Narrative:The CRJ-100SE, a corporate version of the RegionalJet, was conducting a maintenance positioning flight from Moscow's Vnukovo Airport to Berlin-Schönefeld Airport (SXF), Germany.
At 14:30 hours the aircraft was rolled out of a heated hangar and towed to the apron of the Vnukovo-3 business terminal.
At 15:57 the crew radioed a request to start the engines. This was allowed by ATC and the crew read back: "CK, start up approved and we will be ready in 10 to 15 minutes for taxi and take off due to deicing procedure".
At 16:01 the aircraft was towed to the anti-icing platform, where, at the request of the captain, it was processed in two stages by type I and type IV fluids. At 16:18 after the anti-icing treatment of the aircraft was completed, it was towed to the beginning of taxiway 14, where the engines were started. After working the necessary checklists the flight was cleared to taxi to runway 06 for departure. At 16:36 the flight was cleared for takeoff.
The airplane lifted off runway 06 about 1,500 meters from the threshold, and immediately banked sharply to the left. It then banked sharply to the right, hitting the runway with the right wingtip. The airplane continued to roll to the right until it was inverted, and veered off the right side of the runway. It came to rest 1,950 meters from the runway threshold, about 35 meters to the right of the runway's edge.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE (translated from Russian):
The accident with the aircraft CRJ100-SE registration number N168CK occurred as a result of loss of the lifting properties of the wing during the take-off phase, which led to the stalling of the aircraft immediately after detachment from the runway, collision of the right wing tip with the surface of the runway, subsequent destruction and fire.
The reason for the loss of the bearing properties of the wing under the actual meteorological conditions (moderate to strong rainfall, temperature minus 6°C, dew point minus 7°C) was the effect of ground icing, despite the anti-icing treatment that could be caused by a combination of the following factors:
- deficiencies in the guidance documents defining the procedure for de-icing aircraft in a two-stage procedure, which resulted in the possibility of a different interpretation of the requirements for the start of a 3-minute interval between the first and second stages of processing;
- non-receipt by the crew of meteorological documentation in full in preparation for the flight and, as a consequence, inability to correctly determine the protective action time of the LOA and failure to take measures to re-process the aircraft;
- violation of the airway route recommended by the AFM, and non-retention of the recommended 3-minute interval between the first and second stages of treatment;
- lack of proper control by crew members and / or airline representatives for the completeness and quality of anti-icing treatment;
- non-inclusion by the crew of the PIC wing before take-off, which is a mandatory requirement of the AFM for the actual weather conditions.
The protuberance of the sealant on the upper and lower surfaces of the wing by an amount significantly exceeding the limitation of the current technical conditions, as well as the beginning of the nose wheel lift of the aircraft at a speed of 12 knots less than the recommended one, reduced the margin for the stall angle of attack.
The existing procedural method for monitoring the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the inefficiency at the take-off stage of the existing stall protection system, because of the increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of such incidents in the future.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | MAK Russia  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 5 months | Accident number: | Final report | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Icing
Loss of control
Sources:
» NTSB id NYC07RA064
METAR Weather report:
13:36 UTC / 16:36 local time:
UUWW 131330Z 13005MPS 1000 R06/1000N SHSN VV003 M06/M07 Q1009 TEMPO 0700 +SHSN RMK 06511040 QBB100=wind 130 degrees at 10 kts, visibility 1000 m in snow showers with a 300 ft.vertical visibility, Temperature -6°C, Dewpoint -7°C,QNH 1009 hPa
Follow-up / safety actions
Transport Canada issued 4 Airworthiness Directives
Issued: 10-MAR-2008 | To: CL-600-2B19 | CF-2008-15 |
The original issue of this directive mandated the introduction of additional limitations and procedures to the AFM and required that any operators Pilots Checklist fully reflects these procedures. In order not to compromise the takeoff operational safety margin, strict adherence to all the AFM procedures and limitations was required. |
Issued: 10-MAR-2008 | To: CL-600 | CF-2008-16 |
Mandates the introduction of additional limitations and procedures to the AFM and requires that any operators Pilot\'s Checklist fully reflects these procedures. In order not to compromise the takeoff operational safety margin, strict adherence to all the AFM procedures and limitations is required. |
Issued: 03-SEP-2008 | To: CL-600-2B19 | CF-2008-15R1 |
Revision 1 of this directive mandates the amendment of the AFM by inserting Temporary revision (TR) RJ/155-5 which, in addition to retaining the limitations and procedures introduced to the AFM Limitations Section through AFM TR RJ/155-2, now also requires specific pilot training on or before 1 November 2008 with regard to enhanced take-off procedures and winter operations. |
Issued: 03-SEP-2008 | To: CL-600 | CF-2008-16R1 |
Mandates the amendment of the AFM Limitations Section which, in addition to retaining the limitations and procedures introduced at previous AFM temporary revisions, now also requires specific pilot training on or before 1 November 2008 with regard to enhanced take-off procedures and winter operations. |
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Photos

accident date:
13-02-2007type: Canadair Challenger 850
registration: N168CK

accident date:
13-02-2007type: Canadair Challenger 850
registration: N168CK
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Moskva-Vnukovo Airport to Berlin-Schönefeld Airport as the crow flies is 1572 km (983 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.