Narrative:Flight 6448 departed Atlanta (ATL) at 13:31. The first officer was flying the airplane. The captain reported they were cleared for the ILS runway 24R approach. Approximately 10 minutes prior to landing, air traffic control changed the landing runway to runway 28. The captain stated they were informed that the runway visual range (RVR) was 6,000 feet and that the braking action was fair. Also, the glideslope for the ILS runway 28 approach was unusable at the time of the accident due to the snow. After passing the final approach fix, they were informed that the RVR had decreased to 2,000 feet. The captain had the approach lights in sight and at 50 feet above the ground, he had the runway in sight. The first officer then turned off the autopilot to land. At 30 feet above the ground the captain momentarily lost sight of the runway. He then regained sight of the runway and the airplane was landed. They encountered strong gusty winds during the landing flare and after touchdown they could barely see the runway lights and taxiway turn-offs. Despite the use of full reverse and braking, the airplane did not seem to slow down. The airplane traveled off the runway and into the snow covered grass and went partially through the fence before coming to a stop more than 150 feet past the end of the runway. Runway 28 is 6017 feet long.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable. Contributing to the accident were (1) the crews decision to descend to the instrument landing system decision height instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude; (2) the first officers long landing on a short contaminated runway and the crews failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness; (3) the captains fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing; and (4) Shuttle Americas failure to administer an attendance policy that permitted flight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 2 months | Accident number: | NTSB AAR-08-01 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Insufficient rest / fatigue
Runway excursion
Sources:
»
SKYbrary » NTSB/AAR-08/01
METAR Weather report:
20:17 UTC / 15:17 local time:
KCLE 182017Z 33013G19KT 1/4SM +SN BKN003 BKN010 OVC015 M08/M11 A3003 RMK AO2 P000020:33 UTC / 15:33 local time:
KCLE 182033Z 32013KT 1 1/2SM -SN SCT003 BKN011 OVC028 M08/M11 A3004 RMK AO2 P0000
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 5 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 15-APR-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-16 |
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, (1) decision-making for rejected landings below 50 feet along with a rapid reduction in visual cues and (2) practice in executing this maneuver. (Open Acceptable Alternate Response) |
Issued: 15-APR-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-17 |
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, practice for pilots in accomplishing maximum performance landings on contaminated runways. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 15-APR-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-18 |
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to have a written policy emphasizing that either pilot can make a go-around callout and that the response to the callout is an immediate missed approach. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 15-APR-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-19 |
In cooperation with pilot unions, the Regional Airline Association, and the Air Transport Association, develop a specific, standardized policy for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators that would allow flight crewmembers to decline assignments or remove themselves from duty if they were impaired by a lack of sleep. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 15-APR-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-20 |
Once the fatigue policy described in Safety Recommendation A-08-19 has been developed, require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to adopt this policy and provide, in writing, details of the policy to their flight crewmembers, including the administrative implications of fatigue calls. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
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Photos

accident date:
18-02-2007type: Embraer ERJ-170-100SE
registration: N862RW

accident date:
18-02-2007type: Embraer ERJ-170-100SE
registration: N862RW

accident date:
18-02-2007type: Embraer ER-J170-100SE
registration: N862RW

accident date:
18-02-2007type: Embraer ERJ-170SE
registration: N862RW

accident date:
18-02-2007type: Embraer ERJ-170SE
registration: N862RW
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, GA to Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport, OH as the crow flies is 888 km (555 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.