Issued: 25-AUG-2005 | To: NTSB | 2005–37 |
On 25 August 2005, the AAIASB recommended to the NTSB that the Boeing Company consider taking action to emphasize flight crew training and awareness in relation to (a) the importance of verifying the bleed and pack system configuration after takeoff and (b) the understanding and recognition of the differences between cabin altitude and takeoff configuration warnings. |
Issued: 25-AUG-2005 | To: NTSB | 2005–38 |
On 25 August 2005, the AAIASB recommended to the NTSB that the Boeing Company clarify the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) maintenance procedure for Cabin Pressure Leakage Test (05-51-91) to explicitly specify the actions necessary to complete the maintenance test. Currently, under the title of section F “Put the airplane back to its initial condition”, there were three action items but none of them referred for the pressure mode selector to be placed in the position AUTO. |
Issued: 13-SEP-2005 | To: NTSB | 2005–39 |
On 13 September 2005, the AAIASB recommended to the NTSB that the Boeing Company consider revising the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 05-51-91 by adding an additional step associated with section F (“Put the airplane back to its initial condition”): to re-install the oxygen mask regulators (if removed) per AMM 35-12-00. |
Issued: 20-OCT-2005 | To: Cyprus Air Accident and Incident Investigation Board | 2005–40 |
On 20 October 2005, the AAIASB recommended to the Cyprus Air Accident and Incident Investigation Board that all airlines under the jurisdiction of the Cyprus DCA standardize cabin crew procedures for access to the flight deck and use of the cockpit door, and include relevant training in the Operations Manual. |
Issued: 23-DEC-2005 | To: NTSB | 2005–41 |
On 23 December 2005, the AAIASB recommended to the NTSB that the Boeing Company consider enhancing the design of the Preflight checklist to better distinguish between items referring to the air conditioning and the pressurization systems of the aircraft and to include an explicit line item instructing flight crews to set the pressurization mode selector to AUTO. |
Issued: 23-DEC-2005 | To: NTSB | 2005–42 |
On 23 December 2005, the AAIASB recommended to the NTSB that the Boeing Company reconsider the design of the Cabin Pressure Control System controls and indicators so as to better attract and retain the flight crewÂ’s attention when the pressurization mode selector position is in the MAN (manual) position. |
Issued: 02-MAY-2006 | To: Hellenic ACC | 2005–43 |
On 2 May 2006, the AAIASB recommended to the Hellenic ACC that it consider the need for adding an indication on the label attached to the target of a flight on the radar scope, to draw a controller’s attention when radio communication has not been achieved, and that it establish procedures to specify a time limit within which a controller should take the initiative to contact a flight that omitted to report its position when it crossed a compulsory reporting point (FIR boundaries, etc.). ICAO procedures (Doc 4444) stated that action should be taken if a report from an aircraft is not received within a “reasonable period of time”, and it is left to regional air navigation agreements to prescribe a specified time interval. |
Issued: 22-JUN-2006 | To: Boeing Model 737 Airplanes | AD 2006-13-13 |
AFM update, adding \'\'For normal operations, the pressurization mode selector should be in AUTO prior to takeoff" |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: EASA/JAA | 2006–41 |
EASA/JAA require all airlines to amend cabin crew procedures, so that, when the oxygen masks deploy in the cabin due to loss of cabin pressure or insufficient cabin pressure and if the aircraft does not suspend climb, or level-off or start a descent,, the Cabin Chief (or the cabin crew member situated closest to the flight deck) be required to immediately notify the flight crew of the oxygen masks deployment and to confirm that the flight crew have donned their oxygen masks. |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: EASA/JAA | 2006–42 |
EASA/JAA require aircraft manufacturers to install in newly manufactured aircraft, and on a retrofit basis in older aircraft, in addition to the existing cabin altitude warning horn, a visual and/or an oral alert warning when the cabin altitude exceeds 10 000 ft. |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: EASA/JAA | 2006–43 |
EASA/JAA require practical hypoxia training as a mandatory part of flight crew and cabin crew training. This training should include the use of recently developed hypoxia training tools that reduce the amount of oxygen a trainee receives while wearing a mask and performing tasks. |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: EASA/JAA and ICAO | 2006–45 |
EASA/JAA and ICAO require aircraft manufacturers to evaluate the feasibility of installation of a CVR that records the entire flight. |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: EASA/JAA and ICAO | 2006–46 |
EASA/JAA and ICAO require all company communications with the aircraft (operations office, technical base/stations, and airport stations) to be recorded. |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: EASA/JAA and ICAO | 2006–47 |
EASA/JAA and ICAO require the aircraft manufacturers to also record cabin altitude on the FDR. |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: EASA/JAA and ICAO | 2006–48 |
EASA/JAA and ICAO study the feasibility of requiring the installation of crash protected image recorders on the flight deck of commercial aircraft. |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: EASA/JAA and ICAO | 2006–49 |
EASA/JAA and ICAO implement a means to record international safety audits of the StatesÂ’ Civil Aviation Authorities, which ensures that the findings can be tracked in depth, action plans are developed and implemented in shortest possible time; and impose the necessary pressure when they become aware that international obligations and standards are not being met by the Authorities. |
Issued: 04-OCT-2006 | To: Republic of Cyprus | 2006–50 |
The Republic of Cyprus should support by all necessary resources the already under-reorganization Cyprus DCA so that it may be better equipped to carry out the governmental aviation safety oversight functions and to meet its international obligations in the shortest possible time. |
Issued: 10-NOV-2008 | To: Boeing Model 737 Airplanes | AD 2008-23-07 |
AFM update regarding Cabin altitude warning takeoff briefing |