Crash-aerien 18 FEB 2007 d'un Embraer ERJ 170-100 SE (ERJ-170SE) N862RW - Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport, OH (CLE)

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Accident

Last updated: 22 May 2013

Statuts:	Enquête Officielle
Date:	18 FEV 2007
Heure:	15:06
Type/Sous-type:	Embraer ERJ 170-100 SE (ERJ-170SE)
Compagnie:	Shuttle America / Delta Connection
Immatriculation:	N862RW
Numéro de série:	17000098
Année de Fabrication:	2005
Moteurs:	2 General Electric CF34-8E
Equipage:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 4
Passagers:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 71
Total:	victimes: 0 / à bord: 75
Dégats de l'appareil:	Substantiels
Conséquences:	Repaired
Lieu de l'accident:	Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport, OH (CLE) (Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
Phase de vol:	A l'atterrissage (LDG)
Nature:	Transport de Passagers Nat.
Aéroport de départ:	Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, GA (ATL/KATL), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Aéroport de destination:	Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport, OH (CLE/KCLE), Etats-Unis d'Amérique
Numéro de vol:	6448

Détails:
Flight 6448 departed Atlanta (ATL) at 13:31. The first officer was flying the airplane. The captain reported they were cleared for the ILS runway 24R approach. Approximately 10 minutes prior to landing, air traffic control changed the landing runway to runway 28. The captain stated they were informed that the runway visual range (RVR) was 6,000 feet and that the braking action was fair. Also, the glideslope for the ILS runway 28 approach was unusable at the time of the accident due to the snow. After passing the final approach fix, they were informed that the RVR had decreased to 2,000 feet. The captain had the approach lights in sight and at 50 feet above the ground, he had the runway in sight. The first officer then turned off the autopilot to land. At 30 feet above the ground the captain momentarily lost sight of the runway. He then regained sight of the runway and the airplane was landed. They encountered strong gusty winds during the landing flare and after touchdown they could barely see the runway lights and taxiway turn-offs. Despite the use of full reverse and braking, the airplane did not seem to slow down. The airplane traveled off the runway and into the snow covered grass and went partially through the fence before coming to a stop more than 150 feet past the end of the runway. Runway 28 is 6017 feet long. Weather around the time of the accident was:
KCLE 182017Z 33013G19KT 1/4SM +SN BKN003 BKN010 OVC015 M08/M11 A3003 RMK AO2 P0000
KCLE 182033Z 32013KT 1 1/2SM -SN SCT003 BKN011 OVC028 M08/M11 A3004 RMK AO2 P0000

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flight crew to execute a missed approach when visual cues for the runway were not distinct and identifiable. Contributing to the accident were (1) the crew’s decision to descend to the instrument landing system decision height instead of the localizer (glideslope out) minimum descent altitude; (2) the first officer’s long landing on a short contaminated runway and the crew’s failure to use reverse thrust and braking to their maximum effectiveness; (3) the captain’s fatigue, which affected his ability to effectively plan for and monitor the approach and landing; and (4) Shuttle America’s failure to administer an attendance policy that permitted flight crewmembers to call in as fatigued without fear of reprisals."

Sources:
» NTSB/AAR-08/01

Official accident investigation report

investigating agency:	National Transport Safety Bureau (NTSB) - USA
report status:	Final
report number:	NTSB AAR-08-01
report released:	15-APR-2008
duration of investigation:	422 days (1 year 1.9 months)
download report:	Runway Overrun During Landing Shuttle America, Inc. Doing Business as Delta Connection Flight 6448 Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW Cleveland, Ohio February 18, 2007 (NTSB AAR-08-01)

Opérations de secours

NTSB issued 10 Safety Recommendations

Issued: --	To: FAA	NTSB Safety Recommendation A-08-16
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, (1) decision-making for rejected landings below 50 feet along with a rapid reduction in visual cues and (2) practice in executing this maneuver.
Issued: --	To: FAA	NTSB Safety Recommendation A-08-17
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, practice for pilots in accomplishing maximum performance landings on contaminated runways.
Issued: --	To: FAA	NTSB Safety Recommendation A-08-18
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to have a written policy emphasizing that either pilot can make a go-around callout and that the response to the callout is an immediate missed approach.
Issued: --	To: FAA	NTSB Safety Recommendation A-08-19
In cooperation with pilot unions, the Regional Airline Association, and the Air Transport Association, develop a specific, standardized policy for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators that would allow flight crewmembers to decline assignments or remove themselves from duty if they were impaired by a lack of sleep.
Issued: --	To: FAA	NTSB Safety Recommendation A-08-20
Once the fatigue policy described in Safety Recommendation A-08-19 has been developed, require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to adopt this policy and provide, in writing, details of the policy to their flight crewmembers, including the administrative implications of fatigue calls.
Issued: 15-APR-2008	To: FAA	A-08-016
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, (1) decision-making for rejected landings below 50 feet along with a rapid reduction in visual cues and (2) practice in executing this maneuver. (Open Acceptable Alternate Response)
Issued: 15-APR-2008	To: FAA	A-08-017
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to include, in their initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent simulator training for turbojet airplanes, practice for pilots in accomplishing maximum performance landings on contaminated runways. (Open Acceptable Alternate Response)
Issued: 15-APR-2008	To: FAA	A-08-018
Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to have a written policy emphasizing that either pilot can make a go-around callout and that the response to the callout is an immediate missed approach. (Open - Acceptable Response)
Issued: 15-APR-2008	To: FAA	A-08-019
In cooperation with pilot unions, the Regional Airline Association, and the Air Transport Association, develop a specific, standardized policy for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators that would allow flight crewmembers to decline assignments or remove themselves from duty if they were impaired by a lack of sleep. (Open - Acceptable Response)
Issued: 15-APR-2008	To: FAA	A-08-020
Once the fatigue policy described in Safety Recommendation A-08-19 has been developed, require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and Part 91 subpart K operators to adopt this policy and provide, in writing, details of the policy to their flight crewmembers, including the administrative implications of fatigue calls. (Open - Acceptable Response)

Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations

Photos

Photo taken shortly after the overrun; the passengers and crew are still on board the aircraft.

Plan

Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposé destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, GA et Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport, OH est de 888 km (555 miles).

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