Estado: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Fecha: | martes 10 octubre 2006 |
Hora: | 07:32 |
Tipo: | British Aerospace BAe-146-200A |
Operador: | Atlantic Airways |
Registración: | OY-CRG |
Numéro de série: | E2075 |
Año de Construcción: | 1987-06-23 (19 years 4 months) |
Horas Totales de la Célula: | 39828 |
Ciclos: | 21726 |
Motores: | 4 Lycoming ALF502R-5 |
Tripulación: | Fatalidades: 1 / Ocupantes: 4 |
Pasajeros: | Fatalidades: 3 / Ocupantes: 12 |
Total: | Fatalidades: 4 / Ocupantes: 16 |
Daños en la Aeronave: | Destruido |
Consecuencias: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Ubicación: | Stord-Sørstokken Airport (SRP) ( Noruega)
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Elevación del lugar del accidente: | 49 m (161 feet) amsl |
Fase: | Aterrizaje (LDG) |
Naturaleza: | Vuelo Doméstico No Programado |
Aeropuerto de Salida: | Stavanger-Sola Airport (SVG/ENZV), Noruega |
Aeropuerto de Llegada: | Stord-Sørstokken Airport (SRP/ENSO), Noruega |
Número de Vuelo: | RC670 |
Descripción:Atlantic Airways Flight RC670 was chartered by the Norwegian industrial concern Aker Kværner to fly personnel from Stavanger (SVG) to Molde (MOL) via Stord (SRP). The airplane departed Stavanger at 07:17 and positioned for an approach to runway 33 at Stord around 07:30.
Before OY-CRG started its approach, the airport performed a routine runway inspection. The runway report did not contain information with regard to whether the runway was dry, damp or wet. Because the crew were not informed otherwise, they assumed that the runway was dry. However, investigations by the AIBN have revealed that the runway was in fact damp.
A corresponding aircraft had performed a normal landing towards the south (runway 15) 15 minutes earlier. The crew of OY-CRG were given a wind reading of 120° at 6 knots. They had visual contact with the airport at an early stage and decided to carry out a visual approach northwards (runway 33).
Upon landing the pilots noted that the aircraft's lift spoilers did not deploy. The indicator lights that normally light up after 3 seconds did not do so. The pilots immediately called "No spoilers". Thereafter the pilots experienced that the maximum application of the brakes did not lead to the expected deceleration. The alternative braking system was brought into use and then finally the emergency brakes, without this making any difference.
The emergency brakes do not have anti-skid protection and the wheels locked, so that in combination with the damp runway reverted rubber hydroplaning occurred. Consequently the friction against the runway was significantly reduced.
The commander had a certain directional control of the aircraft and wanted to avoid leaving the runway at places where he knew that the terrain was particularly unfavourable. The aircraft left the runway end to the north at a relatively low speed of 15-20 knots. It continued down a steep slope and the aircraft sustained significant damage as it crashed into lighting poles, trees and large rocks.
When the aircraft came to rest, it was not possible to stop the left inner engine (no. 2) due to the damage. It continued to operate at a high rpm for several minutes. The forward left emergency exit could not be opened due to damage to the fuselage that had jammed the door. The forward right emergency exit was blocked by the terrain outside. The commander made several attempts to open and release the cockpit door without success. The cabin roof had sustained a large rift which resulted in fuel from the wings entering the cabin. A fire on the aircrafts right side spread into the cabin and over to the aircrafts left side. Three passengers and the forward cabin crew member were killed. The remaining nine passengers and the rear cabin crew member managed to evacuate the aircraft from the aircrafts rear left emergency exit by jumping to the ground and passing the engine that was still running. Six people sustained serious burns.
According to the manufacturers approved documentation, it is to be expected that the landing distance would increase by 40% if all lift spoilers were inoperative. The AIBN has calculated that under the prevailing conditions OY-CRG should have stopped around 100 metres before the end of the runway. The aircrafts undercarriage has been thoroughly examined by the AIBN. A number of fragments of "boiled" rubber were found on the runway. Further, a tyre showed clear indications of so-called "rubber reversal" which occurs when a cushion of steam forms and the rubber is "boiled" under the tyres.
Probable Cause:
The investigation report did not contain a probable cause paragraph as recommended in ICAO Annex 13.
It was amongst others concluded that none of the aircraft's six lift spoilers were deployed when the commander operated the spoiler lever. The AIBN has found two possible explanations for the spoilers not being deployed: 1. A mechanical fault in the spoiler lever mechanism. 2. Faults in two of the four thrust lever micro switches. A fault in one switch may have been hidden right up until a further switch failed. The AIBN reports that the runway at Stord was not grooved and it believes that reverted rubber hydroplaning will not occur, or will be significantly reduced, on grooved runways.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | AIBN (Norway) |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 5 years and 7 months | Accident number: | SL 2012/04 | Download report: | Final report
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Fuentes:
»
SKYbrary » Atlantic Airways press release
» CAA Norway press release
» Plane overshoots runway, bursts into flames (Aftenposten, 10-10-2006)
» Tre savnet - 13 funnet i live (VG Nett, 10-10-2006)
» Undersøkelse av luftfartsulykke på Stord lufthavn Sørstokken 10. oktober med Atlantic Airways BAe 146-200, OY-CRG (Statens havarikommisjon for transport 17-10-2006)
Subsiguiente / acciones de seguridad
AIBN issued 2 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 18-APR-2012 | To: CAA Norway | Safety recommendation SL no. 2012/02T |
Deviation from BSL E 3-2 and ICAO Annex 14 SARPS in relation to the airport\'s safety area and adjacent terrain contributed to a significant extent to the severity of the accident and complicated the fire and rescue work. CAA Norway renewed the airport\'s technical and operational approval from June 2006 subject to a requirement for improvement of the safety area by October 2008. No compensatory measures were required during the dispensation period prior to the improvements being made. The AIBN recommends that CAA Norway, in its system for technical and operational approval of airports, revise its practice for handling nonconformities with a view to establishing requirements for risk compensation. |
Issued: 18-APR-2012 | To: EASA | Safety recommendation SL no. 2012/03T |
The flight crew got information that both lift spoiler systems had failed, and taught that in addition the brake system had failed. For that reason they changed to emergency brakes which did not have any anti-skid protection. The AIBN generally considers that excursions could be prevented by a better understanding of the system influence to each other related to failures of the lift spoilers and the effect that it has on the aircrafts stopping distance. The AIBN recommends that EASA in cooperation with BAE Systems makes operators of the BAe 146 aware of the problem associated with inoperative lift spoilers. This should be included in both theoretical and practical training. |
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Fotos
accident date:
10-10-2006type: BAe-146-200A
registration: OY-CRG
accident date:
10-10-2006type: BAe-146-200A
registration: OY-CRG
accident date:
10-10-2006type: BAe-146-200A
registration: OY-CRG
OY-CRG
OY-CRG
accident date:
10-10-2006type: BAe-146-200A
registration: OY-CRG
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Stavanger-Sola Airport to Stord-Sørstokken Airport as the crow flies is 102 km (64 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.