Narrative:Flight 4712 departed Minneapolis (MSP) at 21:44. The flight was cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 28 by Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center. Weather was reported as snowing. Automatic weather observation data indicated at 00:30, the visibility was one-half mile in
snow, with indefinite ceiling and vertical visibility of 200 feet. Snow removal operations were in progress at the airport, and the flight crew communicated directly with airport operations regarding the runway conditions. After landing, the airplane overran the departure end of runway 28, which is 6,501 feet long, with an additional 200 feet of pavement. Initial examination indicates that the airplane exited the paved surface onto a grassy snow-covered field, the nose gear separated from the fuselage, and the airplane came to rest about 100 feet beyond the pavement. The passengers and crew exited the airplane via
the main cabin door.
Weather reported shortly after the accident (00:53, 04:53 UTC) was: KTVC 120453Z 02008KT 1/4SM SN VV002 00/M01 A2951 RMK AO2 SLP000 P0008 T00001006 400221022= [Wind 020 degrees at 8 kts, visibility 1/4 miles, snow, vertical visibility 200ft, temperature 0C dewpoint -1C, QNH 29.51in]
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilots decision to land at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse City, Michigan, without performing a required landing distance assessment based on runway contamination initially reported by TVC ground operations personnel and continuing reports of deteriorating weather and runway conditions throughout the approach. This poor decision-making likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day; and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions. Contributing to the accident were 1) the Federal Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time regulations that permitted the pilots long, demanding duty day and 2) the TVC operations supervisors use of ambiguous and unspecific radio phraseology in providing runway braking information."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 2 months | Accident number: | NTSB AAR-08-02 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Insufficient rest / fatigue
Runway excursion
Sources:
»
SKYbrary » NTSB press release April 24, 2007
» Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712 (Pinnacle Airlines news release 12-4-2007)
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 10-DEC-2001 | To: FAA | A-01-66 |
Evaluate crash detection and location technologies, select the most promising candidate(s) for ensuring that emergency responders could expeditiously arrive at an accident scene, and implement a requirement to install and use the equipment. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 07-FEB-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-10 |
Modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of-service regulations to take into consideration factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, and other factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current industry experience to affect crew alertness. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 04-OCT-2007 | To: FAA | A-07-57 |
Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
Issued: 17-JUN-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-40 |
Emphasize with principal operations inspectors the importance of conducting timely postaccident drug and alcohol testing. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 17-JUN-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-41 |
As part of the Takeoff/Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee, address the need for initial training on the rationale for and criticality of conducting landing distance assessments before landing on contaminated runways. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 17-JUN-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-42 |
Issue a CertAlert to all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airports that describes the circumstances of this accident, emphasizes the importance of specific and decisive radio communications, and urges airports to ensure that those criteria are being met in all airfield radio communications. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 17-JUN-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-43 |
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airport operators to include in their airports snow and ice control plan absolute criteria for type and depth of contamination and runway friction assessments that, when met, would trigger immediate closure of the affected runway to air carrier operations. Friction assessments should be based on pilot braking action reports, values obtained from ground friction measuring equipment, or estimates provided by airport ground personnel. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos

accident date:
12-04-2007type: Canadair CRJ-200LR
registration: N8905F
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, MN to Traverse City-Cherry Capital Airport, MI as the crow flies is 598 km (374 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.