Narrative:
The Ilyushin Il-62M was operated on a ferry flight from Tripoli, Libya to Moscow, Russia for overhaul.
During the approach to runway 32R at Domodedovo Airport the airspeed was higher than recommended. The aircraft crossed the threshold at an altitude of 12 m and a speed of 304 km/h. During the flare, at an altitude of about 5 meters, the captain instructed the flight engineer to bring back the thrust levers to idle. The flight engineer confirmed selected all four engines to idle. The captain subsequently called for the thrust reversers to be deployed but the flight engineer did not confirm this instruction but asked again: "Turn on the reverse?".
The reverser buckets were then deployed, but the engines were not brought to the maximum reverse thrust. It is possible that at this moment the flight engineer was distracted.
The aircraft floated at an altitude of 1-0.5 m over the runway. As a result, the landing of the aircraft occurred at a distance of 1100 m from the threshold end of the runway at a speed of 258 km/h.
Before landing, the captain again instructed to turn on the reverse of the engines. A misunderstanding between the captain and flight engineer and subsequent actions by the flight engineer caused the two engines to be operated at full power with reversers stowed. The aircraft overran the end of the runway of runway 32R and continued for 680 meters before it collided with a slope of the ravine.
The accident occurred as a result of erroneous actions by the flight engineer during operations to turn on the engine reverse when landing the plane, expressed in shifting the reverse buckets to direct thrust and putting the 1st and 4th engines to take-off mode after landing.
The Commission concluded that the flight engineers erroneous actions were facilitated by:
- a low level of technological discipline in the crew due to the weak role of the captain as a leader in the crew, which was manifested in the crew members not fully fulfilling the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew members of the IL-62M aircraft" and Aircraft Flight Manual during descent, approach and landing;
- emotional relaxation of the crew at the end of a business trip and return to base;
- lack of effective control, including according to the data of flight recorders over flight operations with LIBAVIA;
- in the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew of the IL-62M aircraft" there are no control functions on the part of other crew members for the actions of the flight engineer at the stage of aircraft landing and the status of the reverse on/off alarm;
- the absence in the training programs of the simulator of exercises for practicing the actions of crew members in case of erroneous actions by the flight engineer when the reverse is turned on;
- lack of equipment for the flight engineers workplace with a radio headset, lack of procedures in the "Instructions for Interaction and the Work Technology of the Crew Members of the Il-62M Aircraft" for the use of a radio headset for flight personnel in flights with a reduced crew;
- excessive volume of the SSU speakers broadcasting external radio communications, which created additional difficulties when listening to the commands given by the captain;
- fuzziness (illegibility) of the commands given by the PIC and the lack of response of the PIC to the non-confirmation of the commands given by him to the flight engineer.
Runway mishap
» Russian Ministry of Transport
UUDD 291630Z 17002MPS 2400 -RA BR BKN004 OVC100 03/02 Q1002 TEMPO 0500 FG =
17:00 UTC / 21:00 local time:
UUDD 291700Z 19002MPS 160V230 1800 -RA BR BKN004 OVC10003/02 Q1002 EMPO 0500 FG =
accident date: 29-03-2006
type: Ilyushin Il-62M
registration: 5A-DKR
| Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | Wednesday 29 March 2006 |
| Time: | 20:51 |
| Type: |  Ilyushin Il-62M |
| Operated by: | Libavia |
| On behalf of: | Libyan Government |
| Registration: | 5A-DKR |
| MSN: | 4053514 |
| First flight: | 1990 |
| Engines: | 4 Soloviev D-30KU |
| Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6 |
| Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0 |
| Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6 |
| Aircraft damage: | Damaged beyond repair |
| Location: | Moskva-Domodedovo Airport (DME) ( Russia)
|
| Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
| Nature: | Ferry/positioning |
| Departure airport: | Tripoli-Mitiga International Airport (MJI/HLLM), Libya |
| Moskva-Domodedovo Airport (DME/UUDD), Russia |
The Ilyushin Il-62M was operated on a ferry flight from Tripoli, Libya to Moscow, Russia for overhaul.
During the approach to runway 32R at Domodedovo Airport the airspeed was higher than recommended. The aircraft crossed the threshold at an altitude of 12 m and a speed of 304 km/h. During the flare, at an altitude of about 5 meters, the captain instructed the flight engineer to bring back the thrust levers to idle. The flight engineer confirmed selected all four engines to idle. The captain subsequently called for the thrust reversers to be deployed but the flight engineer did not confirm this instruction but asked again: "Turn on the reverse?".
The reverser buckets were then deployed, but the engines were not brought to the maximum reverse thrust. It is possible that at this moment the flight engineer was distracted.
The aircraft floated at an altitude of 1-0.5 m over the runway. As a result, the landing of the aircraft occurred at a distance of 1100 m from the threshold end of the runway at a speed of 258 km/h.
Before landing, the captain again instructed to turn on the reverse of the engines. A misunderstanding between the captain and flight engineer and subsequent actions by the flight engineer caused the two engines to be operated at full power with reversers stowed. The aircraft overran the end of the runway of runway 32R and continued for 680 meters before it collided with a slope of the ravine.
Probable Cause:
The accident occurred as a result of erroneous actions by the flight engineer during operations to turn on the engine reverse when landing the plane, expressed in shifting the reverse buckets to direct thrust and putting the 1st and 4th engines to take-off mode after landing.
The Commission concluded that the flight engineers erroneous actions were facilitated by:
- a low level of technological discipline in the crew due to the weak role of the captain as a leader in the crew, which was manifested in the crew members not fully fulfilling the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew members of the IL-62M aircraft" and Aircraft Flight Manual during descent, approach and landing;
- emotional relaxation of the crew at the end of a business trip and return to base;
- lack of effective control, including according to the data of flight recorders over flight operations with LIBAVIA;
- in the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew of the IL-62M aircraft" there are no control functions on the part of other crew members for the actions of the flight engineer at the stage of aircraft landing and the status of the reverse on/off alarm;
- the absence in the training programs of the simulator of exercises for practicing the actions of crew members in case of erroneous actions by the flight engineer when the reverse is turned on;
- lack of equipment for the flight engineers workplace with a radio headset, lack of procedures in the "Instructions for Interaction and the Work Technology of the Crew Members of the Il-62M Aircraft" for the use of a radio headset for flight personnel in flights with a reduced crew;
- excessive volume of the SSU speakers broadcasting external radio communications, which created additional difficulties when listening to the commands given by the captain;
- fuzziness (illegibility) of the commands given by the PIC and the lack of response of the PIC to the non-confirmation of the commands given by him to the flight engineer.
Classification:
Language/communication problemsRunway mishap
Sources:
» MAK Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC)» Russian Ministry of Transport
METAR Weather report:
16:30 UTC / 20:30 local time:UUDD 291630Z 17002MPS 2400 -RA BR BKN004 OVC100 03/02 Q1002 TEMPO 0500 FG =
17:00 UTC / 21:00 local time:
UUDD 291700Z 19002MPS 160V230 1800 -RA BR BKN004 OVC10003/02 Q1002 EMPO 0500 FG =
Photos
accident date: 29-03-2006
type: Ilyushin Il-62M
registration: 5A-DKR
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Tripoli-Mitiga International Airport to Moskva-Domodedovo Airport as the crow flies is 3127 km (1955 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
Distance from Tripoli-Mitiga International Airport to Moskva-Domodedovo Airport as the crow flies is 3127 km (1955 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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