and regulations: to assess the safety benefit that could be achieved from the fitment of a serviceable autopilot to all aircraft currently on the Australian civil aircraft register, engaged on scheduled air transport operations with a view to ensuring that all aircraft placed on the Australian civil aircraft register after a specified date and intended to be engaged on scheduled air transport operations are equipped with a serviceable autopilot. |
Issued: 10-FEB-2006 | To: CASA | R20060005 |
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority review the maintenance requirements for cockpit voice recording systems and flight data recording systems against international standards such as EUROCAE ED-112 and ICAO Annex 6 with the aim of improving their reliability and increasing the availability of data to investigators. (Closed - Partial Action) |
Issued: 10-FEB-2006 | To: | R20060006 |
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Department of Transport and Regional Services, with the assistance of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, pursues further the development of proposals to amend the provisions of Part IIIB of the Civil Aviation Act 1988. While recognising the need to have protections to prevent inappropriate disclosure and use of Cockpit Voice Recorder information, the proposals to amend the CA Act should take into account the need to enable approved maintenance organisations to replay in-flight Cockpit Voice Recorder data for legitimate maintenance and testing purposes. (Closed - Action Taken) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: CASA | R20070002 |
CASA did not provide sufficient guidance to its inspectors to enable them to effectively and consistently evaluate several key aspects of operator management systems. These aspects included evaluating organisational structure and staff resources, evaluating the suitability of key personnel, evaluating organisational change, and evaluating risk management processes.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority undertake further work to address this safety issue. (Closed - Action Taken) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: CASA | R20070003 |
CASA did not require operators to conduct structured and/or comprehensive risk assessments, or conduct such assessments itself, when evaluating applications for the initial issue or subsequent variation of an Air Operator\'s Certificate.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority undertake further work to address this safety issue. (Closed - Action Taken) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: CASA | R20070004 |
CASA did not have a systematic process for determining the relative risk levels of airline operators.
This issue was discussed in the analysis section of the draft report but was not listed as a safety issue. However, it has now been included as a safety issue following assessment of comments on the draft report.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority address this safety issue. (Closed - Partial Action) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: CASA | R20070005 |
CASA\'s process for accepting an instrument approach did not involve a systematic risk assessment of pilot workload and other potential hazards, including activation of a ground proximity warning system.
The ATSB recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority address this safety issue. (Closed - Action Taken) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: CASA | R20070006 |
CASA\'s guidance material provided to operators about the structure and content of an operations manual was not as comprehensive as that provided by ICAO in areas such as multi-crew procedures and stabilised approach criteria. The ATSB recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority address this safety issue. (Closed - Accepted) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: CASA | R20070007 |
There was no regulatory requirement for instrument approach charts to include coloured contours to depict terrain. This was required by a standard in ICAO Annex 4 in certain situations. Australia had not notified a difference to the standard.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority address this safety issue. (Closed - Action Taken) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: CASA | R20070008 |
Based on the available evidence, the Lockhart River Runway 12 RNAV (GNSS) approach design resulted in mode 2A ground proximity warning system alerts and warnings when flown on the recommended profile or at the segment minimum safe altitudes.
This safety issue was not listed in the draft report but was identified during assessment of comments on the draft report. CASA was formally advised of this safety issue on 20 March 2007.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority address this safety issue. (Closed - Action Taken) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: Jeppesen Sanderson | R20070009 |
Based on the available evidence, the Lockhart River Runway 12 RNAV (GNSS) approach design resulted in mode 2A ground proximity warning system alerts and warnings when flown on the recommended profile or at the segment minimum safe altitudes.
This safety issue was not listed in the draft report but was identified during assessment of comments on the draft report. CASA was formally advised of this safety issue on 20 March 2007.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority address this safety issue. (Closed - Partial Action) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: Jeppesen Sanderson | R20070010 |
Jeppesen instrument approach charts depicted coloured contours on the plan-view of approach charts based on the maximum height of terrain relative to the airfield only, rather than also considering terrain that increases the final approach or missed approach procedure gradient to be steeper than the optimum. Jeppesen instrument approach charts did not depict the terrain profile on the profile-view although the segment minimum safe altitudes were depicted.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that Jeppesen Sanderson Inc. address this safety issue. (Closed - Action Taken) |
Issued: 04-APR-2007 | To: Airservices Australia | R20070011 |
Airservices Australia\'s instrument approach charts did not depict the terrain contours on the plan-view. They also did not depict the terrain profile on the profile-view, although the segment minimum safe altitudes were depicted.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that Airservices Australia address this safety issue. (Closed - Action Taken) |